Positive and negative affective states are respectively associated with optimistic and pessimistic expectations regarding future reward. One mechanism that might underlie these affect-related expectation biases is attention to positive- versus negative-valence features (e.g., attending to the positive reviews of a restaurant versus its expensive price). Here we tested the effects of experimentally induced positive and negative affect on feature-based attention in 120 participants completing a compound-generalization task with eye-tracking. We found that participants' reward expectations for novel compound stimuli were modulated in an affect-congruent way: positive affect induction increased reward expectations for compounds, whereas negative affect induction decreased reward expectations. Computational modelling and eye-tracking analyses each revealed that these effects were driven by affect-congruent changes in participants' allocation of attention to high- versus low-value features of compounds. These results provide mechanistic insight into a process by which affect produces biases in generalized reward expectations.

Realistic and complex decision tasks often allow for many possible solutions. How do we find the correct one? Introspection suggests a process of trying out solutions one after the other until success. However, such methodical serial testing may be too slow, especially in environments with noisy feedback. Alternatively, the underlying learning process may involve implicit reinforcement learning that learns about many possibilities in parallel. Here we designed a multi-dimensional probabilistic active-learning task tailored to study how people learn to solve such complex problems. Participants configured three-dimensional stimuli by selecting features for each dimension and received probabilistic reward feedback. We manipulated task complexity by changing how many feature dimensions were relevant to maximizing reward, as well as whether this information was provided to the participants. To investigate how participants learn the task, we examined models of serial hypothesis testing, feature-based reinforcement learning, and combinations of the two strategies. Model comparison revealed evidence for hypothesis testing that relies on reinforcement-learning when selecting what hypothesis to test. The extent to which participants engaged in hypothesis testing depended on the instructed task complexity: people tended to serially test hypotheses when instructed that there were fewer relevant dimensions, and relied more on gradual and parallel learning of feature values when the task was more complex. This demonstrates a strategic use of task information to balance the costs and benefits of the two methods of learning.

There is no single way to represent a task. Indeed, despite experiencing the same task events and contingencies, different subjects may form distinct task representations. As experimenters, we often assume that subjects represent the task as we envision it. However, such a representation cannot be taken for granted, especially in animal experiments where we cannot deliver explicit instruction regarding the structure of the task. Here, we tested how rats represent an odor-guided choice task in which two odor cues indicated which of two responses would lead to reward, whereas a third odor indicated free choice among the two responses. A parsimonious task representation would allow animals to learn from the forced trials what is the better option to choose in the free-choice trials. However, animals may not necessarily generalize across odors in this way. We fit reinforcement-learning models that use different task representations to trial-by-trial choice behavior of individual rats performing this task, and quantified the degree to which each animal used the more parsimonious representation, generalizing across trial types. Model comparison revealed that most rats did not acquire this representation despite extensive experience. Our results demonstrate the importance of formally testing possible task representations that can afford the observed behavior, rather than assuming that animals' task representations abide by the generative task structure that governs the experimental design.

The activity of neural populations in the brains of humans and animals can exhibit vastly different spatial patterns when faced with different tasks or environmental stimuli. The degrees of similarity between these neural activity patterns in response to different events are used to characterize the representational structure of cognitive states in a neural population. The dominant methods of investigating this similarity structure first estimate neural activity patterns from noisy neural imaging data using linear regression, and then examine the similarity between the estimated patterns. Here, we show that this approach introduces spurious bias structure in the resulting similarity matrix, in particular when applied to fMRI data. This problem is especially severe when the signal-to-noise ratio is low and in cases where experimental conditions cannot be fully randomized in a task. We propose Bayesian Representational Similarity Analysis (BRSA), an alternative method for computing representational similarity, in which we treat the covariance structure of neural activity patterns as a hyper-parameter in a generative model of the neural data. By marginalizing over the unknown activity patterns, we can directly estimate this covariance structure from imaging data. This method offers significant reductions in bias and allows estimation of neural representational similarity with previously unattained levels of precision at low signal-to-noise ratio, without losing the possibility of deriving an interpretable distance measure from the estimated similarity. The method is closely related to Pattern Component Model (PCM), but instead of modeling the estimated neural patterns as in PCM, BRSA models the imaging data directly and is suited for analyzing data in which the order of task conditions is not fully counterbalanced. The probabilistic framework allows for jointly analyzing data from a group of participants. The method can also simultaneously estimate a signal-to-noise ratio map that shows where the learned representational structure is supported more strongly. Both this map and the learned covariance matrix can be used as a structured prior for maximum a posteriori estimation of neural activity patterns, which can be further used for fMRI decoding. Our method therefore paves the way towards a more unified and principled analysis of neural representations underlying fMRI signals. We make our tool freely available in Brain Imaging Analysis Kit (BrainIAK).

In neuroscience, the similarity matrix of neural activity patterns in response to different sensory stimuli or under different cognitive states reflects the structure of neural representational space. Existing methods derive point estimations of neural activity patterns from noisy neural imaging data, and the similarity is calculated from these point estimations. We show that this approach translates structured noise from estimated patterns into spurious bias structure in the resulting similarity matrix, which is especially severe when signal-to-noise ratio is low and experimental conditions cannot be fully randomized in a cognitive task. We propose an alternative Bayesian framework for computing representational similarity in which we treat the covariance structure of neural activity patterns as a hyper-parameter in a generative model of the neural data, and directly estimate this covariance structure from imaging data while marginalizing over the unknown activity patterns. Converting the estimated covariance structure into a correlation matrix offers a much less biased estimate of neural representational similarity. Our method can also simultaneously estimate a signal-to-noise map that informs where the learned representational structure is supported more strongly, and the learned covariance matrix can be used as a structured prior to constrain Bayesian estimation of neural activity patterns. Our code is freely available in Brain Imaging Analysis Kit (Brainiak) (https://github.com/IntelPNI/brainiak), a python toolkit for brain imaging analysis.

Model-based analysis of fMRI data is an important tool for investigating the computational role of different brain regions. With this method, theoretical models of behavior can be leveraged to find the brain structures underlying variables from specific algorithms, such as prediction errors in reinforcement learning. One potential weakness with this approach is that models often have free parameters and thus the results of the analysis may depend on how these free parameters are set. In this work we asked whether this hypothetical weakness is a problem in practice. We first developed general closed-form expressions for the relationship between results of fMRI analyses using different regressors, e.g., one corresponding to the true process underlying the measured data and one a model-derived approximation of the true generative regressor. Then, as a specific test case, we examined the sensitivity of model-based fMRI to the learning rate parameter in reinforcement learning, both in theory and in two previously-published datasets. We found that even gross errors in the learning rate lead to only minute changes in the neural results. Our findings thus suggest that precise model fitting is not always necessary for model-based fMRI. They also highlight the difficulty in using fMRI data for arbitrating between different models or model parameters. While these specific results pertain only to the effect of learning rate in simple reinforcement learning models, we provide a template for testing for effects of different parameters in other models.

Psychophysical and neurophysiological studies have suggested that memory is not simply a carbon copy of our experience: Memories are modified or new memories are formed depending on the dynamic structure of our experience, and specifically, on how gradually or abruptly the world changes. We present a statistical theory of memory formation in a dynamic environment, based on a nonparametric generalization of the switching Kalman filter. We show that this theory can qualitatively account for several psychophysical and neural phenomena, and present results of a new visual memory experiment aimed at testing the theory directly. Our experimental findings suggest that humans can use temporal discontinuities in the structure of the environment to determine when to form new memory traces. The statistical perspective we offer provides a coherent account of the conditions under which new experience is integrated into an old memory versus forming a new memory, and shows that memory formation depends on inferences about the underlying structure of our experience.

Human behavior has long been recognized to display hierarchical structure: actions fit together into subtasks, which cohere into extended goal-directed activities. Arranging actions hierarchically has well established benefits, allowing behaviors to be represented efficiently by the brain, and allowing solutions to new tasks to be discovered easily. However, these payoffs depend on the particular way in which actions are organized into a hierarchy, the specific way in which tasks are carved up into subtasks. We provide a mathematical account for what makes some hierarchies better than others, an account that allows an optimal hierarchy to be identified for any set of tasks. We then present results from four behavioral experiments, suggesting that human learners spontaneously discover optimal action hierarchies.

No abstract available.

Working memory is a central topic of cognitive neuroscience because it is critical for solving real world problems in which information from multiple temporally distant sources must be combined to generate appropriate behavior. However, an often neglected fact is that learning to use working memory effectively is itself a difficult problem. The Gating" framework is a collection of psychological models that show how dopamine can train the basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex to form useful working memory representations in certain types of problems. We bring together gating with ideas from machine learning about using finite memory systems in more general problems. Thus we present a normative Gating model that learns, by online temporal difference methods, to use working memory to maximize discounted future rewards in general partially observable settings. The model successfully solves a benchmark working memory problem, and exhibits limitations similar to those observed in human experiments. Moreover, the model introduces a concise, normative definition of high level cognitive concepts such as working memory and cognitive control in terms of maximizing discounted future rewards."

Reinforcement learning models have long promised to unify computa- tional, psychological and neural accounts of appetitively conditioned be- havior. However, the bulk of data on animal conditioning comes from free-operant experiments measuring how fast animals will work for rein- forcement. Existing reinforcement learning (RL) models are silent about these tasks, because they lack any notion of vigor. They thus fail to ad- dress the simple observation that hungrier animals will work harder for food, as well as stranger facts such as their sometimes greater produc- tivity even when working for irrelevant outcomes such as water. Here, we develop an RL framework for free-operant behavior, suggesting that subjects choose how vigorously to perform selected actions by optimally balancing the costs and benefits of quick responding. Motivational states such as hunger shift these factors, skewing the tradeoff. This accounts normatively for the effects of motivation on response rates, as well as many other classic findings. Finally, we suggest that tonic levels of dopamine may be involved in the computation linking motivational state to optimal responding, thereby explaining the complex vigor-related ef- fects of pharmacological manipulation of dopamine.