Social robots and other technologies designed to engage in social interactions with their users increasingly enter our everyday environments. Dealing with conceptual and practical challenges, related to these developments, requires an understanding of these technologies as new types of social actors. However, despite the substantial research effort in HRI and related fields, many basic questions about the meaning of “social actors” in the case of technological artifacts largely remain open. In this paper, we argue that a potential way to address the questions is avoiding essentialist assumptions about the nature of technological artifacts as social actors. Instead, we propose focusing on contextual framing of artifacts, that is, on how people perceive the artifacts as embedded in meaningful social contexts. In line with this proposition, we call for the development of conceptual and methodological tools that allow researchers to systematically address contextual framing. To illustrate potential directions for this development, we propose tentative versions of two analytical tools: (1) a conceptual model of robot-mediated collaboration, and (2) a set of analytical dimensions specifically focusing on contextual framing of technological agents.

The discussion of potential dangers, brought about by intelligent machines, can be traced back at least to Wiener (1960). However, it has never been more needed than it is now. Current technologica...

In HCI there is an increasing trend to approach computing artifacts as agents. In this article, we make a case for “Objects with Intent” (OwI's) as an emerging type of agents that take advantage of the meaning of everyday things as the site for their intelligence and agency. After reviewing relevant existing research in HCI and related fields, we demonstrate how OwI's provide a new perspective on human–agent interaction. We then elaborate on how the notion of OwI's is informed by Dennett's theory of intentionality and Leontiev's Activity Theory. Thereafter, we illustrate the application of OwI's through the design case of Fizzy, a robotic ball used to stimulate hospitalized children to engage in physical play. We end by discussing the nature and merit of OwI's and reflecting more broadly on the challenges involved in designing OwI's.

The profound impact of digital technologies on human life makes it imperative for HCI research to deal with the most fundamental aspects of human existence. Arguably, insights from existential philosophy and psychology are highly relevant for addressing such issues. Building on previous attempts to bring in existential themes and terminology to HCI, this paper argues that Yalom's notion of "the givens of existence", as well as related work in experimental existential psychology, can inform the development of an existential inquiry framework in HCI. The envisioned framework is intended to complement current approaches in HCI by specifically focusing on the existential aspects of the design and use of technology. The paper reflects on possible ways, in which existential concepts can support HCI research, and maintains that adopting an existential framework in HCI would be consistent with the overall conceptual development of the field.

The general problem addressed in this paper is supporting a more efficient communication between remote users, who control telepresence robots, and people in the local setting. The design of most telepresence robots does not allow them to perform gestures. Given the key role of pointing in human communication, exploring design solutions for providing telepresence robots with deictic gesturing capabilities is, arguably, a timely research issue for Human-Robot Interaction. To address this issue, we conducted an empirical study, in which a set of low fidelity prototypes, illustrating various designs of a robot's gesture arm, were assessed by the participants (N=18). The study employed a mixed-method approach, a combination of a controlled experiment, elicitation study, and design provocation. The evidence collected in the study reveals participants' assessment of the designs, used in the study, and provides insights into participants' attitudes and expectations regarding gestural communication with telepresence robots in general

This paper reports a study of the use of activity theory in human–computer interaction (HCI) research. We analyse activity theory in HCI since its first appearance about 25 years ago. Through an analysis and meta-synthesis of 109 selected HCI activity theory papers, we created a taxonomy of 5 different ways of using activity theory: (1) analysing unique features, principles, and problematic aspects of the theory; (2) identifying domain-specific requirements for new theoretical tools; (3) developing new conceptual accounts of issues in the field of HCI; (4) guiding and supporting empirical analyses of HCI phenomena; and (5) providing new design illustrations, claims, and guidelines. We conclude that HCI researchers are not only users of imported theory, but also theory-makers who adapt and develop theory for different purposes.

Interpretations of the concept of "affordances" in HCI are becoming increasingly diverse, extending well beyond the original Gibsonian meaning. We discuss some of the key analyses of affordances in HCI research and make three related claims. First, we argue that many current interpretations of the concept are essentially incompatible with Gibson. Second, we hold that the Gibsonian concept of affordances, conceptualized as interaction between animals and their environments, provides some important insights, but is, in the end, of limited relevance to HCI research. Third, we call for adopting a mediated action perspective on affordances as an alternative to Gibson's ecological psychology. We outline a view of technology affordances as possibilities for human action mediated by cultural means conceived as a relational property of a three-way interaction between the person, mediational means, and environment. We conclude with a discussion of prospects for future conceptual and empirical explorations of the meditational perspective in HCI research.

The field of interaction design to date has been predominantly concerned with designing products, that is, devices, systems, and more recently services. A growing body of theoretical and empirical analyses suggests that the scope of interaction design needs to be expanded: An explicit concern of the field should include not only helping designers create better products but also helping people themselves create better environments for their work, learning, and leisure activities. In this article we argue that expanding the scope of interaction design beyond products requires a revision of some of the most central concepts in interaction design, including the notion of “the object of design” and our understanding of the impact of technologies on human practices. The aim of the article is to explore some of these conceptual challenges and discuss possible ways of dealing with them. We differentiate between intrinsic and extrinsic technology-enabled practice transformation, and foreground the need for interaction design research and practice to more directly deal with analysis and construction of technology-enhanced activity spaces. The implications of these notions for the research agenda of interaction design are discussed.

The paper systematically explores the social dimension of external interruptions of human activities. Interruptions and interruption handling are key issues in human-computer interaction (HCI) and computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW) research. However, existing research has almost exclusively dealt with effects of interruptions on individual tasks. In this paper we call for expanding the scope of analysis by including the effect of interruptions on the social context. We identify four facets of the social 'ripple effect' of interruptions: location, communication, collaboration, and interpersonal relation. We discuss the advantages of extending the notion of interruptions and its implications for future research.

Virtual environments based on the desktop metaphor provide limited support for creating and managing project-specific work contexts. The paper discusses existing approaches to supporting higher-level user activities and presents a system named UMEA (User-Monitoring Environment for Activities). The design of the system is informed by activity theory. The system: (a) organizes resources into project-related pools consisting of documents, folders, URLs, and contacts, (b) monitors user activities, (c) automatically adds new resources to pools associated with active projects, and (d) provides personal information management tools linked to individual projects. An empirical evaluation of the system is reported.

Papers comprising this special issue (15:5 and 15:6) focus on a common underlying problem; how information technologies are integrated into everyday human activities. The general problem (that human interaction with the world is mediated by artefacts) has a long history, which can be traced back at least to major conceptual breakthroughs made in the first half of the last century (Heidegger, 1962; Vygotsky, 1978). In my view, this double special issue entitled ‘from artefact to instrument’ makes a substantial contribution to research addressing this problem. Making this contribution apparent requires selecting a baseline for comparison. One of the most common references in the papers in this special issue, also discussed by the editors in their editorial introduction (Rabardel and Waern) is the notion of ‘cognitive artefacts’ introduced by Norman (1991). It appears appropriate to use this notion as a point of reference. According to Norman (1991) “A cognitive artefact is an artificial device designed to maintain, display, or operate upon information in order to serve a representational function”. (p. 17). Three ideas related to the notion of cognitive artefacts are most relevant in the context of the present discussion. First, this notion emphasizes the cognitive, rational, information processing functions served by technologies used by human beings. Emotional, physical, social, and other facets of the use of technology, which do not fall into the category of purely cognitive functioning, are not covered by the notion. Second, cognitive artefacts, as described by Norman, are intended for individual, rather than collective use. Third, it is stated that artefacts do not change individuals' capabilities. It is the system's cognition, which is enhanced, so that the system can accomplish more with the artefact than without the artefact. The cognitive abilities of the person are unchanged.