EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Lisa Wagner
dblp:117/3597
· DBLP profile ↗
8ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-1925-2676ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 3Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 3 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
4 papers |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 79% Algorithms and data structures · 12% Graph algorithms and graph theory · 9% | |
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Multi-agent systems · 100% |
Topics — the 8 heaviest of 9, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Multi-agent systems
coalition formation |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Hedonic Coalition Formation in Networks · AAAI 2015 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
coalition formation |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Hedonic Coalition Formation in Networks · AAAI 2015 |
Algorithms and data structures
dynamic algorithms |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Maintaining Near-Popular Matchings · ICALP (2) 2015 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › cooperative game theory
hedonic coalition formation |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Hedonic Coalition Formation in Networks · AAAI 2015 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
matching |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Maintaining Near-Popular Matchings · ICALP (2) 2015 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › coalition formation
network-constrained coalition formation |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Hedonic Coalition Formation in Networks · AAAI 2015 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › matching › matching under preferences
popular matching |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Maintaining Near-Popular Matchings · ICALP (2) 2015 |
Graph algorithms and graph theory › graph matching › matching algorithms
stable marriage |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Locally Stable Marriage with Strict Preferences · ICALP (2) 2013 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
graph theory · 0.4game theory · 0.4combinatorial algorithms · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Assessing Early Communicative Milestones in Preterm and Full-Term Children Using the Pebbles App
Miriam Teresa Löffler, Tabea Stähli, Lisa Wagner, Moritz M. Daum, Giancarlo Natalucci |
CogSci | 3 |
| 2018 | Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
Martin Hoefer 0001, Daniel Vaz 0001, Lisa Wagner |
Artif. Intell. | 3 |
| 2017 | Locally Stable Marriage with Strict PreferencesabstractWe study stable matching problems with locality of information and control. In our model, each agent is a node in a fixed network and strives to be matched to another agent. An agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it can be matched with. Agents can match arbitrarily, and they learn about possible partners dynamically based on their current neighborhood. We consider convergence of dynamics to locally stable matchings---states that are stable with respect to their imposed information structure in the network. In the two-sided case of stable marriage in which existence is guaranteed, we show that the existence of a path to stability becomes NP-hard to decide. This holds even when the network exists only among one partition of agents. In contrast, if one partition has no network and agents remember a previous match every round, a path to stability is guaranteed and random dynamics converge with probability 1. We characterize this positive result in various ways. For instance, it holds for random memory and for cache memory with the most recent partner, but not for cache memory with the best partner. Also, it is crucial which partition of the agents has memory. Finally, we present results for centralized computation of locally stable matchings, i.e., computing maximum locally stable matchings in the two-sided case and deciding existence in the roommates case. Martin Hoefer 0001, Lisa Wagner |
SIAM J. Discret. Math. | 2 |
| 2015 | Hedonic Coalition Formation in NetworksabstractCoalition formation is a fundamental problem in the organization of many multi-agent systems. In large populations, the formation of coalitions is often restricted by structural visibility and locality constraints under which agents can reorganize. We capture and study this aspect using a novel network-based model for dynamic locality within the popular framework of hedonic coalition formation games. We analyze the effects of network-based visibility and structure on the convergence of coalition formation processes to stable states. Our main result is a tight characterization of the structures based on which dynamic coalition formation can stabilize quickly. Maybe surprisingly, polynomial-time convergence can be achieved if and only if coalition formation is based on complete or star graphs. Martin Hoefer 0001, Daniel Vaz 0001, Lisa Wagner |
AAAI | 3 |
| 2015 | Maintaining Near-Popular Matchings
Sayan Bhattacharya, Martin Hoefer 0001, Chien-Chung Huang 0001, Telikepalli Kavitha, Lisa Wagner |
ICALP (2) | 5 |
| 2014 | Matching Dynamics with Constraints
Martin Hoefer 0001, Lisa Wagner |
WINE | 2 |
| 2013 | Locally Stable Marriage with Strict Preferences
Martin Hoefer 0001, Lisa Wagner |
ICALP (2) | 2 |
| 2013 | Designing Profit Shares in Matching and Coalition Formation Games
Martin Hoefer 0001, Lisa Wagner |
WINE | 2 |