EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
David Sutherland
dblp:07/2393
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 1984
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Operating systems · 67% Program verification · 33% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Systems and software security · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Operating systems › system security › operating system security › secure operating system
multilevel secure operating system |
0.0 | 1 | 1984 | Formal Specification of a Multi-Level Secure Operating System · S&P 1984 |
Operating systems › system security › operating system security
secure operating system |
0.0 | 1 | 1984 | Formal Specification of a Multi-Level Secure Operating System · S&P 1984 |
Systems and software security › security engineering
security requirements specification |
0.0 | 1 | 1984 | Formal Specification of a Multi-Level Secure Operating System · S&P 1984 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
formal verification · 0.0formal specification · 0.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1984 | Formal Specification of a Multi-Level Secure Operating SystemabstractThe experiences of Odyssey Research Associates (0RA) in formally specifying and verifying a multi-level secure operating system for the Military Computer Family are described. ORA'S approach to linking system requirements to system functionality is explained, and certain deficiencies in the tools currently available for formal specification and verification are discussed. Tanya Korelsky, David Sutherland |
S&P | 2 |