Mobility management is a challenging problem in current networks, typically requiring dedicated, specialised protocols that manage the lifetime of a series of tunnels that follow mobile hosts as they roam through the network. The fundamental issue that complicates the mobility management problem is the lack of a complete naming and addressing schema in the current Internet architecture. This paper analyses what properties such schema needs to have, and discusses how Internet mobility solutions are missing parts of it. Then it looks at RINA, a network architecture with a complete naming scheme. Theoretical analysis backed up by experimental validation of the main properties for mobility support shows that managing mobility in RINA networks not only is simpler and easier to scale compared to the Internet situation, but also that no special protocols or mechanisms need to be added to RINA in order to support mobility.

Current Internet security is complex, expensive and ineffective. The usual argument is that the TCP/IP protocol suite was not designed having security in mind and security mechanisms have been added as add-ons or separate protocols. We argue that fundamental limitations in the Internet architecture are a major factor contributing to the insecurity of the Net. In this paper we explore the security properties of the Recursive InterNetwork Architecture, analyzing the principles that make RINA networks inherently more secure than TCP/IP-based ones. We perform the specification, implementation and experimental evaluation of the first authentication and SDU protection policies for RINA networks. RINA's approach to securing layers instead of protocols increases the security of networks, while reducing the complexity and cost of providing security.

The TCP/IP architecture was originally designed without taking security measures into consideration. Over the years, it has been subjected to many attacks, which has led to many patches to counter them. Our investigations into the fundamental principles of networking have shown that carefully following an abstract model of Inter-Process Communication (IPC) addresses many problems [1]. Guided by this IPC principle, we designed a clean-slate Recursive InterNetwork Architecture (RINA) [2]. In this paper, we show how, without the aid of cryptographic techniques, the bare-bones architecture of RINA can resist most of the security attacks faced by TCP/IP, and of course, is only more secure if cryptographic techniques are employed. Specifically, the RINA model decouples different concerns that makes it more resistant to transport-level attacks: (1) RINA decouples authentication from connection management, thus transport-level attacks are limited to “insider” attacks, and (2) RINA decouples transport port allocation and access control from data synchronization and transfer, thus making transport-level attacks much harder to mount. Using typical field lengths in packet headers, we analyze how hard it is for an intruder to compromise RINA.

This position paper outlines a new network architecture that is based on the fundamental principle that networking is interprocess communication (IPC). In this model, application processes (APes) communicate via an IPC facility. The IPC processes that make up this facility provide a protocol that implements an IPC mechanism, and a protocol for managing distributed IPC (routing, security and other management tasks). Our architecture is recursive in that the IPC processes can themselves be APes requesting services from lower IPC facilities. We present the repeating patterns and structures in our architecture, and show how the proposed model would cope with the challenges faced by today's Internet (and that of the future).

Terminal protocols provide basic services for the users of computer networks. This paper presents a survey of the architecture and mechanisms used in current terminal protocols. The paper disusses both parametric terminal protocols such as the CCITT X.3, X.28, and X.29 and virtual terminal protocols, such as the ARPANET TELNET protocol. Many of the problems encountered in terminal protocols recur in more complex forms in the more sophisticated protocols.