Alejandro Hernández-Cano, Alexander Hägele, Allen Hao Huang, Angelika Romanou, Antoni-Joan Solergibert, Barna Pásztor, Bettina Messmer, Dhia Garbaya, Eduard Frank Ďurech, Ido Hakimi, Juan Garcia Giraldo, Mete Ismayilzada, Negar Foroutan, Skander Moalla, Tiancheng Chen, Vinko Sabolčec, Yixuan Xu, Michael Aerni, Badr AlKhamissi, Inés Altemir Marinas, Mohammad Hossein Amani, Matin Ansaripour, Ilia Badanin, Harold Benoit, Emanuela Boros, Nicholas John Browning, Fabian Bösch, Maximilian Böther, Niklas Canova, Camille Challier, Clément Charmillot, Jonathan Coles, Jan Milan Deriu, Arnout Devos, Lukas Drescher, Daniil Dzenhaliou, Maud Ehrmann, Dongyang Fan, Simin Fan, Silin Gao, Miguel Gila, María Grandury, Diba Hashemi, Alexander Miserlis Hoyle, Jiaming Jiang, Mark Klein, Andrei Kucharavy, Anastasiia Kucherenko, Frederike Lübeck, Roman Machacek, Theofilos Ioannis Manitaras, Andreas Marfurt, Kyle Matoba, Simon Matrenok, Henrique Mendonça, Fawzi Roberto Mohamed, Syrielle Montariol, Luca Mouchel, Sven Najem-Meyer, Jingwei Ni, Gennaro Oliva, Matteo Pagliardini, Elia Palme, Andrei Panferov, Léo Paoletti, Marco Passerini, Ivan Pavlov, Auguste Poiroux, Kaustubh Ponkshe, Nathan Ranchin, Javier Rando, Mathieu Sauser, Jakhongir Saydaliev, Mukhammadali Sayfiddinov, Marian Schneider, Stefano Schuppli, Marco Scialanga, Andrei Semenov, Kumar Shridhar, Raghav Singhal, Anna Sotnikova, Alexander Sternfeld, Ayush Kumar Tarun, Paul Teiletche, Jannis Vamvas, Xiaozhe Yao, Hao Zhao, Alexander Ilic, Ana Klimovic, Andreas Krause, Caglar Gulcehre, David Rosenthal, Elliott Ash, Florian Tramèr, Joost VandeVondele, Livio Veraldi, Martin Rajman, Thomas C. Schulthess, Torsten Hoefler, Antoine Bosselut, Martin Jaggi, Imanol Schlag. Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2026.

Two security domains that want to exchange information securely may need to agree on translations of mandatory access control (MAC) labels of their information, if their MAC labels have a different syntax or semantics. It is desirable that these translations do not introduce any confidentiality violations. We present a property, the security level translation property (SLTP), which must hold if the security level translation functions satisfy MAC confidentiality. This property is in some sense the best possible non-disclosure test of the level translations in the absence of a "common domain" that gives the real relationships among the levels of the two domains.

A decomposition method is given for showing restrictiveness that supports shared resource handling. The author splits a process into two subprocesses representing the server and client. The client process may request information and block until the information is sent. The server process will provide information when requested. This kind of method supports a natural way of expressing models using a shared resource such as file system. The author presents both the theoretical basis for the method as well as how it can be practically applied.>

Ways to securely buffer messages are examined. The focus is on the development of a decomposition theorem for the theory of restrictiveness, so that if the buffering part of a process and the output part of a process satisfy the specified constraints then the combined process is restrictive. This technique is applied to a number of buffering methods, including a priority queue. A method of decomposition for interrupt handling is shown.>

Previously, the author described a methodology for proving McCullough security (also called RADC hook-up security, restriction, and flow security) (Proc. Comput. Security Found. Workshop, pp.90-97, Mitre Tech Report M88-37, June 1988). He describes how to build a theorem generation mechanism for the validation of a security property which implies McCullough Security. He makes use of the USL language.>

Some issues in distributed system security are discussed in the context of the design of a secure distributed operating system (SDOS). The design is targeted for an A1 rating. Some developments in formal verification methods are reported. Distributed system security is contrasted with single-host and network security, and described in the context of the Trusted Network Interpretation. Problems unique to distributed system security are discussed. An argument is made for implementing security features in higher layers, corresponding roughly to the session through application layers of the OSI model. A security policy based on message-passing rather than reads and writes is described. The SDOS design is summarized.>

There has been much work in developing the interconnections between model theory and algebra. Here we look at a particular example, the divisible ordered abelian groups, and show how the indiscernibles are related to the algebraic structure. Now a divisible ordered abelian group is a model of Th (Q, +, 0, <) and so is linearly ordered by <. Thus the theory is unstable and has a large number of models. It is therefore unrealistic to expect that a simple condition will completely determine a model. Instead we would just like to obtain nice algebraic invariants. Definition. A subset C of a divisible ordered abelian group is a set of (order) indiscernibles iff for every sequence of integers n1,…,nk and for every c1 < … < ck and d1 < … < dk in C Note that this simplified form of indiscernibility is an immediate consequence of quantifier elimination for the theory. The above definition could be formulated in the language of +, 0, < but we have used subtraction as a matter of convenience. Similarly we may also use rational coefficients. Also note that a set of order indiscernibles is usually defined with respect to some external order. But in this case there are only two possibilities: the ordering inherited from or its reverse. So we will always assume that a set of order indiscernibles has the ordering inherited from . We may sometimes refer to a set of indiscernibles as a sequence of indiscernibles if we want to explicitly mention the ordering associated with the set.