The second Cyber Security in Cars Workshop (CSCS'25) takes place in Taipei, Taiwan, on October 17, 2025, in conjunction with the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'25). CSCS is the successor of the yearly ACM Computer Science in Cars Symposium, which ran from 2017 to 2023. CSCS'25 aims to bring together researchers, practitioners, developers, and anyone interested in solving the myriad of complex problems of cyber security in modern vehicles. The conference offers a common platform to discuss new developments in vehicle technology and its applications. In addition to presenting current research contributions, the conference offers the opportunity for networking, joint brainstorming on current challenges, and the development of new solutions.

Lithium-ion batteries are becoming essential vehicle components with the ongoing shift to electric vehicles. Battery management systems manage these batteries. Typically, battery management systems used to be placed deep within the vehicle architecture, away from external interfaces. However, with increasing connectivity to backend systems, e.g., to improve monitoring battery properties and optimize charging, battery management systems have moved closer to the attack surface, increasing security risks. Also, batteries will soon be reused in so-called second life applications, e.g., as an energy storage system in a private home. While conventional methods involve removing the battery and reusing it with a new battery management system, modern methods retain the original system. Though security controls exist for first and second life applications, there is a lack of research on the transition phase. This paper analyzes the phase of transferring the battery management system from the first to the second life of particular relevance for security, privacy, and intellectual property. We try to close this research gap by analyzing the security aspects of a battery management system life cycle and its altering system environment. We are defining the transition phase, identifying necessary activities, and providing cybersecurity needs for the transitioning of battery management systems from first to second life.

The increasing attack surface of modern cars and the new regulatory requirements for cybersecurity (like UNECE R155) made cybersecurity an important part of car design. The "CSCS'24 Cyber Security in Cars Workshop" is designed to address current topics in the rapidly evolving automotive cybersecurity domain. The goal is to bring together academia and industry to find novel solutions for cybersecurity problems in the automotive domain. CSCS'24 is the first CSCS workshop co-located with ACM CCS. Nonetheless, it is founded on a series of events known as the "ACM Cyber Security in Cars Symposium (CSCS symposium)" that lasted from 2017 until 2023. CSCS'24 welcomes any theoretical or practical contributions to the rich field of automotive cybersecurity, including secure automotive communication, ECU system security, and aspects of Cyber Security Management Systems (CSMS).

This poster presents work-in-progress in the field of usable security. The usability of security mechanisms is crucial to avoid unintended misuse of security mechanisms which lowers the security level of a system. It is the goal of the work presented in this poster to identify security design patterns with good usability. Requirements for security design patterns with good usability stem from existing usable security design guidelines. A collection of security usability failures is presented as well as examples of how misuse anti-patterns can be derived from these failures. Misuse cases will be used in future work to identify security design patterns with good usability.

Secure communication is very important in computer networks and authentication is one of the most eminent preconditions. However, common authentication schemes are not applicable in ad hoc networks because public key infrastructures with a centralized certification authority are hard to deploy there. We propose and evaluate a security concept based on a distributed certification facility. A network is divided into clusters with one special head node each. These cluster head nodes execute administrative functions and hold shares of a network key used for certification. New nodes start to participate in the network as guests; they can only become full members with a network-signed certificate after their authenticity has been warranted by some other members. The feasibility of this concept was verified by simulation. Three different models for node mobility were used in order to include realistic scenarios as well as make the results comparable to other work. The simulation results include an evaluation of the log-on times, availability, and communication overhead.