Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Robert Kirk
dblp:01/9684
· DBLP profile ↗
14ranked-venue papers
2as first author
12since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · unresolved
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 12 · 2 first-author · 12 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 2Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
10 papers |
Language models and text generation · 54% Trustworthy machine learning · 18% Reinforcement learning · 14% | |
| Network and information security
3 papers |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 83% Systems and software security · 17% |
Topics — the 30 heaviest of 38, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
reinforcement learning from human feedback |
1.5 | 2 | 2024 | Understanding the Effects of RLHF on LLM Generalisation and Diversity · ICLR 2024 Reward Model Ensembles Help Mitigate Overoptimization · ICLR 2024 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness |
1.5 | 2 | 2024 | Mechanistically analyzing the effects of fine-tuning on procedurally defined tasks · ICLR 2024 Reward Model Ensembles Help Mitigate Overoptimization · ICLR 2024 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › adversarial machine learning
jailbreak attack |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | STACK: Adversarial Attacks on LLM Safeguard Pipelines · AAAI 2026 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model safety |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | STACK: Adversarial Attacks on LLM Safeguard Pipelines · AAAI 2026 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | STACK: Adversarial Attacks on LLM Safeguard Pipelines · AAAI 2026 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › LLM agents
agent security |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competition · NeurIPS 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model evaluation |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Investigating Non-Transitivity in LLM-as-a-Judge · ICML 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model reasoning |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Procedural Knowledge in Pretraining Drives Reasoning in Large Language Models · ICLR 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › large language model evaluation
LLM-as-a-judge |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Investigating Non-Transitivity in LLM-as-a-Judge · ICML 2025 |
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Knowledge representation and reasoning › nonmonotonic reasoning › preference handling
preference modeling |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Investigating Non-Transitivity in LLM-as-a-Judge · ICML 2025 |
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Knowledge representation and reasoning › knowledge structures
procedural knowledge |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Procedural Knowledge in Pretraining Drives Reasoning in Large Language Models · ICLR 2025 |
Machine learning › Deep learning architectures and training
scaling laws |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | How Do Large Language Monkeys Get Their Power (Laws)? · ICML 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
test-time scaling |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | How Do Large Language Monkeys Get Their Power (Laws)? · ICML 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › poisoning attack
fine-tuning attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Fundamental Limitations in Pointwise Defences of LLM Finetuning APIs · NeurIPS 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
prompt injection |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competition · NeurIPS 2025 |
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Fundamental Limitations in Pointwise Defences of LLM Finetuning APIs · NeurIPS 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › model steering › language model steering
activation steering |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Analysing the Generalisation and Reliability of Steering Vectors · NeurIPS 2024 |
Machine learning › Transfer learning and domain adaptation
fine-tuning |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Mechanistically analyzing the effects of fine-tuning on procedurally defined tasks · ICLR 2024 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
in-context learning |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Generalization to New Sequential Decision Making Tasks with In-Context Learning · ICML 2024 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
instruction tuning |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Reward Model Ensembles Help Mitigate Overoptimization · ICLR 2024 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
interpretability |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Analysing the Generalisation and Reliability of Steering Vectors · NeurIPS 2024 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model fine-tuning |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Understanding the Effects of RLHF on LLM Generalisation and Diversity · ICLR 2024 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › alignment
reward overoptimization |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Reward Model Ensembles Help Mitigate Overoptimization · ICLR 2024 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning › reinforcement learning from human feedback › learning from human feedback
RLHF |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Reward Model Ensembles Help Mitigate Overoptimization · ICLR 2024 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
steering vectors |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Analysing the Generalisation and Reliability of Steering Vectors · NeurIPS 2024 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning › generalization in reinforcement learning
task generalization |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Generalization to New Sequential Decision Making Tasks with In-Context Learning · ICML 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
red teaming |
0.6 | 2 | 2026 | STACK: Adversarial Attacks on LLM Safeguard Pipelines · AAAI 2026 Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competition · NeurIPS 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › large language model › large language model adaptation
pre-trained language model fine-tuning |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Mechanistically analyzing the effects of fine-tuning on procedurally defined tasks · ICLR 2024 |
Electronic design automation › hardware verification and test
hardware verification |
0.0 | 1 | 1981 | A timing verification system based on extracted MOS/VLSI circuit parameters · DAC 1981 |
Electronic design automation › hardware verification and test
timing verification |
0.0 | 1 | 1981 | A timing verification system based on extracted MOS/VLSI circuit parameters · DAC 1981 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
transfer attack · 2.0staged attack · 2.0few-shot prompting · 2.0black-box attack · 2.0benchmark construction · 1.7swiss-wise iterative matchmaking · 0.9round-robin tournaments · 0.9red-teaming · 0.9power law fitting · 0.9perplexity-based detection · 0.9influence functions · 0.9fine-tuning API attacks · 0.9bradley-terry model · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | STACK: Adversarial Attacks on LLM Safeguard PipelinesabstractFrontier AI developers are relying on layers of safeguards to protect against catastrophic misuse of AI systems. Anthropic guards their latest Claude 4 Opus model using one such defense pipeline, and other frontier developers including Google DeepMind and OpenAI pledge to soon deploy similar defenses. However, the security of such pipelines is unclear, with limited prior work evaluating or attacking these pipelines. We address this gap by developing and red-teaming an open-source defense pipeline. 1 First, we find that a novel few-shot-prompted input and output classifier outperforms state-of-the-art open-weight safeguard model ShieldGemma across three attacks and two datasets, reducing the attack success rate (ASR) to 0% on the catastrophic misuse dataset ClearHarm. Second, we introduce a STaged AttaCK (STACK) procedure that achieves 71% ASR on ClearHarm in a black-box attack against the few-shot-prompted classifier pipeline. Finally, we also evaluate STACK in a transfer setting, achieving 33% ASR, providing initial evidence that it is feasible to design attacks with no access to the target pipeline. We conclude by suggesting specific mitigations that developers could use to thwart staged attacks. Ian R. McKenzie, Oskar John Hollinsworth, Tom Tseng, Xander Davies, Stephen Casper, Aaron D. Tucker, Robert Kirk, Adam Gleave |
AAAI | 7 |
| 2025 | Procedural Knowledge in Pretraining Drives Reasoning in Large Language ModelsabstractThe capabilities and limitations of Large Language Models (LLMs) have been sketched out in great detail in recent years, providing an intriguing yet conflicting picture. On the one hand, LLMs demonstrate a general ability to solve problems. On the other hand, they show surprising reasoning gaps when compared to humans, casting doubt on the robustness of their generalisation strategies. The sheer volume of data used in the design of LLMs has precluded us from applying the method traditionally used to measure generalisation: train-test set separation. To overcome this, we study what kind of generalisation strategies LLMs employ when performing reasoning tasks by investigating the pretraining data they rely on. For two models of different sizes (7B and 35B) and 2.5B of their pretraining tokens, we identify what documents influence the model outputs for three simple mathematical reasoning tasks and contrast this to the data that are influential for answering factual questions. We find that, while the models rely on mostly distinct sets of data for each factual question, a document often has a similar influence across different reasoning questions within the same task, indicating the presence of procedural knowledge. We further find that the answers to factual questions often show up in the most influential data. However, for reasoning questions the answers usually do not show up as highly influential, nor do the answers to the intermediate reasoning steps. When we characterise the top ranked documents for the reasoning questions qualitatively, we confirm that the influential documents often contain procedural knowledge, like demonstrating how to obtain a solution using formulae or code. Our findings indicate that the approach to reasoning the models use is unlike retrieval, and more like a generalisable strategy that synthesises procedural knowledge from documents doing a similar form of reasoning. Laura Ruis, Maximilian Mozes, Juhan Bae, Siddhartha Rao Kamalakara, Dwaraknath Gnaneshwar, Acyr Locatelli, Robert Kirk, Tim Rocktäschel, Edward Grefenstette, Max Bartolo |
ICLR | 7 |
| 2025 | How Do Large Language Monkeys Get Their Power (Laws)?abstractRecent research across mathematical problem solving, proof assistant programming and multimodal jailbreaking documents a striking finding: when (multimodal) language model tackle a suite of tasks with multiple attempts per task – succeeding if any attempt is correct – then the negative log of the average success rate scales a power law in the number of attempts. In this work, we identify an apparent puzzle: a simple mathematical calculation predicts that on each problem, the failure rate should fall exponentially with the number of attempts. We confirm this prediction empirically, raising a question: from where does aggregate polynomial scaling emerge? We then answer this question by demonstrating per-problem exponential scaling can be made consistent with aggregate polynomial scaling if the distribution of single-attempt success probabilities is heavy tailed such that a small fraction of tasks with extremely low success probabilities collectively warp the aggregate success trend into a power law - even as each problem scales exponentially on its own. We further demonstrate that this distributional perspective explains previously observed deviations from power law scaling, and provides a simple method for forecasting the power law exponent with an order of magnitude lower relative error, or equivalently, ${\sim}2-4$ orders of magnitude less inference compute. Overall, our work contributes to a better understanding of how neural language model performance improves with scaling inference compute and the development of scaling-predictable evaluations of (multimodal) language models. Rylan Schaeffer, Joshua Kazdan, Jordan Juravsky, Sara Price, Aengus Lynch, Erik Jones, Robert Kirk, Azalia Mirhoseini, Oluwasanmi Koyejo |
ICML | 8 |
| 2025 | Investigating Non-Transitivity in LLM-as-a-JudgeabstractAutomatic evaluation methods based on large language models (LLMs) are emerging as the standard tool for assessing the instruction-following abilities of LLM-based agents. The most common method in this paradigm, pairwise comparisons with a baseline model, critically depends on the assumption of transitive preferences. However, the validity of this assumption remains largely unexplored. In this study, we investigate the presence of non-transitivity within the AlpacaEval framework and analyze its effects on model rankings. We find that LLM judges exhibit non-transitive preferences, leading to rankings that are sensitive to the choice of the baseline model. To mitigate this issue, we show that round-robin tournaments combined with Bradley-Terry models of preference can produce more reliable rankings. Notably, our method increases both the Spearman correlation and the Kendall correlation with Chatbot Arena (95.0% $\rightarrow$ 96.4% and 82.1% $\rightarrow$ 86.3% respectively). To address the computational cost of round-robin tournaments, we propose Swiss-Wise Iterative Matchmaking (Swim) tournaments, using a dynamic matching strategy to capture the benefits of round-robin tournaments while maintaining computational efficiency. Laura Ruis, Tim Rocktäschel, Robert Kirk |
ICML | 4 |
| 2025 | Fundamental Limitations in Pointwise Defences of LLM Finetuning APIsabstractLLM developers deploy technical mitigations to prevent _fine-tuning misuse attacks_, attacks in which adversaries evade safeguards by fine-tuning the model using a public API. Previous work has established several successful attacks against specific fine-tuning API defences; however, prior attacks training and/or inference samples can be easily flagged as suspicious. In this work, we show that defences of fine-tuning APIs that seek to detect individual harmful training or inference samples ('pointwise' detection) are _fundamentally limited_ in their ability to prevent fine-tuning attacks. We demonstrate a class of 'pointwise-undetectable' attacks that repurpose semantic or syntactic variations in benign model outputs to covertly transmit dangerous knowledge. Our attacks are composed solely of unsuspicious benign samples that can be collected from the model before fine-tuning, meaning training and inference samples are all individually benign and low-perplexity. We test our attacks against the OpenAI fine-tuning API, finding they succeed in eliciting answers to harmful multiple-choice questions, and that they evade an enhanced monitoring system we design that successfully detects other fine-tuning attacks. Our results showing fundamental limitations of defending against pointwise attacks suggest focusing research efforts on mitigations towards multi-point defences. Xander Davies, Eric Winsor, Alexandra Souly, Tomek Korbak, Robert Kirk, Christian Schröder de Witt, Yarin Gal |
NeurIPS | 5 |
| 2025 | Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public CompetitionabstractAI agents are rapidly being deployed across diverse industries, but can they adhere to deployment policies under attacks? We organized a one-month red teaming challenge---the largest of its kind to date---involving expert red teamers attempting to elicit policy violations from AI agents powered by $22$ frontier LLMs. Our challenge collected $1.8$ million prompt injection attacks, resulting in over $60,000$ documented successful policy violations, revealing critical vulnerabilities. Utilizing this extensive data, we construct a challenging AI agent red teaming benchmark, currently achieving near $100\%$ attack success rates across all tested agents and associated policies. Our further analysis reveals high transferability and universality of successful attacks, underscoring the scale and criticality of existing AI agent vulnerabilities. We also observe minimal correlation between agent robustness and factors such as model capability, size, or inference compute budget, highlighting the necessity of substantial improvements in defense. We hope our benchmark and insights drive further research toward more secure and reliable AI agents. Andy Zou, Maxwell Lin, Eliot Krzysztof Jones, Micha Nowak, Mateusz Dziemian, Nick Winter, Valent Nathanael, Ayla Croft, Xander Davies, Jai Patel, Robert Kirk, Yarin Gal, Dan Hendrycks, J. Zico Kolter, Matt Fredrikson |
NeurIPS | 11 |
| 2024 | Reward Model Ensembles Help Mitigate OveroptimizationabstractReinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a standard approach for fine-tuning large language models to follow instructions. As part of this process, learned reward models are used to approximately model human preferences. However, as imperfect representations of the “true” reward, these learned reward models are susceptible to overoptimization. Gao et al. (2023) studied this phenomenon in a synthetic human feedback setup with a significantly larger “gold” reward model acting as the true reward (instead of humans) and showed that overoptimization remains a persistent problem regardless of the size of the proxy reward model and training data used. Using a similar setup, we conduct a systematic study to evaluate the efficacy of using ensemble-based conservative optimization objectives, specifically worst-case optimization (WCO) and uncertainty-weighted optimization (UWO), for mitigating reward model overoptimization when using two optimization methods: (a) best-of-n sampling (BoN) (b) proximal policy optimization (PPO). We additionally extend the setup of Gao et al. (2023) to include 25% label noise to better mirror real-world conditions. Both with and without label noise we find that conservative optimization practically eliminates overoptimization and improves performance by up to 70% for BoN sampling. For PPO, ensemble-based conservative optimization always reduces overoptimization and outperforms single reward model optimization. Moreover, combining it with a small KL penalty successfully prevents overoptimization at no performance cost. Overall, our results demonstrate that ensemble-based conservative optimization can effectively counter overoptimization. Thomas Coste, Usman Anwar, Robert Kirk, David Krueger 0001 |
ICLR | 3 |
| 2024 | Mechanistically analyzing the effects of fine-tuning on procedurally defined tasksabstractFine-tuning large pre-trained models has become the de facto strategy for developing both task-specific and general-purpose machine learning systems, including developing models that are safe to deploy. Despite its clear importance, there has been minimal work that explains how fine-tuning alters the underlying capabilities learned by a model during pretraining: does fine-tuning yield entirely novel capabilities or does it just modulate existing ones? We address this question empirically in synthetic, controlled settings where we can use mechanistic interpretability tools (e.g., network pruning and probing) to understand how the model's underlying capabilities are changing. We perform an extensive analysis of the effects of fine-tuning in these settings, and show that: (i) fine-tuning rarely alters the underlying model capabilities; (ii) a minimal transformation, which we call a `wrapper', is typically learned on top of the underlying model capabilities, creating the illusion that they have been modified; and (iii) further fine-tuning on a task where such ``wrapped capabilities'' are relevant leads to sample-efficient revival of the capability, i.e., the model begins reusing these capabilities after only a few gradient steps. This indicates that practitioners can unintentionally remove a model's safety wrapper merely by fine-tuning it on a, e.g., superficially unrelated, downstream task. We additionally perform analysis on language models trained on the TinyStories dataset to support our claims in a more realistic setup. Samyak Jain, Robert Kirk, Ekdeep Singh Lubana, Robert P. Dick, Hidenori Tanaka, Tim Rocktäschel, Edward Grefenstette, David Krueger 0001 |
ICLR | 2 |
| 2024 | Understanding the Effects of RLHF on LLM Generalisation and DiversityabstractLarge language models (LLMs) fine-tuned with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) have been used in some of the most widely deployed AI models to date, such as OpenAI's ChatGPT or Anthropic's Claude. While there has been significant work developing these methods, our understanding of the benefits and downsides of each stage in RLHF is still limited. To fill this gap, we present an extensive analysis of how each stage of the process (i.e. supervised fine-tuning (SFT), reward modelling, and RLHF) affects two key properties: out-of-distribution (OOD) generalisation and output diversity. OOD generalisation is crucial given the wide range of real-world scenarios in which these models are being used, while output diversity refers to the model's ability to generate varied outputs and is important for a variety of use cases. We perform our analysis across two base models on both summarisation and instruction following tasks, the latter being highly relevant for current LLM use cases. We find that RLHF generalises better than SFT to new inputs, particularly as the distribution shift between train and test becomes larger. However, RLHF significantly reduces output diversity compared to SFT across a variety of measures, implying a tradeoff in current LLM fine-tuning methods between generalisation and diversity. Our results provide guidance on which fine-tuning method should be used depending on the application, and show that more research is needed to improve the tradeoff between generalisation and diversity. Robert Kirk, Ishita Mediratta, Christoforos Nalmpantis, Jelena Luketina, Eric Hambro, Edward Grefenstette, Roberta Raileanu |
ICLR | 1 |
| 2024 | Generalization to New Sequential Decision Making Tasks with In-Context LearningabstractTraining autonomous agents that can learn new tasks from only a handful of demonstrations is a long-standing problem in machine learning. Recently, transformers have been shown to learn new language or vision tasks without any weight updates from only a few examples, also referred to as in-context learning. However, the sequential decision making setting poses additional challenges having a lower tolerance for errors since the environment’s stochasticity or the agent’s actions can lead to unseen, and sometimes unrecoverable, states. In this paper, we use an illustrative example to show that naively applying transformers to sequential decision making problems does not enable in-context learning of new tasks. We then demonstrate how training on sequences of trajectories with certain distributional properties leads to in-context learning of new sequential decision making tasks. We investigate different design choices and find that larger model and dataset sizes, as well as more task diversity, environment stochasticity, and trajectory burstiness, all result in better in-context learning of new out-of-distribution tasks. By training on large diverse offline datasets, our model is able to learn new MiniHack and Procgen tasks without any weight updates from just a handful of demonstrations. Sharath Chandra, Eric Hambro, Robert Kirk, Mikael Henaff, Roberta Raileanu |
ICML | 3 |
| 2024 | Analysing the Generalisation and Reliability of Steering VectorsabstractSteering vectors (SVs) are a new approach to efficiently adjust language model behaviour at inference time by intervening on intermediate model activations. They have shown promise in terms of improving both capabilities and model alignment. However, the reliability and generalisation properties of this approach are unknown. In this work, we rigorously investigate these properties, and show that steering vectors have substantial limitations both in- and out-of-distribution. In-distribution, steerability is highly variable across different inputs. Depending on the concept, spurious biases can substantially contribute to how effective steering is for each input, presenting a challenge for the widespread use of steering vectors. Out-of-distribution, while steering vectors often generalise well, for several concepts they are brittle to reasonable changes in the prompt, resulting in them failing to generalise well. Overall, our findings show that while steering can work well in the right circumstances, there remain many technical difficulties of applying steering vectors to guide models' behaviour at scale. Daniel Tan 0001, David Chanin, Aengus Lynch, Brooks Paige, Dimitrios Kanoulas, Adrià Garriga-Alonso, Robert Kirk |
NeurIPS | 7 |
| 2023 | A Survey of Zero-shot Generalisation in Deep Reinforcement LearningabstractThe study of zero-shot generalisation (ZSG) in deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) aims to produce RL algorithms whose policies generalise well to novel unseen situations at deployment time, avoiding overfitting to their training environments. Tackling this is vital if we are to deploy reinforcement learning algorithms in real world scenarios, where the environment will be diverse, dynamic and unpredictable. This survey is an overview of this nascent field. We rely on a unifying formalism and terminology for discussing different ZSG problems, building upon previous works. We go on to categorise existing benchmarks for ZSG, as well as current methods for tackling these problems. Finally, we provide a critical discussion of the current state of the field, including recommendations for future work. Among other conclusions, we argue that taking a purely procedural content generation approach to benchmark design is not conducive to progress in ZSG, we suggest fast online adaptation and tackling RL-specific problems as some areas for future work on methods for ZSG, and we recommend building benchmarks in underexplored problem settings such as offline RL ZSG and reward-function variation. Robert Kirk, Amy Zhang 0001, Edward Grefenstette, Tim Rocktäschel |
J. Artif. Intell. Res. | 1 |
| 1981 | A timing verification system based on extracted MOS/VLSI circuit parameters
Pauline Ng, Wolfram Glauert, Robert Kirk |
DAC | 3 |
| 1980 | SIDS (A Symbolic Interactive Design System)abstractA new production approach to IC mask layout/checking is described which makes use of a combination of symbolic layout,computer checking and color graphics to resolve some of the problems in currently available layout systems. Techniques such as on-line design rule and connectivity checking, not found in other production systems, give the user “instant” feedback as he is designing. Dave Clary, Robert Kirk, Steve Sapiro |
DAC | 2 |