Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Celine Fabry

dblp:54/8302 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2014
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Authentication and access control · 85% Usable security · 15%
Human-computer interaction and pervasive computing
1 paper
Usability and user experience research · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Authentication and access control › human interactive proofs
CAPTCHA
0.322014
Easy does it: more usable CAPTCHAs · CHI 2014
The Failure of Noise-Based Non-continuous Audio Captchas · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2011
Usability and user experience research
usability evaluation
0.212014
Easy does it: more usable CAPTCHAs · CHI 2014
Authentication and access control › human interactive proofs › CAPTCHA
audio CAPTCHA
0.112011
The Failure of Noise-Based Non-continuous Audio Captchas · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2011
Authentication and access control › human interactive proofs › CAPTCHA
CAPTCHA breaking
0.112011
The Failure of Noise-Based Non-continuous Audio Captchas · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2011
Usable security › security tool usability
CAPTCHA usability
0.112010
How Good Are Humans at Solving CAPTCHAs? A Large Scale Evaluation · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2010

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

survey · 0.4production deployment · 0.4crowdsourced evaluation · 0.4speech distortion analysis · 0.1signal processing · 0.1large-scale user study · 0.1crowdsourcing · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2014 Easy does it: more usable CAPTCHAs
abstract
Websites present users with puzzles called CAPTCHAs to curb abuse caused by computer algorithms masquerading as people. While CAPTCHAs are generally effective at stopping abuse, they might impair website usability if they are not properly designed. In this paper we describe how we designed two new CAPTCHA schemes for Google that focus on maximizing usability. We began by running an evaluation on Amazon Mechanical Turk with over 27,000 respondents to test the usability of different feature combinations. Then we studied user preferences using Google's consumer survey infrastructure. Finally, drawing on the insights gleaned during those studies, we tested our new captcha schemes first on Mechanical Turk and then on a fraction of production traffic. The resulting scheme is now an integral part of our production system and is served to millions of users. Our scheme achieved a 95.3% human accuracy, a 6.7.
Elie Bursztein, Angelique Moscicki, Celine Fabry, Steven Bethard, John C. Mitchell, Daniel Jurafsky
CHI3
2011 The Failure of Noise-Based Non-continuous Audio Captchas
abstract
CAPTCHAs, which are automated tests intended to distinguish humans from programs, are used on many web sites to prevent bot-based account creation and spam. To avoid imposing undue user friction, CAPTCHAs must be easy for humans and difficult for machines. However, the scientific basis for successful CAPTCHA design is still emerging. This paper examines the widely used class of audio CAPTCHAs based on distorting non-continuous speech with certain classes of noise and demonstrates that virtually all current schemes, including ones from Microsoft, Yahoo, and eBay, are easily broken. More generally, we describe a set of fundamental techniques, packaged together in our Decaptcha system, that effectively defeat a wide class of audio CAPTCHAs based on non-continuous speech. Decaptcha's performance on actual observed and synthetic CAPTCHAs indicates that such speech CAPTCHAs are inherently weak and, because of the importance of audio for various classes of users, alternative audio CAPTCHAs must be developed.
Elie Bursztein, Romain Beauxis, Hristo S. Paskov, Daniele Perito, Celine Fabry, John C. Mitchell
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy5
2010 How Good Are Humans at Solving CAPTCHAs? A Large Scale Evaluation
abstract
Captchas are designed to be easy for humans but hard for machines. However, most recent research has focused only on making them hard for machines. In this paper, we present what is to the best of our knowledge the first large scale evaluation of captchas from the human perspective, with the goal of assessing how much friction captchas present to the average user. For the purpose of this study we have asked workers from Amazon's Mechanical Turk and an underground captchabreaking service to solve more than 318 000 captchas issued from the 21 most popular captcha schemes (13 images schemes and 8 audio scheme). Analysis of the resulting data reveals that captchas are often difficult for humans, with audio captchas being particularly problematic. We also find some demographic trends indicating, for example, that non-native speakers of English are slower in general and less accurate on English-centric captcha schemes. Evidence from a week's worth of eBay captchas (14,000,000 samples) suggests that the solving accuracies found in our study are close to real-world values, and that improving audio captchas should become a priority, as nearly 1% of all captchas are delivered as audio rather than images. Finally our study also reveals that it is more effective for an attacker to use Mechanical Turk to solve captchas than an underground service.
Elie Bursztein, Steven Bethard, Celine Fabry, John C. Mitchell, Daniel Jurafsky
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy3