Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have rapidly gained prominence for their strong performance in solving complex tasks. Many modern black-box LRMs expose the intermediate reasoning traces through APIs to improve transparency (e.g., Gemini-2.5 and Claude-sonnet). Despite their benefits, we find that these traces can leak membership signals, creating a new privacy threat even without access to token logits used in prior attacks. In this work, we initiate the first systematic exploration of Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) on black-box LRMs. Our preliminary analysis shows that LRMs produce confident, recall-like reasoning traces on familiar training member samples but more hesitant, inference-like reasoning traces on non-members. The representations of these traces are continuously distributed in the semantic latent space, spanning from familiar to unfamiliar samples. Building on this observation, we propose BlackSpectrum, the first membership inference attack framework targeting the black-box LRMs. The key idea is to construct a recall–inference axis in the semantic latent space, based on representations derived from the exposed traces. By locating where a query sample falls along this axis, the attacker can obtain a membership score and predict how likely it is to be a member of the training data. Additionally, to address the limitations of outdated datasets unsuited to modern LRMs, we provide two new datasets to support future research, arXivReasoning and BookReasoning. Empirically, exposing reasoning traces greatly increases the vulnerability of LRMs to MIAs, boosting attack accuracy by up to 23.8%, AUC by 29.9%, and nearly doubling TPR@5%FPR. Our findings highlight the need for LRM companies to balance transparency in intermediate reasoning traces with privacy preservation.

Detecting whether a given text is a member in the pre-training data of Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial for ensuring data privacy and copyright protection. Most existing methods rely on the LLM's hidden information (e.g., model parameters or token probabilities), making them ineffective in the black-box setting, where only input and output texts are accessible. Although some methods have been proposed for the black-box setting, they rely on massive manual efforts such as designing complicated questions or instructions. To address these issues, we propose VeilProbe, the first framework for automatically detecting LLMs' pre-training texts in a black-box setting without human intervention. VeilProbe utilizes a sequence-to-sequence mapping model to infer the latent mapping feature between the input text and the corresponding output suffix generated by the LLM. Then it performs the key token perturbations to obtain more distinguishable membership features. Additionally, considering real-world scenarios where the ground-truth training text samples are limited, a prototype-based membership classifier is introduced to alleviate the overfitting issue. Extensive evaluations on three widely used datasets demonstrate that our framework is effective and superior in the black-box setting.