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Helmut Scherzer

dblp:00/4855 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2010
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 3 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 33% Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 33% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 33%
Computer networks
1 paper
Cellular and mobile networks · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptanalysis
key recovery attack
0.012002
Partitioning Attacks: Or How to Rapidly Clone Some GSM Cards · S&P 2002
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › blockchain network security
network partitioning attack
0.012002
Partitioning Attacks: Or How to Rapidly Clone Some GSM Cards · S&P 2002
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel attack
0.012002
Partitioning Attacks: Or How to Rapidly Clone Some GSM Cards · S&P 2002

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

table lookup countermeasure · 0.1chosen-plaintext attack · 0.0chosen plaintext attack · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2010 Designing a Side Channel Resistant Random Number Generator
Suresh Chari, Vincenzo DiLuoffo, Paul A. Karger, Elaine R. Palmer, Tal Rabin, Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi, Helmut Scherzer, Michael Steiner 0001, David C. Toll
CARDIS8
2003 Authenticating Mandatory Access Controls and Preserving Privacy for a High-Assurance Smart Card
Helmut Scherzer, Ran Canetti, Paul A. Karger, Hugo Krawczyk, Tal Rabin, David C. Toll
ESORICS1
2002 Partitioning Attacks: Or How to Rapidly Clone Some GSM Cards
abstract
In this paper, we introduce a new class of side-channel attacks called partitioning attacks. We have successfully launched a version of the attack on several implementations of COMP128, the popular GSM authentication algorithm that has been deployed by different service providers in several types of SIM cards, to retrieve the 128 bit key using as few as 8 chosen plaintexts. We show how partitioning attacks can be used effectively to attack implementations that have been equipped with ad hoc and inadequate countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Such ad hoc countermeasures are systemic in implementations of cryptographic algorithms, such as COMP128, which require the use of large tables since there has been a mistaken belief that sound countermeasures require more resources than are available. To address this problem, we describe a new resource-efficient countermeasure for protecting table lookups in cryptographic implementations and justify its correctness rigorously.
Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi, Helmut Scherzer, Stéphane Tinguely
S&P3