This paper considers the problem of fair probabilistic binary classification with binary protected groups. The classifier assigns scores, and a practitioner predicts labels using a certain cut-off threshold based on the desired trade-off between false positives vs. false negatives. It derives these thresholds from the ROC of the classifier. The resultant classifier may be unfair to one of the two protected groups in the dataset. It is desirable that no matter what threshold the practitioner uses, the classifier should be fair to both the protected groups; that is, the ℒₚ norm between FPRs and TPRs of both the protected groups should be at most ε. We call such fairness on ROCs of both the protected attributes εₚ-Equalized ROC. Given a classifier not satisfying ε₁-Equalized ROC, we aim to design a post-processing method to transform the given (potentially unfair) classifier's output (score) to a suitable randomized yet fair classifier. That is, the resultant classifier must satisfy ε₁-Equalized ROC. First, we introduce a threshold query model on the ROC curves for each protected group. The resulting classifier is bound to face a reduction in AUC. With the proposed query model, we provide a rigorous theoretical analysis of the minimal AUC loss to achieve ε₁-Equalized ROC. To achieve this, we design a linear time algorithm, namely FROC, to transform a given classifier's output to a probabilistic classifier that satisfies ε₁-Equalized ROC. We prove that under certain theoretical conditions, FROC achieves the theoretical optimal guarantees. We also study the performance of our FROC on multiple real-world datasets with many trained classifiers.

Abstract We formalize a framework for coordinating funding and selecting projects, the costs of which are shared among agents with quasi-linear utility functions and individual budgets. Our model contains the discrete participatory budgeting model as a special case, while capturing other useful scenarios. We propose several important axioms and objectives and study how well they can be simultaneously satisfied. We show that whereas welfare maximization admits an FPTAS, welfare maximization subject to a natural and very weak participation requirement leads to a strong inapproximability. This result is bypassed if we consider some natural restricted valuations, namely laminar single-minded valuations and symmetric valuations. Our analysis for the former restriction leads to the discovery of a new class of tractable instances for the Set Union Knapsack problem, a classical problem in combinatorial optimization.

In crowdsourcing systems, requesters publish tasks, and interested workers provide answers to get rewards. Worker anonymity motivates participation since it protects their privacy. Anonymity with unlinkability is an enhanced version of anonymity because it makes it impossible to “link” workers across the tasks they participate in. Another core feature of crowdsourcing systems is worker quality which expresses a worker's trustworthiness and quantifies their historical performance. In this work, we present AVeCQ, the first crowdsourcing system that reconciles these properties, achieving enhanced anonymity and verifiable worker quality updates. AVeCQ relies on a suite of cryptographic tools, such as zero-knowledge proofs, to (i) guarantee workers’ privacy, (ii) prove the correctness of worker quality scores and task answers, and (iii) commensurate payments. AVeCQ is developed modularly, where requesters and workers communicate over a platform that supports pseudonymity, information logging, and payments. To compare AVeCQ with the state-ofthe-art, we prototype it over Ethereum. AVeCQ outperforms the state-of-the-art in three popular crowdsourcing tasks (image annotation, average review, and Gallup polls). E.g., for an Average Review task with 5 choices and 128 workers AVeCQ is 40% faster (including computing and verifying necessary proofs, and blockchain transaction processing overheads) with the task's requester consuming 87% fewer gas.

The recently proposed Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM) literature studies the strategic interaction between the miner of a block and the transaction creators (or users) in a blockchain. In a TFM, the miner includes transactions that maximize its utility while users submit fees for a slot in the block. The existing TFM literature focuses on satisfying standard incentive properties – which may limit widespread adoption. We argue that a TFM is “fair” to the transaction creators if it satisfies specific notions, namely Zero-fee Transaction Inclusion and Monotonicity. First, we prove that one generally cannot ensure both these properties and prevent a miner’s strategic manipulation. We also show that existing TFMs either do not satisfy these notions or do so at a high cost to the miners’ utility. As such, we introduce a novel TFM using on-chain randomness – rFTM. We prove that rFTM guarantees incentive compatibility for miners and users while satisfying our novel fairness constraints.

Rational Consensus (RC) is a more realistic modelling of the traditional Byzantine Consensus problem, motivated by the recent works in Rational Cryptography. RC is the problem of achieving consensus in the presence of Rational, Byzantine and Honest players (players- participants in the consensus protocol) in a distributed system. This work focuses on consensus in multiple rounds with additional agreement on ordering among rounds which is a more general problem called Atomic BroadCast (ABC). Blockchains is an example of application of ABC. This work abstracts rational players in three types on their incentive structure. We show the impossibility of achieving consensus for two out of the three types of rational players under some conditions. For the third type of rational players, existing work models a single round of agreement and, therefore, doesn't capture the existence of another insecure equilibrium strategy for rational players. We finally fill the gap in the literature of a Rational ABC by proposing a novel protocol for rational consensus, namely pRFT. We prove (i) the correctness of the protocol and (ii) the communication complexity of pRFT, which is a form of accountable protocol, equals the best-known accountable agreement protocols.

Civic Crowdfunding (CC) uses the ``power of the crowd" to garner contributions towards public projects. As these projects are non-excludable, agents may prefer to ``free-ride," resulting in the project not being funded. Researchers introduce refunds for single project CC to incentivize agents to contribute, guaranteeing the project's funding. These funding guarantees are applicable only when agents have an unlimited budget. This paper focuses on a combinatorial setting, where multiple projects are available for CC and agents have a limited budget. We study specific conditions where funding can be guaranteed. Naturally, funding the optimal social welfare subset of projects is desirable when every available project cannot be funded due to budget restrictions. We prove the impossibility of achieving optimal welfare at equilibrium for any monotone refund scheme. Further, given the contributions of other agents, we prove that it is NP-Hard for an agent to determine its optimal strategy. That is, while profitable deviations may exist for agents instead of funding the optimal welfare subset, it is computationally hard for an agent to find its optimal deviation. Consequently, we study different heuristics agents can use to contribute to the projects in practice. We demonstrate the heuristics' performance as the average-case trade-off between the welfare obtained and an agent's utility through simulations.

Proof-of-Stake(PoS) based blockchain protocols have gained popularity due to their higher throughput and low carbon footprint when compared with Proof-of-Work blockchain protocols. The two major parts of blockchain protocols are the selection of the next block proposer and the selection of the longest chain. In PoS the block publishers are selected based on their relative stake. However, PoS-based blockchain protocols may face vulnerability against Fully Adaptive Corruptions. This paper proposes a novel PoS-based blockchain protocol, QuickSync, to achieve security against Fully Adaptive Corruptions while improving performance. Towards this, we propose a metric for each block: block power. We compute the chain power of a chain as the sum of block powers of all the blocks comprising the chain. The chain selection rule selects the chain with the highest chain power as the valid chain. Since the block proposer is not selected upfront, this scheme is resilient to fully adaptive corruptions, which we also show formally. We also ensure that our block power mechanism is resistant to Sybil attacks. We prove the security of QuickSync by showing that it satisfies the common prefix, chain growth, and chain quality properties. Our analysis demonstrates that QuickSync performs better than Bitcoin by order of magnitude on both transactions per second and time to finality.

One of the widely used peak reduction methods in smart grids is demand response, where one analyzes the shift in customers' (agents') usage patterns in response to the signal from the distribution company. Often, these signals are in the form of incentives offered to agents. This work studies the effect of incentives on the probabilities of accepting such offers in a real-world smart grid simulator, PowerTAC. We first show that there exists a function that depicts the probability of an agent reducing its load as a function of the discounts offered to them. We call it reduction probability (RP). RP function is further parametrized by the rate of reduction (RR), which can differ for each agent. We provide an optimal algorithm, MJS--ExpResponse, that outputs the discounts to each agent by maximizing the expected reduction under a budget constraint. When RRs are unknown, we propose a Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) based online algorithm, namely MJSUCB--ExpResponse, to learn RRs. Experimentally we show that it exhibits sublinear regret. Finally, we showcase the efficacy of the proposed algorithm in mitigating demand peaks in a real-world smart grid system using the PowerTAC simulator as a test bed.

The long-term feasibility of blockchain technology is hindered by the inability of existing blockchain protocols to prune the consensus data leading to constantly growing storage and communication requirements. Kiayias et al. have proposed Non-Interactive-Proofs-of-Proof-of-Works (NIPoPoWs) as a mecha-nism to reduce the storage and communication complexity of blockchains to O(poly log(n)). However, their protocol is only resilient to an adversary that may control strictly less than a third of the total computational power, which is a reduction from the security guaranteed by Bitcoin and other existing Proof-of-based blockchains. We present an improvement to the Kiayias et al. proposal, which is resilient against an adversary that may control less than half of the total computational power while operating in$o$(polylog$(n)$) storage and communication complexity. Additionally, we present a novel proof that establishes a lower bound of$O(\log(n))$on the storage and communication complexity of any PoW-based blockchain protocol.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) enables agents to learn how to perform various tasks from scratch. In domains like autonomous driving, recommendation systems, and more, optimal RL policies learned could cause a privacy breach if the policies memorize any part of the private reward. We study the set of existing differentially-private RL policies derived from various RL algorithms such as Value Iteration, Deep-Q Networks, and Vanilla Proximal Policy Optimization. We propose a new Privacy-Aware Inverse RL analysis framework (PRIL) that involves performing reward reconstruction as an adversarial attack on private policies that the agents may deploy. For this, we introduce the reward reconstruction attack, wherein we seek to reconstruct the original reward from a privacy-preserving policy using the Inverse RL algorithm. An adversary must do poorly at reconstructing the original reward function if the agent uses a tightly private policy. Using this framework, we empirically test the effectiveness of the privacy guarantee offered by the private algorithms on instances of the FrozenLake domain of varying complexities. Based on the analysis performed, we infer a gap between the current standard of privacy offered and the standard of privacy needed to protect reward functions in RL. We do so by quantifying the extent to which each private policy protects the reward function by measuring distances between the original and reconstructed rewards.

Cryptocurrencies are poised to revolutionize the modern economy by democratizing commerce. These currencies operate on top of blockchain-based distributed ledgers. Existing permissionless blockchain-based protocols offer unparalleled benefits like decentralization, anonymity, and transparency. However, these protocols suffer in performance which hinders their widespread adoption. In particular, high time-to-finality and low transaction rates keep them from replacing centralized payment systems such as the Visa network. Permissioned blockchain protocols offer attractive performance guarantees, but they are not considered suitable for deploying decentralized cryptocurrencies due to their centralized nature. Researchers have developed several multi-layered blockchain protocols that combine both permissioned and permissionless blockchain protocols to achieve high performance along with decentralization. The key idea with existing layered blockchain protocols in literature is to divide blockchain operations into two layers and use different types of consensus to manage each layer. However, many such works come with the assumptions of honest majority which may not accurately reflect the real world where the participants may be self-interested or rational. These assumptions may render the protocols susceptible to security threats in the real world, as highlighted by the literature focused on exploring game-theoretic attacks on these protocols. We generalize the “layered” approach taken by existing protocols in the literature and present a framework to analyze the system in the BAR Model and provide a generalized game-theoretic analysis of such protocols. Using our analysis, we identify the critical system parameters required for a distributed ledger’s secure operation in a more realistic setting.

An autonomous broker that liaises between retail customers and power-generating companies (GenCos) is essential for the smart grid ecosystem. The efficiency brought in by such brokers to the smart grid setup can be studied through a well-developed simulation environment. In this paper, we describe the design of one such energy broker called VidyutVanika21 (VV21) and analyze its performance using a simulation platform called PowerTAC (PowerTrading Agent Competition). Specifically, we discuss the retail (VV21–RM) and wholesale market (VV21–WM) modules of VV21 that help the broker achieve high net profits in a competitive setup. Supported by game-theoretic analysis, the VV21–RM designs tariff contracts that a) maintain a balanced portfolio of different types of customers; b) sustain an appropriate level of market share, and c) introduce surcharges on customers to reduce energy usage during peak demand times. The VV21–WM aims to reduce the cost of procurement by following the supply curve of the GenCo to identify its lowest ask for a particular auction which is then used to generate suitable bids. We further demonstrate the efficacy of the retail and wholesale strategies of VV21 in PowerTAC 2021 finals and through several controlled experiments.

We study fairness in the context of feature-based price discrimination in monopoly markets. We propose a new notion of individual fairness, namely, \alpha-fairness, which guarantees that individuals with similar features face similar prices. First, we study discrete valuation space and give an analytical solution for optimal fair feature-based pricing. We show that the cost of fair pricing is defined as the ratio of expected revenue in an optimal feature-based pricing to the expected revenue in an optimal fair feature-based pricing (CoF) can be arbitrarily large in general. When the revenue function is continuous and concave with respect to the prices, we show that one can achieve CoF strictly less than 2, irrespective of the model parameters. Finally, we provide an algorithm to compute fair feature-based pricing strategy that achieves this CoF.

Advances in mobile computing have paved the way for new types of distributed applications that can be executed solely by mobile devices on Device-to-Device (D2D) ecosystems (e.g., crowdsensing). Sophisticated applications, like cryptocurrencies, need distributed ledgers (DLs) to function. DLs, such as blockchains and directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), employ consensus protocols to add data in the form of blocks. However, such protocols are designed for resourceful devices that are interconnected via the Internet. Moreover, existing DLs are not deployable to D2D ecosystems since their storage needs are continuously increasing. In this work, we introduce and analyze Mneme, a DAG-based DL that can be maintained solely by mobile devices. Mneme utilizes two novel consensus protocols: 1) Proof of Context (PoC) and 2) Proof of Equivalence (PoE). PoC employs users’ context to add data on Mneme. PoE is executed periodically to summarize data and produce equivalent blocks that require less storage. We analyze Mneme’s security and justify the ability of PoC and PoE to guarantee the characteristics of DLs: persistence and liveness. Furthermore, we analyze potential attacks from malicious users and prove that the probability of a successful attack is inversely proportional to the square of the number of mobile users who maintain Mneme.

Community Question Answering Websites (CQAs) like Stack Overflow rely on continuous user contributions to keep their services active. Nevertheless, they often undergo a sharp decline in their user participation during the holiday season, undermining their performance. To address this issue, some CQAs have developed their own special promotional gamification schemes to incentivize users to maintain their contributions throughout the holiday season. These promotional gamification schemes are often time-limited, optional, and run alongside the default gamification schemes of their websites. However, the impact of such promotional gamification schemes on user behavior remains largely unexplored in the existing literature. This paper takes the first steps toward filling this knowledge gap by conducting a large-scale empirical study of a particular promotional gamification scheme called Winter Bash (WB) on the CQA of Stack Overflow. According to our findings, promotional gamification schemes may not be the panacea they are portrayed to be. For example, in the case of WB, we find that the scheme is not effective for improving the collective engagement of all users. Only some particular user types (i.e., experienced and reputable users) are often provoked under WB. Most novice users, who comprise the majority of Stack Overflow website's user base, seem to be indifferent to such a gamification scheme. Our research also shows the importance of studying the quantity and quality of user engagement in unison to better understand the effectiveness of a gamification scheme. Previous gamification studies in the literature have focused predominantly on studying the quantity of user engagement alone. Last but not least, we conclude our paper by presenting some practical considerations for improving the design of future promotional gamification schemes in CQAs and similar platforms.

Periodic Double Auctions (PDAs) are commonly used in the real world for trading, e.g. in stock markets to determine stock opening prices, and energy markets to trade energy in order to balance net demand in smart grids, involving trillions of dollars in the process. A bidder, participating in such PDAs, has to plan for bids in the current auction as well as for the future auctions, which highlights the necessity of good bidding strategies. In this paper, we perform an equilibrium analysis of single unit single-shot double auctions with a certain clearing price and payment rule, which we refer to as ACPR, and find it intractable to analyze as number of participating agents increase. We further derive the best response for a bidder with complete information in a single-shot double auction with ACPR. Leveraging the theory developed for single-shot double auction and taking the PowerTAC wholesale market PDA as our testbed, we proceed by modeling the PDA of PowerTAC as an MDP. We propose a novel bidding strategy, namely MDPLCPBS. We empirically show that MDPLCPBS follows the equilibrium strategy for double auctions that we previously analyze. In addition, we benchmark our strategy against the baseline and the state-of-the-art bidding strategies for the PowerTAC wholesale market PDAs, and show that MDPLCPBS outperforms most of them consistently.

Demand response is a crucial tool to maintain the stability of the smart grids. With the upcoming research trends in the area of electricity markets, it has become a possibility to design a dynamic pricing system, and consumers are made aware of what they are going to pay. Though the dynamic pricing system (pricing based on the total demand a distributor company is facing) seems to be one possible solution, the current dynamic pricing approaches are either too complex for a consumer to understand or are too naive leading to inefficiencies in the system (either consumer side or distributor side). Due to these limitations, the recent literature is focusing on the approach to provide incentives to the consumers to reduce the electricity, especially in peak hours. For each round, the goal is to select a subset of consumers to whom the distributor should offer incentives so as to minimize the loss which comprises of cost of buying the electricity from the market, uncertainties at consumer end, and cost incurred to the consumers to reduce the electricity which is a private information to the consumers. Due to the uncertainties in the loss function (arising from renewable energy resources as well as consumption needs), traditional auction theory-based incentives face manipulation challenges. Towards this, we propose a novel combinatorial multi-armed bandit (MAB) algorithm, which we refer to as \namemab\ to learn the uncertainties along with an auction to elicit true costs incurred by the consumers. We prove that our mechanism is regret optimal and is incentive compatible. We further demonstrate efficacy of our algorithms via simulations.

In classification models, fairness can be ensured by solving a constrained optimization problem. We focus on fairness constraints like Disparate Impact, Demographic Parity, and Equalized Odds, which are non-decomposable and non-convex. Researchers define convex surrogates of the constraints and then apply convex optimization frameworks to obtain fair classifiers. Surrogates serve as an upper bound to the actual constraints, and convexifying fairness constraints is challenging. We propose a neural network-based framework, \emph{FNNC}, to achieve fairness while maintaining high accuracy in classification. The above fairness constraints are included in the loss using Lagrangian multipliers. We prove bounds on generalization errors for the constrained losses which asymptotically go to zero. The network is optimized using two-step mini-batch stochastic gradient descent. Our experiments show that FNNC performs as good as the state of the art, if not better. The experimental evidence supplements our theoretical guarantees. In summary, we have an automated solution to achieve fairness in classification, which is easily extendable to many fairness constraints.

Advances in mobile computing have paved the way for new types of distributed applications that can be executed solely by mobile devices on device-to-device (D2D) ecosystems (e.g., crowdsensing). More sophisticated applications, like cryptocurrencies, need distributed ledgers to function. Distributed ledgers, such as blockchains and directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), employ consensus protocols to add data in the form of blocks. However such protocols are designed for resourceful devices that are interconnected via the Internet. Moreover, existing distributed ledgers are not deployable to D2D ecosystems since their storage needs are continuously increasing. In this work, we introduce Mneme, a DAG-based distributed ledger that can be maintained solely by mobile devices and operates via two consensus protocols: Proof-of-Context (PoC) and Proof-of-Equivalence (PoE). PoC employs users' context to add data on Mneme. PoE is executed periodically to summarize data and produce equivalent blocks that require less storage. We analyze the security of Mneme and justify the ability of PoC and PoE to guarantee the characteristics of distributed ledgers: persistence and liveness. Furthermore, we analyze potential attacks from malicious users and prove that the probability of a successful attack is inversely proportional to the square of the number of mobile users who maintain Mneme.

A smart grid is an efficient and sustainable energy system that integrates diverse generation entities, distributed storage capacity, and smart appliances and buildings. A smart grid brings new kinds of participants in the energy market served by it, whose effect on the grid can only be determined through high fidelity simulations. Power TAC offers one such simulation platform using real-world weather data and complex state-of-the-art customer models. In Power TAC, autonomous energy brokers compete to make profits across tariff, wholesale and balancing markets while maintaining the stability of the grid. In this paper, we design an autonomous broker VidyutVanika, the runner-up in the 2018 Power TAC competition. VidyutVanika relies on reinforcement learning (RL) in the tariff market and dynamic programming in the wholesale market to solve modified versions of known Markov Decision Process (MDP) formulations in the respective markets. The novelty lies in defining the reward functions for MDPs, solving these MDPs, and the application of these solutions to real actions in the market. Unlike previous participating agents, VidyutVanika uses a neural network to predict the energy consumption of various customers using weather data. We use several heuristic ideas to bridge the gap between the restricted action spaces of the MDPs and the much more extensive action space available to VidyutVanika. These heuristics allow VidyutVanika to convert near-optimal fixed tariffs to time-of-use tariffs aimed at mitigating transmission capacity fees, spread out its orders across several auctions in the wholesale market to procure energy at a lower price, more accurately estimate parameters required for implementing the MDP solution in the wholesale market, and account for wholesale procurement costs while optimizing tariffs. We use Power TAC 2018 tournament data and controlled experiments to analyze the performance of VidyutVanika, and illustrate the efficacy of the above strategies.

In the last decade, civic crowdfunding has proved to be effective in generating funds for the provision of public projects. However, the existing literature deals only with citizen's with positive valuation and symmetric belief towards the project's provision. In this work, we present novel mechanisms which break these two barriers, i.e., mechanisms which incorporate negative valuation and asymmetric belief, independently. For negative valuation, we present a methodology for converting existing mechanisms to mechanisms that incorporate agents with negative valuations. Particularly, we adapt existing PPR and PPS mechanisms, to present novel PPRN and PPSN mechanisms which incentivize strategic agents to contribute to the project based on their true preference. With respect to asymmetric belief, we propose a reward scheme Belief Based Reward (BBR) based on Robust Bayesian Truth Serum mechanism. With BBR, we propose a general mechanism for civic crowdfunding which incorporates asymmetric agents. We leverage PPR and PPS, to present PPRx and PPSx. We prove that in PPRx and PPSx, agents with greater belief towards the project's provision contribute more than agents with lesser belief. Further, we also show that contributions are such that the project is provisioned at equilibrium.

Although peer prediction markets are widely used in crowdsourcing to aggregate information from agents, they often fail to reward the participating agents equitably. Honest agents can be wrongly penalized if randomly paired with dishonest ones. In this work, we introduce selective and cumulative fairness. We characterize a mechanism as fair if it satisfies both notions and present FaRM, a representative mechanism we designed. FaRM is a Nash incentive mechanism that focuses on information aggregation for spontaneous local activities which are accessible to a limited number of agents without assuming any prior knowledge of the event. All the agents in the vicinity observe the same information. FaRM uses (i) a report strength score to remove the risk of random pairing with dishonest reporters, (ii) a consistency score to measure an agent's history of accurate reports and distinguish valuable reports, (iii) a reliability score to estimate the probability of an agent to collude with nearby agents and prevents agents from getting swayed, and (iv) a location robustness score to filter agents who try to participate without being present in the considered setting. Together, report strength, consistency, and reliability represent a fair reward given to agents based on their reports.

The popularity and applicability of mobile crowdsensing applications are continuously increasing due to the widespread of mobile devices and their sensing and processing capabilities. However, we need to offer appropriate incentives to the mobile users who contribute their resources and preserve their privacy. Blockchain technologies enable semi-anonymous multi-party interactions and can be utilized in crowdsensing applications to maintain the privacy of the mobile users while ensuring first-rate crowdsensed data. In this work, we propose to use blockchain technologies and smart contracts to orchestrate the interactions between mobile crowdsensing providers and mobile users for the case of spatial crowdsensing, where mobile users need to be at specific locations to perform the tasks. Smart contracts, by operating as processes that are executed on the blockchain, are used to preserve users' privacy and make payments. Furthermore, for the assignment of the crowdsensing tasks to the mobile users, we design a truthful, cost-optimal auction that minimizes the payments from the crowdsensing providers to the mobile users. Extensive experimental results show that the proposed privacy preserving auction outperforms state-of-the-art proposals regarding cost by ten times for high numbers of mobile users and tasks.

Crowdfunding is emerging as a popular means to generate funding from citizens for public projects. This is popularly known as civic crowdfunding. In this paper, we focus on crowdfunding public projects with provision point: these are projects in which contributions must reach a predetermined threshold in order for the project to be provisioned. On web based civic crowdfunding platforms, the success of crowdfunding public projects has been somewhat mixed. In this paper, our objective is to design a mechanism that improves the success of crowdfunding public projects. In particular, we propose a class of mechanisms for crowdfunding platforms with sequentially arriving agents. This class of mechanisms induces an extensive form game for agents arriving on the platform and we show that the game has a non-empty set of sub-game perfect equilibria at which the project is fully funded. We call this new class of mechanisms Provision Point Mechanism with Securities (PPS). The novelty of PPS lies in the use of a prediction market to incentivize agents to contribute in proportion to their true value for the project and to contribute as soon as they arrive at the crowdfunding platform. Different variations of PPS are possible depending on the underlying prediction market. In this paper, we use a cost function (or equivalently, scoring rule) based prediction market; in fact, we specify the requirements that a cost function should satisfy to be used in PPS. We study and compare two specific instances of PPS: (1) Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule based and (2) Quadratic Scoring Rule based. We also discuss the considerations that should guide the choice of the cost function when deploying our mechanism on crowdfunding platforms.

Motivated by web based marketplaces where the number of bidders in an auction is a small subset of potential bidders, we consider auctions where the auctioneer (seller) wishes to increase her revenue and/or social welfare by expanding the pool of participants. To this end, the seller crowdsources this task by offering a referral bonus to the participants. With the introduction of referrals, a participant can now bid and/or refer other agents to bid. We call our auctions crowdsourced referral auctions since the seller exploits the knowledge that agents have about other potential participants in the crowd. We introduce the notion of price of locality to quantify the loss in social welfare due to restricted (local) access of the seller to potential bidders. We introduce the notion of Crowdsourced Referral Auction Mechanisms (CRAMs), propose two novel versions of CRAMs and study the induced referral game in the canonical context of an auction for selling a single indivisible item. We compare their revenue performance and game theoretic properties and show that both of them outperform the baseline auction without referrals.

Dynamic resource assignment is a common problem in multi-agent systems. We consider scenarios in which dynamic agents have preferences about assignments and the resources that can be assigned using online auctions. We study the trade-off between the following online auction properties: (i) truthfulness, (ii) expressiveness, (iii) efficiency, and (iv) average case performance. We theoretically and empirically compare four different online auctions: (i) Arrival Priority Serial Dictatorship, (ii) Split Dynamic VCG, (iii) e-Action, and (iv) Online Ranked Competition Auction. The latter is a novel design based on the competitive secretary problem. We show that, in addition to truthfulness and algorithmic efficiency, the degree of competition also plays an important role in selecting the best algorithm for a given context.

The popularity of digital currencies, especially cryptocurrencies, has been continuously growing since the appearance of Bitcoin. Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer (P2P) cryptocurrency protocol enabling transactions between individuals without the need of a trusted authority. Its network is formed from resources contributed by individuals known as miners. Users of Bitcoin currency create transactions that are stored in a specialised data structure called a block chain. Bitcoin's security lies in a proof-of-work scheme, which requires high computational resources at the miners. These miners have to be synchronised with any update in the network, which produces high data traffic rates. Despite advances in mobile technology, no cryptocurrencies have been proposed for mobile devices. This is largely due to the lower processing capabilities of mobile devices when compared with conventional computers and the poorer Internet connectivity to that of the wired networking. In this work, we propose LocalCoin, an alternative cryptocurrency that requires minimal computational resources, produces low data traffic and works with off-the-shelf mobile devices. LocalCoin replaces the computational hardness that is at the root of Bitcoin's security with the social hardness of ensuring that all witnesses to a transaction are colluders. It is based on opportunistic networking rather than relying on infrastructure and incorporates characteristics of mobile networks such as users' locations and their coverage radius in order to employ an alternative proof-of-work scheme. Localcoin features (i) a lightweight proof-of-work scheme and (ii) a distributed block chain.

This paper presents a framework for Robust Infrastructure over Shared Computing resource (RISC), which can offer Organizations with Small-scale Computing infrastructures (OSCs) a way to share their unused resources in an ad-hoc manner for suitable monetary incentives. Such a framework provides dual benefits to an OSC: it enables sharing of unused resource during periods of low computing load while allowing execution of any long-term computation on public or anonym zed data at a very low cost during periods of high load. The ad-hoc and heterogeneous nature of the shared infrastructure make the resource management problem inRISC non-trivial -- a resource manager needs to: (i) maximize profit while determining incentives for resource owners and prices for resource users in an integrated manner, and (ii)emulate large-scale cloud-like robustness and capabilities out of unreliable, small-scale and intermittently available resources at a low cost. This leads to a constrained market situation where offered prices and incentives should lead to a desired level of SLA and reliability for the consumers. Existing approaches of incentive based scheduling for market-like grids assume an open market, based only on demand response, and thus are inapplicable for the constrained market situation in shared resources infrastructure. Specifically, RISC framework has two main components: (i) a first-of-a-kind Dynamic Pricing and Incentivization (DPI) strategy that computes the incentives and the prices while maximizing profit for RISC, using an epoch-by-epoch pricing feedback loop, and (ii) a DPI dependent Reliability, Cost and Seaware(RCS) scheduler that takes the resource reservation requests as input and assigns replicas of these requests tone or more shared resources for guaranteeing performanceSLAs and reliability, while minimizing the cost of resource reservations. Moreover, to handle the communication overhead of computing over geographically distributed resources, the scheduler strives to reduce the network cost of resource allocation. Results from extensive trace-driven experimentation show that our approach can indeed provide appropriate incentives for resource providers, and robust cost-efficient infrastructure solution for resource users.

This paper presents C-CLOUD, a democratic cloud infrastructure for renting computing resources includingnon-cloud resources (i.e. computing equipment not part of any cloud infrastructure, such as, PCs, laptops, enterprise servers and clusters). C-CLOUD enables enormous amount of surplus computing resources, in the range of hundreds of millions, to be rented out to cloud users. Such a sharing of resources allows resource owners to earn from idle resources, and cloud users to have a cost-efficient alternative to large cloud providers. Compared to existing approaches to sharing surplus resources, C-CLOUD has two key challenges: ensuring Service Level Agreement (SLA) and reliability of reservations made over heterogeneous resources, and providing appropriate mechanism to encourage sharing of resources. In this context, C-CLOUD introduces novel incentive mechanism that determines resourcerents parametrically based on their reliability and capability.

There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p) each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem satisfying weak budget balance, individual rationality, and minimizing the budget imbalance. This calls for designing an appropriate rebate function. When the objects are identical, this problem has been solved which we refer as WCO mechanism. We measure the performance of such mechanisms by the redistribution index. We first prove an impossibility theorem which rules out linear rebate functions with non-zero redistribution index in heterogeneous object assignment. Motivated by this theorem, we explore two approaches to get around this impossibility. In the first approach, we show that linear rebate functions with non-zero redistribution index are possible when the valuations for the objects have a certain type of relationship and we design a mechanism with linear rebate function that is worst case optimal. In the second approach, we show that rebate functions with non-zero efficiency are possible if linearity is relaxed. We extend the rebate functions of the WCO mechanism to heterogeneous objects assignment and conjecture them to be worst case optimal.

We study a problem of dynamic allocation without money. Agents have arrivals and departures and strict preferences over items. Strategyproofness requires the use of an arrival-priority serial-dictatorship (APSD) mechanism, which is ex post Pareto efficient but has poor ex ante efficiency as measured through average rank efficiency. We introduce the scoring-rule (SR) mechanism, which biases in favor of allocating items that an agent values above the population consensus. The SR mechanism is not strategyproof but has tolerable manipulability in the sense that: (i) if every agent optimally manipulates, it reduces to APSD, and (ii) it significantly outperforms APSD for rank efficiency when only a fraction of agents are strategic. The performance of SR is also robust to mistakes by agents that manipulate on the basis of inaccurate information about the popularity of items.