Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Orestis Telelis
dblp:26/3762
· DBLP profile ↗
28ranked-venue papers
3as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
0000-0002-8236-7353ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Theory of computation · 15 · 2 first-authorArtificial intelligence and machine learning · 6 · 1 first-authorApplied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 5Computer networks · 4Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 4 · 2 first-author · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2Systems, architecture and hardware · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
3 papers |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% | |
| Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper |
Query processing and optimization · 75% Distributed and cloud data management · 25% | |
| Human-computer interaction and pervasive computing
1 paper |
Ubiquitous computing and smart environments · 100% | |
| Computer networks
2 papers |
Internet of things and sensor networks · 92% Content delivery and video streaming · 8% |
Topics — the 17 heaviest of 19, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Distributed and cloud data management › mapreduce
mapreduce query processing |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Parallel and Distributed Processing of Reverse Top-k Queries · ICDE 2019 |
Query processing and optimization
parallel query processing |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Parallel and Distributed Processing of Reverse Top-k Queries · ICDE 2019 |
Query processing and optimization › top-k query processing
reverse top-k query |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Parallel and Distributed Processing of Reverse Top-k Queries · ICDE 2019 |
Query processing and optimization
top-k query processing |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Parallel and Distributed Processing of Reverse Top-k Queries · ICDE 2019 |
Ubiquitous computing and smart environments › mobile crowdsourcing › crowdsensing
mobile crowdsensing |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | User recruitment for mobile crowdsensing over opportunistic networks · INFOCOM 2015 |
Ubiquitous computing and smart environments › mobile crowdsourcing › crowdsensing › mobile crowdsensing
user recruitment |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | User recruitment for mobile crowdsensing over opportunistic networks · INFOCOM 2015 |
Internet of things and sensor networks
opportunistic networks |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | User recruitment for mobile crowdsensing over opportunistic networks · INFOCOM 2015 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › algorithmic mechanism design
approximation mechanisms |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Near-Optimal Approximation Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions · IJCAI 2015 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory
combinatorial auction |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Near-Optimal Approximation Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions · IJCAI 2015 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory › combinatorial auction
multi-unit combinatorial auctions |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Near-Optimal Approximation Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions · IJCAI 2015 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › resource allocation
combinatorial public projects |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Item Bidding for Combinatorial Public Projects · AAAI 2014 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
equilibrium analysis |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Item Bidding for Combinatorial Public Projects · AAAI 2014 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
mechanism design |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Item Bidding for Combinatorial Public Projects · AAAI 2014 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › solution concepts in games › equilibrium concepts › nash equilibrium
pure nash equilibrium |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Item Bidding for Combinatorial Public Projects · AAAI 2014 |
Distributed systems
distributed coordination |
0.1 | 1 | 2006 | Distributed Selfish Replication · IEEE Trans. Parallel Distributed Syst. 2006 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
welfare maximization |
0.1 | 1 | 2014 | Item Bidding for Combinatorial Public Projects · AAAI 2014 |
Content delivery and video streaming › content distribution
internet content distribution |
0.0 | 1 | 2006 | Distributed Selfish Replication · IEEE Trans. Parallel Distributed Syst. 2006 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
submodular optimization · 0.4set cover · 0.4greedy heuristics · 0.4mapreduce · 0.4mechanism design · 0.2approximation algorithm · 0.2item bidding · 0.2VCG payments · 0.2game-theoretic equilibrium analysis · 0.2distributed protocol · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Pruning techniques for parallel processing of reverse top-k queries
Panagiotis Nikitopoulos, Georgios A. Sfyris, Akrivi Vlachou, Christos Doulkeridis, Orestis Telelis |
Distributed Parallel Databases | 5 |
| 2020 | On Envy-Free Revenue Approximation for Combinatorial Buyers with Budgets
Evangelos Markakis 0001, Apostolos Ntokos, Orestis Telelis |
Theory Comput. Syst. | 3 |
| 2019 | Parallel and Distributed Processing of Reverse Top-k QueriesabstractIn this paper, we address the problem of processing reverse top-k queries in a parallel and distributed setting. Given a database of objects, a set of user preferences, and a query object q, the reverse top-k query returns the subset of user preferences for which the query object belongs to the top-k results. Although recently, the reverse top-k query operator has been studied extensively, its CPU-intensive nature results in prohibitively expensive processing cost, when applied on vast-sized data sets. This limitation motivates us to explore a parallel processing solution, to enable reverse top-k query evaluation over GBs of data in reasonable execution time. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that addresses the problem of parallel reverse top-k query processing. We propose a solution to this problem, called DiPaRT, which is based on MapReduce and is provably correct. DiPaRT is empirically evaluated using GB-sized data sets. Panagiotis Nikitopoulos, Georgios A. Sfyris, Akrivi Vlachou, Christos Doulkeridis, Orestis Telelis |
ICDE | 5 |
| 2019 | Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction
Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis 0001, Orestis Telelis, Artem Tsikiridis |
Theory Comput. Syst. | 3 |
| 2017 | Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction
Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis 0001, Orestis Telelis, Artem Tsikiridis |
SAGT | 3 |
| 2017 | Item bidding for combinatorial public projects
Evangelos Markakis 0001, Orestis Telelis |
Theor. Comput. Sci. | 2 |
| 2016 | Item Pricing for Combinatorial Public Projects
Evangelos Markakis 0001, Orestis Telelis |
AAIM | 2 |
| 2016 | Envy-Free Revenue Approximation for Asymmetric Buyers with Budgets
Evangelos Markakis 0001, Orestis Telelis |
SAGT | 2 |
| 2015 | Near-Optimal Approximation Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions
Piotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis, Carmine Ventre |
IJCAI | 2 |
| 2015 | User recruitment for mobile crowdsensing over opportunistic networksabstractWe look into the realization of mobile crowdsensing campaigns that draw on the opportunistic networking paradigm, as practised in delay-tolerant networks but also in the emerging device-to-device communication mode in cellular networks. In particular, we ask how mobile users can be optimally selected in order to generate the required space-time paths across the network for collecting data from a set of fixed locations. The users hold different roles in these paths, from collecting data with their sensing-enabled devices to relaying them across the network and uploading them to data collection points with Internet connectivity. We first consider scenarios with deterministic node mobility and formulate the selection of users as a minimum-cost set cover problem with a submodular objective function. We then generalize to more realistic settings with uncertainty about the user mobility. A methodology is devised for translating the statistics of individual user mobility to statistics of spacetime path formation and feeding them to the set cover problem formulation. We describe practical greedy heuristics for the resulting NP-hard problems and compute their approximation ratios. Our experimentation with real mobility datasets (a) illustrates the multiple tradeoffs between the campaign cost and duration, the bound on the hopcount of space-time paths, and the number of collection points; and (b) provides evidence that in realistic problem instances the heuristics perform much better than what their pessimistic worst-case bounds suggest. Merkourios Karaliopoulos, Orestis Telelis, Iordanis Koutsopoulos |
INFOCOM | 2 |
| 2015 | Mechanisms for Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with a Few Distinct GoodsabstractWe design and analyze deterministic truthful approximation mechanisms for multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions involving only a constant number of distinct goods, each in arbitrary limited supply. Prospective buyers (bidders) have preferences over multisets of items, i.e., for more than one unit per distinct good. Our objective is to determine allocations of multisets that maximize the Social Welfare. Our main results are for multi-minded and submodular bidders. In the first setting each bidder has a positive value for being allocated one multiset from a prespecified demand set of alternatives. In the second setting each bidder is associated to a submodular valuation function that defines his value for the multiset he is allocated. For multi-minded bidders, we design a truthful FPTAS that fully optimizes the Social Welfare, while violating the supply constraints on goods within factor (1+e), for any fixed e>0 (i.e., the approximation applies to the constraints and not to the Social Welfare). This result is best possible, in that full optimization is impossible without violating the supply constraints. For submodular bidders, we obtain a PTAS that approximates the optimum Social Welfare within factor (1+e), for any fixed e>0, without violating the supply constraints. This result is best possible as well. Our allocation algorithms are Maximal-in-Range and yield truthful mechanisms, when paired with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Piotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis, Carmine Ventre |
J. Artif. Intell. Res. | 2 |
| 2015 | The Strong Price of Anarchy of Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games
Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Orestis Telelis |
Theory Comput. Syst. | 3 |
| 2015 | Uniform Price Auctions: Equilibria and Efficiency
Evangelos Markakis 0001, Orestis Telelis |
Theory Comput. Syst. | 2 |
| 2014 | Item Bidding for Combinatorial Public ProjectsabstractWe present and analyze a mechanism for the Combinatorial Public Project Problem (CPPP). The problem asks to select k out of m available items, so as to maximize the social welfare for autonomous agents with combinatorial preferences (valuation functions) over subsets of items. The CPPP constitutes an abstract model for decision making by autonomous agents and has been shown to present severe computational hardness, in the design of truthful approximation mechanisms. We study a non-truthful mechanism that is, however, practically relevant to multi-agent environments, by virtue of its natural simplicity. It employs an Item Bidding interface, wherein every agent issues a separate bid for the inclusion of each distinct item in the outcome; the k items with the highest sums of bids are chosen and agents are charged according to a VCG-based payment rule. For fairly expressive classes of the agents' valuation functions, we establish existence of socially optimal pure Nash and strong equilibria, that are resilient to coordinated deviations of subsets of agents. Subsequently we derive tight worst-case bounds on the approximation of the optimum social welfare achieved in equilibrium. We show that the mechanism's performance improves with the number of agents that can coordinate, and reaches half of the optimum welfare at strong equilibrium. Evangelos Markakis 0001, Orestis Telelis |
AAAI | 2 |
| 2013 | Inefficiency of Standard Multi-unit Auctions
Bart de Keijzer, Evangelos Markakis 0001, Guido Schäfer, Orestis Telelis |
ESA | 4 |
| 2012 | Uniform Price Auctions: Equilibria and Efficiency
Evangelos Markakis 0001, Orestis Telelis |
SAGT | 2 |
| 2011 | Externalities among Advertisers in Sponsored Search
Dimitris Fotakis 0001, Piotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis |
SAGT | 3 |
| 2010 | On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games
Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Orestis Telelis |
SAGT | 3 |
| 2010 | Probabilistic models for the Steiner Tree problemabstractAbstract We consider a probabilistic model for the Steiner Tree problem. Under this model, the problem is defined in a two‐stage setting over a first‐stage complete weighted graph having its vertices associated with a probability of presence (independently each from another) in the second stage. A first‐stage feasible solution on the input graph might become infeasible in the second stage, when certain vertices of the graph fail. Therefore, a well defined modification strategy is devised for modifying the remainders of a first‐stage solution to render it second‐stage feasible. The objective is to minimize the expected weight of the second‐stage solution over the distribution of all possible second‐stage materializable subgraphs of the input graph. We recognize two complementary computational problems in this setting, one being the a priori computation of first‐stage decisions given a particular modification strategy, and the second being the cost‐efficient modification of a first‐stage feasible solution. We prove that both these problems are NP‐hard for the Steiner Tree problem under this setting. We design and analyze probabilistically an efficient modification strategy and derive tight approximation results for both aforementioned problems. We show that our techniques can be extended to the case of the more general Steiner Forest problem in the same probabilistic setting. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. NETWORKS, 2010 Vangelis Th. Paschos, Orestis Telelis, Vassilis Zissimopoulos |
Networks | 2 |
| 2009 | Improved Bounds for Facility Location Games with Fair Cost Allocation
Thomas Dueholm Hansen, Orestis Telelis |
COCOA | 2 |
| 2008 | On Labeled Traveling Salesman Problems
Basile Couëtoux, Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Orestis Telelis |
ISAAC | 4 |
| 2008 | On the Social Cost of Distributed Selfish Content Replication
Gerasimos G. Pollatos, Orestis Telelis, Vassilis Zissimopoulos |
Networking | 2 |
| 2008 | Dynamic bottleneck optimization for k-edge and 2-vertex connectivity
Orestis Telelis, Vassilis Zissimopoulos |
Inf. Process. Lett. | 1 |
| 2007 | Steiner Forests on Stochastic Metric Graphs
Vangelis Th. Paschos, Orestis Telelis, Vassilis Zissimopoulos |
COCOA | 2 |
| 2006 | Distributed Selfish ReplicationabstractA commonly employed abstraction for studying the object placement problem for the purpose of Internet content distribution is that of a distributed replication group. In this work, the initial model of the distributed replication group of Leff et al. [CHECK END OF SENTENCE] is extended to the case that individual nodes act selfishly, i.e., cater to the optimization of their individual local utilities. Our main contribution is the derivation of equilibrium object placement strategies that 1) can guarantee improved local utilities for all nodes concurrently as compared to the corresponding local utilities under greedy local object placement, 2) do not suffer from potential mistreatment problems, inherent to centralized strategies that aim at optimizing the social utility, and 3) do not require the existence of complete information at all nodes. We develop a baseline computationally efficient algorithm for obtaining the aforementioned equilibrium strategies and then extend it to improve its performance with respect to fairness. Both algorithms are realizable, in practice, through a distributed protocol that requires only a limited exchange of information. Nikolaos Laoutaris, Orestis Telelis, Vassilis Zissimopoulos, Ioannis Stavrakakis |
IEEE Trans. Parallel Distributed Syst. | 2 |
| 2005 | Local Utility Aware Content Replication
Nikolaos Laoutaris, Orestis Telelis, Vassilis Zissimopoulos, Ioannis Stavrakakis |
NETWORKING | 2 |
| 2005 | Absolute o(log m) error in approximating random set covering: an average case analysis
Orestis Telelis, Vassilis Zissimopoulos |
Inf. Process. Lett. | 1 |
| 2001 | Combinatorial Optimization through Statistical Instance-Based LearningabstractDifferent successful heuristic approaches have been proposed for solving combinatorial optimization problems. Commonly, each of them is specialized to serve a different purpose or address specific difficulties. However, most combinatorial problems that model real world applications have a priori well known measurable properties. Embedded machine learning methods may aid towards the recognition and utilization of these properties for the achievement of satisfactory solutions. In this paper, we present a heuristic methodology which employs the instance-based machine learning paradigm. This methodology can be adequately configured for several types of optimization problems which are known to have certain properties. Experimental results are discussed concerning two well known problems, namely the knapsack problem and the set partitioning problem. These results show that the proposed approach is able to find significantly better solutions compared to intuitive search methods based on heuristics which are usually applied to the specific problems. Orestis Telelis, Panagiotis Stamatopoulos |
ICTAI | 1 |