The lack of transparency for Internet communication prevents effective mitigation of today's security threats: i) Source addresses cannot be trusted and enable untraceable reflection attacks. ii) Malicious communication is opaque to all network entities, except for the receiver; and although ISPs are control points that can stop such attacks, effective detection and mitigation requires information that is available only at the end hosts. We propose TRIS, an architecture that bootstraps transparency for Internet communication. TRIS enables the definition of misbehavior according to the unique requirements of hosts, and then it constructs verifiable evidence of misbehavior. First, hosts express desired traffic properties for incoming traffic; a deviation from these properties signifies misbehavior. Second, ISPs construct verifiable evidence of misbehavior for the traffic they forward. If misbehavior is detected, it can then be proven to the ISPs of the communicating hosts. We implement our architecture on commodity hardware and demonstrate that verifiable proof of misbehavior introduces little overhead with respect to bandwidth and packet processing in the network: our prototype achieves line-rate performance for common packet sizes, saturating a 10 Gbps link with a single CPU core. In addition, we tackle incremental deployment issues and describe interoperability with today's Internet architecture.

Despite a great deal of work to improve the TLS PKI, CA misbehavior continues to occur, resulting in unauthorized certificates that can be used to mount man-in-the-middle attacks against HTTPS sites. CAs lack the incentives to invest in higher security, and the manual effort required to report a rogue certificate deters many from contributing to the security of the TLS PKI. In this paper, we present IKP, a platform that automates responses to unauthorized certificates and provides incentives for CAs to behave correctly and for others to report potentially unauthorized certificates. Domains in IKP specify criteria for their certificates, and CAs specify reactions such as financial penalties that execute in case of unauthorized certificate issuance. By leveraging smart contracts and blockchain-based consensus, we can decentralize IKP while still providing automated incentives. We describe a theoretical model for payment flows and implement IKP in Ethereum to show that decentralizing and automating PKIs with financial incentives is both economically sound and technically viable.

In this article, we address the problem of scaling authentication for naming, routing, and end-entity (EE) certification to a global environment in which authentication policies and users’ sets of trust roots vary widely. The current mechanisms for authenticating names (DNSSEC), routes (BGPSEC), and EE certificates (TLS) do not support a coexistence of authentication policies, affect the entire Internet when compromised, cannot update trust root information efficiently, and do not provide users with the ability to make flexible trust decisions. We propose the Scalable Authentication Infrastructure for Next-generation Trust (SAINT), which partitions the Internet into groups with common, local trust roots and isolates the effects of a compromised trust root. SAINT requires groups with direct routing connections to cross-sign each other for authentication purposes, allowing diverse authentication policies while keeping all entities’ authentication information globally discoverable. SAINT makes trust root management a central part of the network architecture, enabling trust root updates within seconds and allowing users to make flexible trust decisions. SAINT operates without a significant performance penalty and can be deployed alongside existing infrastructures.

We propose a demonstration of SCION, a future Internet Architecture designed for the 21st century. We demonstrate SCION's various rich features (including DDoS defense, native multipath communication, high-speed anonymous routing) and its ease of deployment.

This paper presents FAIR, a forwarding accountability mechanism that incentivizes ISPs to apply stricter security policies to their customers. The Autonomous System (AS) of the receiver specifies a traffic profile that the sender AS must adhere to. Transit ASes on the path mark packets. In case of traffic profile violations, the marked packets are used as a proof of misbehavior. FAIR introduces low bandwidth overhead and requires no per-packet and no per-flow state for forwarding. We describe integration with IP and demonstrate a software switch running on commodity hardware that can switch packets at a line rate of 120 Gbps, and can forward 140M minimum-sized packets per second, limited by the hardware I/O subsystem. Moreover, this paper proposes a "suspicious bit" for packet headers -- an application that builds on top of FAIR's proofs of misbehavior and flags packets to warn other entities in the network.

We study the problem of privacy-preserving proofs on authenticated data, where a party receives data from a trusted source and is requested to prove computations over the data to third parties in a correct and private way, i.e., The third party learns no information on the data but is still assured that the claimed proof is valid. Our work particularly focuses on the challenging requirement that the third party should be able to verify the validity with respect to the specific data authenticated by the source -- even without having access to that source. This problem is motivated by various scenarios emerging from several application areas such as wearable computing, smart metering, or general business-to-business interactions. Furthermore, these applications also demand any meaningful solution to satisfy additional properties related to usability and scalability. In this paper, we formalize the above three-party model, discuss concrete application scenarios, and then we design, build, and evaluate ADSNARK, a nearly practical system for proving arbitrary computations over authenticated data in a privacy-preserving manner. ADSNARK improves significantly over state-of-the-art solutions for this model. For instance, compared to corresponding solutions based on Pinocchio (Oakland'13), ADSNARK achieves up to 25x improvement in proof-computation time and a 20x reduction in prover storage space.

We address the problem in which a client stores a large amount of data with an untrusted server in such a way that, at any moment, the client can ask the server to compute a function on some portion of its outsourced data. In this scenario, the client must be able to efficiently verify the correctness of the result despite no longer knowing the inputs of the delegated computation, it must be able to keep adding elements to its remote storage, and it does not have to fix in advance (i.e., at data outsourcing time) the functions that it will delegate. Even more ambitiously, clients should be able to verify in time independent of the input-size -- a very appealing property for computations over huge amounts of data.

We propose a demonstration of SAFE with some of its newest security features. SAFE is a framework for modern Web application development with automated state consistency, enforced security at various levels, and design for Web personalization and extensibility. With the emerging complexity in (extensible) data-driven Web application development, in particular in terms of consistent data management with multiple clients (many Facebook users), ownership preservation (various Facebook user items with individual intellectual property), and data privacy (sensitive Facebook user data), we believe a demo of a comprehensive data-centric and secure Web application framework with declarative specifications for many modern Web features will be of considerable interest to the security community. In particular, we think it is interesting to see a demonstration of how fast and how intuitive the secure customization of a true multi-tier Web application can be.

This paper presents a novel method for enabling fast development and easy customization of interactive data-intensive web applications. Our approach is based on a high-level hierarchical programming model that results in both a very clean semantics of the application while at the same time creating well-defined interfaces for customization of application components. A prototypical implementation of a conference management system shows the efficacy of our approach.