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Christoph Lucas

dblp:04/8318 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2013
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure multiparty computation
0.322013
A Dynamic Tradeoff between Active and Passive Corruptions in Secure Multi-Party Computation · CRYPTO (2) 2013
Hybrid-secure MPC: trading information-theoretic robustness for computational privacy · PODC 2010
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › adversarial model
corruption models
0.212013
A Dynamic Tradeoff between Active and Passive Corruptions in Secure Multi-Party Computation · CRYPTO (2) 2013

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

fault-tolerant distributed computation · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2013 A Dynamic Tradeoff between Active and Passive Corruptions in Secure Multi-Party Computation
Martin Hirt, Christoph Lucas, Ueli Maurer
CRYPTO (2)2
2013 Erratum: A Dynamic Tradeoff between Active and Passive Corruptions in Secure Multi-Party Computation
Martin Hirt, Christoph Lucas, Ueli Maurer
CRYPTO (2)2
2010 Hybrid-secure MPC: trading information-theoretic robustness for computational privacy
abstract
Most protocols for distributed, fault-tolerant computation, or multi-party computation (MPC), provide security guarantees in an all-or-nothing fashion. In contrast, a hybrid-secure protocol provides different security guarantees depending on the set of corrupted parties and the computational power of the adversary, without being aware of the actual adversarial setting. Thus, hybrid-secure MPC protocols allow for graceful degradation of security.
Christoph Lucas, Dominik Raub, Ueli Maurer
PODC1