Clickjacking is a new attack which exploits a vulnerability in web applications. It tricks victims into clicking on something different from what they perceive they are clicking on. The victims may reveal confidential information or start unintended online transactions. Clickjacking can be prevented if appropriate countermeasures such as frame busting are implemented in web applications. However, the correct implementation is not easy. A trivial mistake in the implementation leads to evasion of the countermeasures. For the correct implementation, web developers must have intimate knowledge on evasion techniques of the countermeasures. In this paper, we propose Clickjuggler, an automated tool for checking for defenses against clickjacking during the development. Clickjuggler generates clickjacking attacks, performs those attacks on web applications, and checks whether the attacks are successful or not. By automating the process of checking for the clickjacking vulnerabilities, web developers are released from the burden of checking the correctness of their implementation. Unskillful developers can benefit from Clickjuggler since no special knowledge on clickjacking is needed to use Clickjuggler. Our experimental results demonstrate that Clickjuggler can check for the clickjacking vulnerabilities in 4 real-world web applications.

Many web applications employ session management to keep track of visitors' activities across pages and over periods of time. A session is a period of time linked to a visitor, which is initiated when he/she arrives at a web application and it ends when his/her browser is closed or after a certain time of inactivity. Attackers can hijack a user's session by exploiting session management vulnerabilities by means of session fixation and cross-site request forgery attacks. Even though such session management vulnerabilities can be eliminated in the development phase of web applications, the test operator is required to have detailed knowledge on the attacks and to set up a test environment each time he/she attempts to detect vulnerabilities. We propose a technique that automatically detects session management vulnerabilities in web applications by simulating real attacks. Our technique requires the test operator to only enter a few pieces of basic information about the web application, without requiring a test environment to be set up or detailed knowledge on the web application. Our experiments demonstrated that our technique could detect vulnerabilities in five web applications deployed in the real world.

Session fixation is a technique for obtaining the visitor's session identifier (SID) by forcing the visitor to use the SID supplied by the attacker. The attacker who obtains the victim's SID can masquerade as the visitor. In this paper, we propose a technique to automatically detect session fixation vulnerabilities in web applications. Our technique uses attack simulator that executes a real session fixation attack and check whether it is successful or not. In the experiment, our system successfully detected vulnerabilities in our original test cases and in a real world web application.