Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data.
EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert

E. L. Burch

dblp:09/2185 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 1986
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 77% Authentication and access control · 23%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Operating systems · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › operating system security
security kernel		 0.011986
On the Design and the Implementation of Secure Xenix Workstations · S&P 1986
Operating systems › system security
operating system security		 0.011986
On the Design and the Implementation of Secure Xenix Workstations · S&P 1986
Authentication and access control
security policy		 0.011986
On the Design and the Implementation of Secure Xenix Workstations · S&P 1986
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1986 On the Design and the Implementation of Secure Xenix Workstations
abstract
Secure Xenix * is an experimental system designed to run on IBM PC/AT workstations. Like Xenix, it is a Unix implementation on the PC/AT workstation; unlike Xenix, it eliminates the Unix security deficiencies and it enhances security policies. In this paper, we present the design features of Secure Xenix, their integration within Xenix, and some of the lessons learned from this experiment to date. In addition, we address some of the problems specific to workstations in the security management area. The major design differences between Secure Xenix and other experiments with Unix security enhancements, such as LINUS IV, are also presented. In a companion paper, we present the important problems that arise in the testing of Secure Xenix and their solutions.
Virgil D. Gligor, E. L. Burch, C. Sekar Chandersekaran, Robert S. Chapman, Leslie J. Dotterer, Matthew S. Hecht, Wen-Der Jiang, Gary L. Luckenbaugh, N. Vasudevan
 S&P2