Binary code from untrusted sources remains one of the primary vehicles for malicious software attacks. This paper presents Reins, a new, more general, and lighter-weight binary rewriting and in-lining system to tame and secure untrusted binary programs. Unlike traditional monitors, Reins requires no cooperation from code-producers in the form of source code or debugging symbols, requires no client-side support infrastructure (e.g., a virtual machine or hypervisor), and preserves the behavior of even complex, event-driven, x86 native COTS binaries generated by aggressively optimizing compilers. This makes it exceptionally easy to deploy. The safety of programs rewritten by Reins is independently machine-verifiable, allowing rewriting to be deployed as an untrusted third-party service. An implementation of Reins for Microsoft Windows demonstrates that it is effective and practical for a real-world OS and architecture, introducing only about 2.4% runtime overhead to rewritten binaries.

Unlike library code, whose instruction addresses can be randomized by address space layout randomization (ASLR), application binary code often has static instruction addresses. Attackers can exploit this limitation to craft robust shell codes for such applications, as demonstrated by a recent attack that reuses instruction gadgets from the static binary code of victim applications.