Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
David C. Littman
dblp:92/484
· DBLP profile ↗
5ranked-venue papers
3as first author
0since 2021 · last 1993
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 2 · 1 first-authorArtificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorSecurity and privacy · 1Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-authorHuman-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
2 papers |
Knowledge representation and reasoning · 100% | |
| Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper |
Computing education · 100% | |
| Human-computer interaction and pervasive computing
1 paper |
User interface design and tools · 100% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Knowledge representation and reasoning
knowledge engineering |
0.0 | 1 | 1987 | Modelling Human Expertise in Knowledge Engineering: Some Preliminary Observations · Int. J. Man Mach. Stud. 1987 |
Computing education
programming education |
0.0 | 1 | 1986 | An Analysis of Tutorial Reasoning about Programming Bugs · AAAI 1986 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
think-aloud protocol · 0.0empirical analysis · 0.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1993 | Integration of formal and heuristic reasoning as a basis for testing and debugging computer security policyabstractErrors can arise in defining and evaluating computer security policy as well as in translating computer security policy into procedures.The effect of such errors in policy upon the secure operation of information systems can impose unacceptable levels of risk from the perspective of procurers and users of information systems.Relying on computer security paradigms based solely on formal methods makes it difficult if not impossible to detect and/or reason about certain classes of threats to computer security and vulnerabilities of information systems to these threats, especially for those aspects of information systems that are more readily amenable to modeling via non-formal methods.We present a paradigm integrating formal and heuristic reasoning as a basis for testing for and debugging computer security policy.To illustrate our approach, and to support our arguments, we consider the problem of reasoning about the plans of an agent who may be trying to compromise the security of an information system. James Bret Michael, Edgar H. Sibley, David C. Littman |
NSPW | 3 |
| 1993 | The role of policy in requirements definitionabstractThree significant challenges facing the discipline of software engineering are understanding how software designers reason about policy, understanding how they define requirements based on this reasoning, and providing machine-based intelligent tools that support reasoning about policy. The authors are developing the concept of a policy workbench: knowledge-based tools that support reasoning about such properties of policies as consistency, completeness, and correctness, and the implications of policy for the behavior of a system. They discuss how such a workbench might help software designers reason about the relationships between policies and requirements.> Edgar H. Sibley, Richard L. Wexelblat, James Bret Michael, Michael C. Tanner, David C. Littman |
RE | 5 |
| 1987 | Modelling Human Expertise in Knowledge Engineering: Some Preliminary ObservationsabstractThis paper reports the results of an empirical analysis of the knowledge engineering behavior of six persons with extensive experience in artificial intelligence (AI). The six persons were given the task of designing an AI program and were videotaped while they did so; during their 2–3 h design sessions, they were asked to talk aloud about what they were doing and why they were doing it. The paper identifies several recurrent behaviors common to all the AI designers. For example, several components of the designers' goal structures are identified, as is the importance of focussing on a “touchstone”, or key issue, around which much of the designer's behavior revolves. Several potential implications of the research for the design of knowledge engineering tools are explored. David C. Littman |
Int. J. Man Mach. Stud. | 1 |
| 1987 | Mental models and software maintenance
David C. Littman, Jeannine Pinto, Stanley Letovsky, Elliot Soloway |
J. Syst. Softw. | 1 |
| 1986 | An Analysis of Tutorial Reasoning about Programming Bugs
David C. Littman, Jeannine Pinto, Elliot Soloway |
AAAI | 1 |