We present a novel class of jailbreak adversarial attacks on LLMs, termed Task-in-Prompt (TIP) attacks. Our approach embeds sequence-to-sequence tasks (e.g., cipher decoding, riddles, code execution) into the model’s prompt to indirectly generate prohibited inputs. To systematically assess the effectiveness of these attacks, we introduce the PHRYGE benchmark. We demonstrate that our techniques successfully circumvent safeguards in six state-of-the-art language models, including GPT-4o and LLaMA 3.2. Our findings highlight critical weaknesses in current LLM safety alignment and underscore the urgent need for more sophisticated defence strategies.

We introduce a heuristic for automatically checking the validity of first-order formulas of the form forallalphamexistbetanmiddot Psi(alpham,betan) that are encountered in inductive proofs of hardware correctness. The heuristic introduced in this paper is used to automatically check the validity of k-step induction formulas needed to verify hardware designs. The heuristic works on word-level designs that can have data and address buses of arbitrary widths. Our refinement heuristic relies on the idea of predicate instantiation introduced in (H. Abu-Haimed et al., 2003). The heuristic proves quantified formulas by the use of a validity checker, CVC (A. Stump et al., 2002), and a first-order theorem prover, Otter (W.W. McCune, 1994). Our heuristic can be used as a stand-alone technique to verify word-level designs or as a component in an interactive theorem prover. We show the effectiveness of this heuristic for hardware verification by verifying a number of hardware designs completely automatically. The large size of the quantified formulas encountered in these examples shows the effectiveness of our heuristic as a component of a theorem prover

We propose a new efficient automatic verification technique, Athena, for security protocol analysis. It uses a new efficient representation – our extension to the Strand Space Model, and utilizes techniques from both model checking and theorem proving approaches. Athena is fully automatic and is ab le to prove the correctness of many security protocols with arbitrary number of concurrent runs. The run time for a typical protocol from the literature, like the Needham–Schroeder protocol, is often a fraction of a second. Athena exploits several different techniques that enable it to analyze infinite sets of protocol runs and achieve such efficiency. Our extended Strand Space Model is a natural and efficient representation for the problem domain. The security properties are specified in a simple logic which permits both efficient proof search algorithms and has enough expressive power to specify interesting properties. The automatic proof search procedure borrows some efficient techniques from both model checking and theorem proving. We believe that it is the right combination of the new compact representation and all the techniques that actually makes Athena successful in fast and automatic verification of security protocols.