A flurry of excitement amongst researchers and practitioners has produced modern proof systems built using novel technical ideas and seeing rapid deployment, especially in cryptocurrencies. Most of these modern proof systems use the Fiat-Shamir (F-S) transformation, a seminal method of removing interaction from a protocol with a public-coin verifier. Some prior work has shown that incorrectly applying F-S (i.e., using the so-called "weak" F-S transformation) can lead to breaks of classic protocols like Schnorr’s discrete log proof; however, little is known about the risks of applying F-S incorrectly for modern proof systems seeing deployment today.In this paper, we fill this knowledge gap via a broad theoretical and practical study of F-S in implementations of modern proof systems. We perform a survey of open-source implementations and find 30 weak F-S implementations affecting 12 different proof systems. For four of these—Bulletproofs, Plonk, Spartan, and Wesolowski’s VDF—we develop novel knowledge soundness attacks accompanied by rigorous proofs of their efficacy. We perform case studies of applications that use vulnerable implementations, and demonstrate that a weak F-S vulnerability could have led to the creation of unlimited currency in a private smart contract platform. Finally, we discuss possible mitigations and takeaways for academics and practitioners.

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Article Free Access Share on UIMSs: threat or menace? Authors: J. Rosenberg Hewlett-Packard Laboratories Hewlett-Packard LaboratoriesView Profile , R. Hill European Computer-Industry Research Center European Computer-Industry Research CenterView Profile , J. Miller Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation Microelectronics and Computer Technology CorporationView Profile , A. Schulert Apollo Computer Apollo ComputerView Profile , D. Shewmake Interactive Development Environments Interactive Development EnvironmentsView Profile Authors Info & Claims CHI '88: Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing SystemsMay 1988 Pages 197–200https://doi.org/10.1145/57167.57200Online:01 May 1988Publication History 13citation212DownloadsMetricsTotal Citations13Total Downloads212Last 12 Months5Last 6 weeks1 Get Citation AlertsNew Citation Alert added!This alert has been successfully added and will be sent to:You will be notified whenever a record that you have chosen has been cited.To manage your alert preferences, click on the button below.Manage my AlertsNew Citation Alert!Please log in to your account Save to BinderSave to BinderCreate a New BinderNameCancelCreateExport CitationPublisher SiteeReaderPDF