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Jose Althouse

dblp:01/4893 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 1983
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 100%

Topics — the 1 heaviest of 1, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels
formal verification of security properties
0.011983
SDC Secure Release Terminal Project · S&P 1983

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

formal development methodology · 0.0design verification · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1983 SDC Secure Release Terminal Project
abstract
The SDC Secure Release Terminal SRT) project provides a useful view of the process involved in constructing software whose code is intended to be formally verified to satisfy desired security properties. The purpose of the SRT is to move appropriately classified data from a processing environment at one security level to a processing environment at another level in machine readable form. This paper discusses the design process for the SRT which was carried out using the SDC Formal Development Methodology (FDM). the SRT project is the first application of the FDM code level verification capabilities. However, since the code level verification has not yet been performed this paper concentrates on the design problems inherent in targeting a system for code level verification.
Thomas H. Hinke, Jose Althouse, Richard A. Kemmerer
S&P2