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Alexandre Rebert

dblp:116/8664 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2014
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-authorSoftware engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
3 papers
Software testing · 57% Program analysis · 43%
Network and information security
2 papers
Systems and software security · 100%

Topics — the 11 heaviest of 11, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery
0.322014
Optimizing Seed Selection for Fuzzing · USENIX Security Symposium 2014
Unleashing Mayhem on Binary Code · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2012
Program analysis
symbolic execution
0.322014
Enhancing symbolic execution with veritesting · ICSE 2014
Unleashing Mayhem on Binary Code · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2012
Systems and software security › vulnerability discovery
fuzzing
0.212014
Optimizing Seed Selection for Fuzzing · USENIX Security Symposium 2014
Software testing
automated testing
0.212014
Enhancing symbolic execution with veritesting · ICSE 2014
Program analysis › symbolic execution
dynamic symbolic execution
0.212014
Enhancing symbolic execution with veritesting · ICSE 2014
Software testing
fuzzing
0.212014
Optimizing Seed Selection for Fuzzing · USENIX Security Symposium 2014
Software testing › fuzzing › seed scheduling
seed selection
0.212014
Optimizing Seed Selection for Fuzzing · USENIX Security Symposium 2014
Software testing
test generation
0.212014
Enhancing symbolic execution with veritesting · ICSE 2014
Systems and software security › exploitation
exploit generation
0.112012
Unleashing Mayhem on Binary Code · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2012
Systems and software security
memory safety
0.112012
Unleashing Mayhem on Binary Code · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2012
Program analysis › static analysis
bug detection
0.112014
Enhancing symbolic execution with veritesting · ICSE 2014

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

optimization · 0.4index-based memory modeling · 0.3hybrid symbolic execution · 0.3concolic execution · 0.3static symbolic execution · 0.2SMT solving · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2014 Enhancing symbolic execution with veritesting
abstract
We present MergePoint, a new binary-only symbolic execution system for large-scale and fully unassisted testing of commodity off-the-shelf (COTS) software. MergePoint introduces veritesting, a new technique that employs static symbolic execution to amplify the effect of dynamic symbolic execution. Veritesting allows MergePoint to find twice as many bugs, explore orders of magnitude more paths, and achieve higher code coverage than previous dynamic symbolic execution systems. MergePoint is currently running daily on a 100 node cluster analyzing 33,248 Linux binaries; has generated more than 15 billion SMT queries, 200 million test cases, 2,347,420 crashes, and found 11,687 bugs in 4,379 distinct applications.
Thanassis Avgerinos, Alexandre Rebert, Sang Kil Cha, David Brumley
ICSE2
2014 Optimizing Seed Selection for Fuzzing
Alexandre Rebert, Sang Kil Cha, Thanassis Avgerinos, Jonathan Foote, David Warren, Gustavo Grieco, David Brumley
USENIX Security Symposium1
2012 Unleashing Mayhem on Binary Code
abstract
In this paper we present Mayhem, a new system for automatically finding exploitable bugs in binary (i.e., executable) programs. Every bug reported by Mayhem is accompanied by a working shell-spawning exploit. The working exploits ensure soundness and that each bug report is security-critical and actionable. Mayhem works on raw binary code without debugging information. To make exploit generation possible at the binary-level, Mayhem addresses two major technical challenges: actively managing execution paths without exhausting memory, and reasoning about symbolic memory indices, where a load or a store address depends on user input. To this end, we propose two novel techniques: 1) hybrid symbolic execution for combining online and offline (concolic) execution to maximize the benefits of both techniques, and 2) index-based memory modeling, a technique that allows Mayhem to efficiently reason about symbolic memory at the binary level. We used Mayhem to find and demonstrate 29 exploitable vulnerabilities in both Linux and Windows programs, 2 of which were previously undocumented.
Sang Kil Cha, Thanassis Avgerinos, Alexandre Rebert, David Brumley
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy3