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Adryana Hutchinson

dblp:374/8992 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
3since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0006-0824-8969ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Privacy and data protection · 61% Usable security · 39%
Human-computer interaction and pervasive computing
2 papers
Accessibility and assistive technology · 57% Collaborative and social computing · 43%
Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper
Computing education · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Privacy and data protection
privacy perceptions
1.012026
Re-Examining the Examiners: Changes in Privacy and Security Perceptions of Exam Proctoring · CHI 2026
Privacy and data protection
surveillance
1.012026
Re-Examining the Examiners: Changes in Privacy and Security Perceptions of Exam Proctoring · CHI 2026
Computing education › educational assessment
online testing
0.312026
Re-Examining the Examiners: Changes in Privacy and Security Perceptions of Exam Proctoring · CHI 2026
Collaborative and social computing › online communities
online community analysis
0.212024
"Modern problems require modern solutions": Community-Developed Techniques for Online Exam Proctoring Evasion · CCS 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

survey · 2.0replication study · 2.0community-based interviews · 2.0social media analysis · 1.5qualitative analysis · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Re-Examining the Examiners: Changes in Privacy and Security Perceptions of Exam Proctoring
abstract
With the shift to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic, educators turned to remote exam proctoring software to support integrity for online tests. However, due to the mechanisms used to surveil test-takers, these systems come with significant privacy and security tradeoffs. At the height of the pandemic, Balash et al. (SOUPS ’21) found that test-takers had privacy concerns with remote proctoring but acquiesced due to a number of factors. We investigate how perceptions have changed four years later. To gain a fuller perspective on how users experience these tools now, we replicate Balash et al.’s study with 127 participants who have experienced exam proctoring. We found a significant shift in favor of proctoring software, with greater acceptance of all monitoring methods compared to 2020. This is likely due to the convenience of remote exams and a growing resignation to privacy trade-offs. We discuss these implications and suggest future directions.
Adryana Hutchinson, Elaine Ly, Collins W. Munyendo, Adam J. Aviv
CHI1
2026 Toward Inclusive Security and Privacy for Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing People: A Community-Based Interview Study
Mindy Tran, Xinru Tang, Adryana Hutchinson, Adam J. Aviv, Yixin Zou
SP3
2024 "Modern problems require modern solutions": Community-Developed Techniques for Online Exam Proctoring Evasion
abstract
COVID-19 caused an abrupt shift towards remote learning, and along with it, an increased adoption of remote, online proctoring technology to both dissuade and identify academic dishonesty (i.e., cheating). This shift also came with significant discontent from students who took to online platforms to both express their displeasure with remote proctoring and the methods they used for evading monitoring methods, essentially discussing _hacks_ to subvert the software and cheat on exams. In this paper, we seek to understand both the methods this online community shares for evading online proctoring and why they do so. Through qualitative analysis of social media videos (n=137) and comments (n=4,297) on YouTube and TikTok, we find both non-technical (e.g., sticky-notes) and deeply technical (e.g., custom virtual machines) methods of evading proctoring. The online videos, as well as the active comment sections, provide an important window into both an (unethical) desire to cheat but also the development of a security mindset. Many see proctoring software as invasive surveillance technology, and the discussion and sharing of methods to subvert it have similar tones to that of the hacker/tinkerer communities who also seek to share their experiences of subverting technology, for fun and profit. We conclude with lessons for the security and privacy community about evading online exam proctoring, as well as a conversation about fairness and equity in proctoring design.
Lucy Simko, Adryana Hutchinson, Alvin Isaac, Evan Fries, Micah Sherr, Adam J. Aviv
CCS2