EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Sam Owre
dblp:06/503
· DBLP profile ↗
17ranked-venue papers
5as first author
2since 2021 · last 2023
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 14 · 4 first-author · 2 since 2021Theory of computation · 11 · 4 first-author · 2 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Security and privacy · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
7 papers |
Automated reasoning and model checking · 81% Logic in computer science · 19% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
6 papers |
Program verification · 58% Programming languages and type systems · 27% Program analysis · 13% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
2 papers |
Embedded and real-time systems · 97% Hardware reliability and fault tolerance · 3% |
Topics — the 20 heaviest of 23, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Embedded and real-time systems
cyber-physical systems |
0.1 | 1 | 2012 | Automatic Dimensional Analysis of Cyber-Physical Systems · FM 2012 |
Automated reasoning and model checking
model checking |
0.1 | 2 | 2004 | SAL 2 · CAV 2004 PVS: Combining Specification, Proof Checking, and Model Checking · CAV 1996 |
Automated reasoning and model checking › model checking
symbolic model checking |
0.0 | 1 | 2004 | SAL 2 · CAV 2004 |
Automated reasoning and model checking
theorem proving |
0.0 | 2 | 2000 | Integrating WS1S with PVS · CAV 2000 PVS: Combining Specification, Proof Checking, and Model Checking · CAV 1996 |
Automated reasoning and model checking › automated reasoning › mathematical reasoning
arithmetic reasoning |
0.0 | 1 | 2001 | ICS: Integrated Canonizer and Solver · CAV 2001 |
Automated reasoning and model checking
decision procedures |
0.0 | 1 | 2001 | ICS: Integrated Canonizer and Solver · CAV 2001 |
Automated reasoning and model checking
satisfiability modulo theories |
0.0 | 1 | 2001 | ICS: Integrated Canonizer and Solver · CAV 2001 |
Program verification
theorem proving |
0.0 | 3 | 1998 | Subtypes for Specifications: Predicate Subtyping in PVS · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1998 Muse - A Computer Assisted Verification System · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987 Muse : A Computer Assisted Verification System · S&P 1986 |
Logic in computer science
monadic second-order logic |
0.0 | 1 | 2000 | Integrating WS1S with PVS · CAV 2000 |
Logic in computer science › monadic second-order logic
WS1S |
0.0 | 1 | 2000 | Integrating WS1S with PVS · CAV 2000 |
Program analysis › static analysis
abstract interpretation |
0.0 | 1 | 1998 | Computing Abstractions of Infinite State Systems Compositionally and Automatically · CAV 1998 |
Program verification
invariant verification |
0.0 | 1 | 1998 | InVeST: A Tool for the Verification of Invariants · CAV 1998 |
Programming languages and type systems
specification language |
0.0 | 1 | 1998 | Subtypes for Specifications: Predicate Subtyping in PVS · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1998 |
Programming languages and type systems
type systems |
0.0 | 1 | 1998 | Subtypes for Specifications: Predicate Subtyping in PVS · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1998 |
Automated reasoning and model checking
invariant generation |
0.0 | 1 | 1998 | InVeST: A Tool for the Verification of Invariants · CAV 1998 |
Logic in computer science
temporal logic |
0.0 | 1 | 2004 | SAL 2 · CAV 2004 |
Program verification › mechanized verification
proof checking |
0.0 | 1 | 1995 | Formal Verification for Fault-Tolerant Architectures: Prolegomena to the Design of PVS · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1995 |
Program verification
proof assistants |
0.0 | 2 | 1987 | Muse - A Computer Assisted Verification System · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987 Muse : A Computer Assisted Verification System · S&P 1986 |
Hardware reliability and fault tolerance
fault-tolerant architecture |
0.0 | 1 | 1995 | Formal Verification for Fault-Tolerant Architectures: Prolegomena to the Design of PVS · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1995 |
Program verification › model-based verification
state machine verification |
0.0 | 1 | 1986 | Muse : A Computer Assisted Verification System · S&P 1986 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
dimensional analysis · 0.3theorem proving · 0.0model checking · 0.0congruence closure · 0.0canonization · 0.0SMT solving · 0.0PVS · 0.0type checking · 0.0theorem prover · 0.0invariant proving · 0.0hierarchical development methodology · 0.0constraint proving · 0.0SPECIAL specification language · 0.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | An Augmented MetiTarski Dataset for Real Quantifier Elimination Using Machine Learning
John Hester, Briland Hitaj, Grant Olney Passmore, Sam Owre, Natarajan Shankar, Eric Yeh |
CICM | 4 |
| 2023 | CoProver: A Recommender System for Proof Construction
Eric Yeh, Briland Hitaj, Sam Owre, Maena Quemener, Natarajan Shankar |
CICM | 3 |
| 2017 | Making PVS Accessible to Generic Services by Interpretation in a Universal Format
Michael Kohlhase, Dennis Müller 0001, Sam Owre, Florian Rabe 0001 |
ITP | 3 |
| 2013 | Tool Integration with the Evidential Tool Bus
Simon Cruanes, Grégoire Hamon, Sam Owre, Natarajan Shankar |
VMCAI | 3 |
| 2012 | Automatic Dimensional Analysis of Cyber-Physical Systems
Sam Owre, Indranil Saha 0001, Natarajan Shankar |
FM | 1 |
| 2004 | SAL 2
Leonardo de Moura 0001, Sam Owre, Harald Ruess, John M. Rushby, Natarajan Shankar, Maria Sorea, Ashish Tiwari 0001 |
CAV | 2 |
| 2001 | ICS: Integrated Canonizer and Solver
Jean-Christophe Filliâtre, Sam Owre, Harald Ruess, Natarajan Shankar |
CAV | 2 |
| 2001 | Incremental Verification by Abstraction
Yassine Lakhnech, Saddek Bensalem, Sergey Berezin, Sam Owre |
TACAS | 4 |
| 2000 | Integrating WS1S with PVS
Sam Owre, Harald Ruess |
CAV | 1 |
| 1998 | Computing Abstractions of Infinite State Systems Compositionally and Automatically
Saddek Bensalem, Yassine Lakhnech, Sam Owre |
CAV | 3 |
| 1998 | InVeST: A Tool for the Verification of Invariants
Saddek Bensalem, Yassine Lakhnech, Sam Owre |
CAV | 3 |
| 1998 | Subtypes for Specifications: Predicate Subtyping in PVSabstractA specification language used in the context of an effective theorem prover can provide novel features that enhance precision and expressiveness. In particular, type checking for the language can exploit the services of the theorem prover. We describe a feature called "predicate subtyping" that uses this capability and illustrate its utility as mechanized in PVS. John M. Rushby, Sam Owre, Natarajan Shankar |
IEEE Trans. Software Eng. | 2 |
| 1996 | PVS: Combining Specification, Proof Checking, and Model Checking
Sam Owre, S. Rajan, John M. Rushby, Natarajan Shankar, Mandayam K. Srivas |
CAV | 1 |
| 1995 | Formal Verification for Fault-Tolerant Architectures: Prolegomena to the Design of PVSabstractPVS is the most recent in a series of verification systems developed at SRI. Its design was strongly influenced, and later refined, by our experiences in developing formal specifications and mechanically checked verifications for the fault-tolerant architecture, algorithms, and implementations of a model "reliable computing platform" (RCP) for life-critical digital flight-control applications, and by a collaborative project to formally verify the design of a commercial avionics processor called AAMP5. Several of the formal specifications and verifications performed in support of RCP and AAMP5 are individually of considerable complexity and difficulty. But in order to contribute to the overall goal, it has often been necessary to modify completed verifications to accommodate changed assumptions or requirements, and people other than the original developer have often needed to understand, review, build on, modify, or extract part of an intricate verification. We outline the verifications performed, present the lessons learned, and describe some of the design decisions taken in PVS to better support these large, difficult, iterative, and collaborative verifications.> Sam Owre, John M. Rushby, Natarajan Shankar, Friedrich W. von Henke |
IEEE Trans. Software Eng. | 1 |
| 1992 | PVS: A Prototype Verification System
Sam Owre, John M. Rushby, Natarajan Shankar |
CADE | 1 |
| 1987 | Muse - A Computer Assisted Verification SystemabstractMuse is a verification system which extends the collection of tools developed by SRI International for their Hierarchical Development Methodology (HDM). It enhances the SRI system by providing a capability for proving invariants and constraints for the state machine described by a specification written in SPECIAL (the specification language of HDM). In particular, it enables one to use the HDM system to meet the requirements for formal verification in a National Computer Security Center A1 evaluation of a secure operating system. In addition to the tools provided by SRI, Muse has a parser, a facility to handle multiple modules, a formula generator, and a theorem prover. The theorem prover has a number of interesting features designed to facilitate human direction of the proving process. In concept, it is open-ended. We introduce the notion of a theorem prover kernel as a device for ensuring the logical soundness of the prover in the face of continual improvements to its functionality. J. Daniel Halpern, Sam Owre, Norman Proctor, William F. Wilson |
IEEE Trans. Software Eng. | 2 |
| 1986 | Muse : A Computer Assisted Verification SystemabstractMuse is a verification system which extends the collection of tools developed by SRI for their Hierarchical Development Methodology (HDM). It enhances the SRI system by providing a capability for proving invariants and constraints for the state machine described by a SPECIAL specification. In particular, it enables one to use the HDM system to meet the requirements for formal verification in a National Computer Security Center Al evaluation of a secure operating system. In addition to the tools provided by SRI, Muse has a parser, a facility to handle multiple modules, a formula generator and a theorem prover. The theorem prover has a number of interesting features designed to facilitate human direction of the proving process. J. Daniel Halpern, Sam Owre, Norman Proctor, William F. Wilson |
S&P | 2 |