A decisionmaker faces n alternatives, each of which represents a potential reward. After investing costly resources into investigating the alternatives, the decisionmaker selects one (or more generally a feasible subset), and receives the associated reward(s). We model each alternative as a Markov Search Process (MSP), a type of undiscounted Markov Decision Process on a finite acyclic graph, and call this problem Combinatorial Markov Search (CMS). CMS broadly generalizes recent NP-hard problems of interest such as Pandora’s Box with nonobligatory inspection. Despite the seemingly adaptive and interactive nature of the problem, we construct online algorithms for CMS that explore each alternative sequentially, either selecting or discarding it before moving to the next. We first show that any ex-ante prophet inequality can be converted into an (inefficient) online algorithm for CMS with the same approximation guarantee. Then, for any matroid feasibility constraint, we construct a polynomial-time (1/2−є)-approximation algorithm for CMS. Our construction also implies incentive-compatible mechanisms with constant Price of Anarchy for a strategic version of the problem that generalizes auctions with inspection costs.

Beginning with Witkowski et al. (2023), recent work on forecasting competitions has addressed incentive problems with the common winner-take-all mechanism. Frongillo et al. (2021) propose a competition mechanism based on Multiplicative Weights, an online learning algorithm. They show that their mechanism selects an epsilon-optimal forecaster with high probability using only O(log(n)/epsilon^2) events. These works, together with all prior work on this problem thus far, assume that events are independent. We prove the first accuracy and approximate truthfulness guarantees for forecasting competitions with correlated events. To quantify correlation, we introduce a notion of block correlation, which allows each event to be strongly correlated with up to b others and weakly correlated with the rest. We show that under distributions with this correlation, the Multiplicative Weights mechanism retains its epsilon-optimal guarantee using O(b^2 log(n)/epsilon^2) events. Our proof involves a novel concentration bound for correlated random variables which may be of broader interest.

When agents trade in a Duality-based Cost Function prediction market, they collectively implement the learning algorithm Follow-The-Regularized-Leader [Abernethy et al., 2013]. We ask whether other learning algorithms could be used to inspire the design of prediction markets. By decomposing and modifying the Duality-based Cost Function Market Maker's (DCFMM) pricing mechanism, we propose a new prediction market, called the Smooth Quadratic Prediction Market, the incentivizes agents to collectively implement general steepest gradient descent. Relative to the DCFMM, the Smooth Quadratic Prediction Market has a better worst-case monetary loss for AD securities while preserving axiom guarantees such as the existence of instantaneous price, information incorporation, expressiveness, no arbitrage, and a form of incentive compatibility. To motivate the application of the Smooth Quadratic Prediction Market, we independently examine agents' trading behavior under two realistic constraints: bounded budgets and buy-only securities. Finally, we provide an introductory analysis of an approach to facilitate adaptive liquidity using the Smooth Quadratic Prediction Market. Our results suggest future designs where the price update rule is separate from the fee structure, yet guarantees are preserved.

Constant-function market makers (CFMMs), such as Uniswap, are automated exchanges offering trades among a set of assets. We study their technical relationship to another class of automated market makers, cost-function prediction markets. We first introduce axioms for market makers and show that CFMMs with concave potential functions characterize "good" market makers according to these axioms. We then show that every such CFMM on n assets is equivalent to a cost-function prediction market for events with n outcomes. Our construction directly converts a CFMM into a prediction market, and vice versa. Using this equivalence, we give another construction which can produce any 1-homogenous, increasing, and concave CFMM, as are typically used in practice, from a cost function. Conceptually, our results show that desirable market-making axioms are equivalent to desirable information-elicitation axioms, i.e., markets are good at facilitating trade if and only if they are good at revealing beliefs. For example, we show that every CFMM implicitly defines a proper scoring rule for eliciting beliefs; the scoring rule for Uniswap is unusual, but known. From a technical standpoint, our results show how tools for prediction markets and CFMMs can interoperate. We illustrate this interoperability by showing how liquidity strategies from both literatures transfer to the other, yielding new market designs.

In multiclass classification over $n$ outcomes, we typically optimize some surrogate loss $L: \mathbb{R}^d \times\mathcal{Y} \to \mathbb{R}$ assigning real-valued error to predictions in $\mathbb{R}^d$. In this paradigm, outcomes must be embedded into the reals with dimension $d \approx n$ in order to design a consistent surrogate loss. Consistent losses are well-motivated theoretically, yet for large $n$, such as in information retrieval and structured prediction tasks, their optimization may be computationally infeasible. In practice, outcomes are typically embedded into some $\mathbb{R}^d$ for $d \ll n$, with little known about their suitability for multiclass classification. We investigate two approaches for trading off consistency and dimensionality in multiclass classification while using a convex surrogate loss. We first formalize partial consistency when the optimized surrogate has dimension $d \ll n$. We then check if partial consistency holds under a given embedding and low-noise assumption, providing insight into when to use a particular embedding into $\mathbb{R}^d$. Finally, we present a new method to construct (fully) consistent losses with $d \ll n$ out of multiple problem instances. Our practical approach leverages parallelism to sidestep lower bounds on $d$.

We formalize and study the natural approach of designing convex surrogate loss functions via embeddings, for discrete problems such as classification, ranking, or structured prediction. In this approach, one embeds each of the finitely many predictions (e.g. rankings) as a point in $\mathbb{R}^d$, assigns the original loss values to these points, and “convexifies” the loss in some way to obtain a surrogate. We establish a strong connection between this approach and polyhedral (piecewise-linear convex) surrogate losses: every discrete loss is embedded by some polyhedral loss, and every polyhedral loss embeds some discrete loss. Moreover, an embedding gives rise to a consistent link function as well as linear surrogate regret bounds. Our results are constructive, as we illustrate with several examples. In particular, our framework gives succinct proofs of consistency or inconsistency for existing polyhedral surrogates, and for inconsistent surrogates, it further reveals the discrete losses for which these surrogates are consistent. We go on to show additional structure of embeddings, such as the equivalence of embedding and matching Bayes risks, and the equivalence of various notions of non-redudancy. Using these results, we establish that indirect elicitation, a necessary condition for consistency, is also sufficient when working with polyhedral surrogates.

We initiate the study of proper losses for evaluating generative models in the discrete setting. Unlike traditional proper losses, we treat both the generative model and the target distribution as black-boxes, only assuming ability to draw i.i.d. samples. We define a loss to be black-box proper if the generative distribution that minimizes expected loss is equal to the target distribution. Using techniques from statistical estimation theory, we give a general construction and characterization of black-box proper losses: they must take a polynomial form, and the number of draws from the model and target distribution must exceed the degree of the polynomial. The characterization rules out a loss whose expectation is the cross-entropy between the target distribution and the model. By extending the construction to arbitrary sampling schemes such as Poisson sampling, however, we show that one can construct such a loss.

Inspired by Aumann's agreement theorem, Aaronson [2005] studied the amount of communication necessary for two Bayesian experts to approximately agree on the expectation of a random variable. Aaronson showed that, remarkably, the number of bits does not depend on the amount of information available to each expert. However, in general the agreed-upon estimate may be inaccurate: far from the estimate they would settle on if they were to share all of their information. We show that if the experts' signals are substitutes---meaning the experts' information has diminishing marginal returns---then it is the case that if the experts are close to agreement then they are close to the truth. We prove this result for a broad class of agreement and accuracy measures that includes squared distance and KL divergence. Additionally, we show that although these measures capture fundamentally different kinds of agreement, Aaronson's agreement result generalizes to them as well.

This paper considers a principal-agent problem of delegation that features two types of information asymmetry. A principal delegates a task to the agent; the agent can first choose to acquire a costly signal, then takes an action. The signal is relevant to the final outcome and the best course of action. Both of these decisions are hidden from the principal, who only observes a final outcome -- a noisy function of both information and action. We call this problem Contracts with Information Acquisition.

The convex consistency dimension of a supervised learning task is the lowest prediction dimension $d$ such that there exists a convex surrogate $L : \mathbb{R}^d \times \mathcal Y \to \mathbb R$ that is consistent for the given task. We present a new tool based on property elicitation, $d$-flats, for lower-bounding convex consistency dimension. This tool unifies approaches from a variety of domains, including continuous and discrete prediction problems. We use $d$-flats to obtain a new lower bound on the convex consistency dimension of risk measures, resolving an open question due to Frongillo and Kash (NeurIPS 2015). In discrete prediction settings, we show that the $d$-flats approach recovers and even tightens previous lower bounds using feasible subspace dimension.

Surrogate risk minimization is an ubiquitous paradigm in supervised machine learning, wherein a target problem is solved by minimizing a surrogate loss on a dataset. Surrogate regret bounds, also called excess risk bounds, are a common tool to prove generalization rates for surrogate risk minimization. While surrogate regret bounds have been developed for certain classes of loss functions, such as proper losses, general results are relatively sparse. We provide two general results. The first gives a linear surrogate regret bound for any polyhedral (piecewise-linear and convex) surrogate, meaning that surrogate generalization rates translate directly to target rates. The second shows that for sufficiently non-polyhedral surrogates, the regret bound is a square root, meaning fast surrogate generalization rates translate to slow rates for the target. Together, these results suggest polyhedral surrogates are optimal in many cases.

Winner-take-all competitions in forecasting and machine-learning suffer from distorted incentives. [23] identified this problem and proposed ELF, a truthful mechanism to select a winner. We show that, from a pool of n forecasters, ELF requires Θ(nłog n) events or test data points to select a near-optimal forecaster with high probability. We then show that standard online learning algorithms select an ε-optimal forecaster using only O(łog(n) / ε2) events, by way of a strong approximate-truthfulness guarantee. This bound matches the best possible even in the nonstrategic setting. We then apply these mechanisms to obtain the first no-regret guarantee for non-myopic strategic experts.

A common technique in supervised learning with discrete losses, such as 0-1 loss, is to optimize a convex surrogate loss over Rd, calibrated with respect to the original loss. In particular, recent work has investigated embedding the original predictions (e.g. labels) as points in Rd, showing an equivalence to using polyhedral surrogates. In this work, we study the notion of the embedding dimension of a given discrete loss: the minimum dimension d such that an embedding exists. We characterize d-embeddability for all d, with a particularly tight characterization for d=1 (embedding into the real line), and useful necessary conditions for d>1 in the form of a quadratic feasibility program. We illustrate our results with novel lower bounds for abstain loss.

In a classical online decision problem, a decision-maker who is trying to maximize her value inspects a sequence of arriving items to learn their values (drawn from known distributions), and decides when to stop the process by taking the current item. The goal is to prove a "prophet inequality": that she can do approximately as well as a prophet with foreknowledge of all the values. In this work, we investigate this problem when the values are allowed to be correlated. Since non-trivial guarantees are impossible for arbitrary correlations, we consider a natural "linear" correlation structure introduced by Bateni et al. [ESA'15] as a generalization of the common-base value model of Chawla et al. [GEB'15].

Given a data set of $(x,y)$ pairs, a common learning task is to fit a model predicting $y$ (a label or dependent variable) conditioned on $x$. This paper considers the similar but much less-understood problem of modeling “higher-order” statistics of $y$’s distribution conditioned on $x$. Such statistics are often challenging to estimate using traditional empirical risk minimization (ERM) approaches. We develop and theoretically analyze an ERM-like approach with multi-observation loss functions. We propose four algorithms formalizing the concept of ERM for this problem, two of which have statistical guarantees in settings allowing both slow and fast convergence rates, but which are out-performed empirically by the other two. Empirical results illustrate potential practicality of these algorithms in low dimensions and significant improvement over standard approaches in some settings.

We study an online classification problem with partial feedback in which individuals arrive one at a time from a fixed but unknown distribution, and must be classified as positive or negative. Our algorithm only observes the true label of an individual if they are given a positive classification. This setting captures many classification problems for which fairness is a concern: for example, in criminal recidivism prediction, recidivism is only observed if the inmate is released; in lending applications, loan repayment is only observed if the loan is granted. We require that our algorithms satisfy common statistical fairness constraints (such as equalizing false positive or negative rates --- introduced as "equal opportunity" in Hardt et al. (2016)) at every round, with respect to the underlying distribution. We give upper and lower bounds characterizing the cost of this constraint in terms of the regret rate (and show that it is mild), and give an oracle efficient algorithm that achieves the upper bound.

We formalize and study the natural approach of designing convex surrogate loss functions via embeddings for problems such as classification or ranking. In this approach, one embeds each of the finitely many predictions (e.g. classes) as a point in \reals^d, assigns the original loss values to these points, and convexifies the loss in some way to obtain a surrogate. We prove that this approach is equivalent, in a strong sense, to working with polyhedral (piecewise linear convex) losses. Moreover, given any polyhedral loss L, we give a construction of a link function through which L is a consistent surrogate for the loss it embeds. We go on to illustrate the power of this embedding framework with succinct proofs of consistency or inconsistency of various polyhedral surrogates in the literature.

In this work we study loss functions for learning and evaluating probability distributions over large discrete domains. Unlike classification or regression where a wide variety of loss functions are used, in the distribution learning and density estimation literature, very few losses outside the dominant \emph{log loss} are applied. We aim to understand this fact, taking an axiomatic approach to the design of loss functions for distributions. We start by proposing a set of desirable criteria that any good loss function should satisfy. Intuitively, these criteria require that the loss function faithfully evaluates a candidate distribution, both in expectation and when estimated on a few samples. Interestingly, we observe that \emph{no loss function} possesses all of these criteria. However, one can circumvent this issue by introducing a natural restriction on the set of candidate distributions. Specifically, we require that candidates are \emph{calibrated} with respect to the target distribution, i.e., they may contain less information than the target but otherwise do not significantly distort the truth. We show that, after restricting to this set of distributions, the log loss and a large variety of other losses satisfy the desired criteria. These results pave the way for future investigations of distribution learning that look beyond the log loss, choosing a loss function based on application or domain need.

Prediction markets are well-studied in the case where predictions are probabilities or expectations of future random variables. In 2008, Lambert, et al. proposed a generalization, which we call "scoring rule markets" (SRMs), in which traders predict the value of arbitrary statistics of the random variables, provided these statistics can be elicited by a scoring rule. Surprisingly, despite active recent work on prediction markets, there has not yet been any investigation into more general SRMs. To initiate such a study, we ask the following question: in what sense are SRMs "markets"? We classify SRMs according to several axioms that capture potentially desirable qualities of a market, such as the ability to freely exchange goods (contracts) for money. Not all SRMs satisfy our axioms: once a contract is purchased in any market for prediction the median of some variable, there will not necessarily be any way to sell that contract back, even in a very weak sense. Our main result is a characterization showing that slight generalizations of cost-function-based markets are the only markets to satisfy all of our axioms for finite-outcome random variables. Nonetheless, we find that several SRMs satisfy weaker versions of our axioms, including a novel share-based market mechanism for ratios of expected values.

Prior work has investigated variations of prediction markets that preserve participants' (differential) privacy, which formed the basis of useful mechanisms for purchasing data for machine learning objectives. Such markets required potentially unlimited financial subsidy, however, making them impractical. In this work, we design an adaptively-growing prediction market with a bounded financial subsidy, while achieving privacy, incentives to produce accurate predictions, and precision in the sense that market prices are not heavily impacted by the added privacy-preserving noise. We briefly discuss how our mechanism can extend to the data-purchasing setting, and its relationship to traditional learning algorithms.

There are now several large scale deployments of differential privacy used to collect statistical information about users. However, these deployments periodically recollect the data and recompute the statistics using algorithms designed for a single use. As a result, these systems do not provide meaningful privacy guarantees over long time scales. Moreover, existing techniques to mitigate this effect do not apply in the ``local model'' of differential privacy that these systems use. In this paper, we introduce a new technique for local differential privacy that makes it possible to maintain up-to-date statistics over time, with privacy guarantees that degrade only in the number of changes in the underlying distribution rather than the number of collection periods. We use our technique for tracking a changing statistic in the setting where users are partitioned into an unknown collection of groups, and at every time period each user draws a single bit from a common (but changing) group-specific distribution. We also provide an application to frequency and heavy-hitter estimation.

Bandit learning is characterized by the tension between long-term exploration and short-term exploitation. However, as has recently been noted, in settings in which the choices of the learning algorithm correspond to important decisions about individual people (such as criminal recidivism prediction, lending, and sequential drug trials), exploration corresponds to explicitly sacrificing the well-being of one individual for the potential future benefit of others. In such settings, one might like to run a ``greedy'' algorithm, which always makes the optimal decision for the individuals at hand --- but doing this can result in a catastrophic failure to learn. In this paper, we consider the linear contextual bandit problem and revisit the performance of the greedy algorithm. We give a smoothed analysis, showing that even when contexts may be chosen by an adversary, small perturbations of the adversary's choices suffice for the algorithm to achieve ``no regret'', perhaps (depending on the specifics of the setting) with a constant amount of initial training data. This suggests that in slightly perturbed environments, exploration and exploitation need not be in conflict in the linear setting.

We study an online linear classification problem in which the data is generated by strategic agents who manipulate their features in an effort to change the classification outcome. In rounds, the learner deploys a classifier, then an adversarially chosen agent arrives and possibly manipulates her features to optimally respond to the learner's choice of classifier. The learner has no knowledge of the agents' utility functions or "real" features, which may vary widely across agents. Instead, the learner is only able to observe their "revealed preferences", i.e., the manipulated feature vectors they provide. For a broad family of agent cost functions, we give a computationally efficient learning algorithm that is able to obtain diminishing "Stackelberg regret" --- a form of policy regret that guarantees that the learner is realizing loss nearly as small as that of the best classifier in hindsight, even allowing for the fact that agents would have best-responded differently to the optimal classifier.

In various matching market settings, such as hospital-doctor matching markets (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005), the existence of stable outcomes depends on substitutability of preferences. But can these stable matchings be computed efficiently, as in the one-to-one matching case? The algorithm of (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005) requires efficient implementation of a choice function over substitutable preferences. We show that even given efficient access to a value oracle or preference relation satisfying substitutability, exponentially many queries may be required in the worst case to implement a choice function. Indeed, this extends to examples where a stable matching requires exponential time to compute. We characterize the computational complexity of stable matchings by showing that efficient computation of a choice function is equivalent to efficient verification—determining whether or not, for a given set, the most preferred subset is the entire set itself. Clearly, verification is necessary for computation, but we show that it is also sufficient: specifically, given a verifier, we design a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a choice function, implying an efficient algorithm for stable matching. We then show that a verifier can be implemented efficiently for various classes of functions, such as submodular functions, implying efficient stable matching algorithms for a broad range of settings. We also investigate the effect of ties in the preference order, which causes complications both in defining substitutes and in computation. In this case, we tightly connect the computational complexity of the choice function to a measure on the number of ties.

We study loss functions that measure the accuracy of a prediction based on multiple data points simultaneously. To our knowledge, such loss functions have not been studied before in the area of property elicitation or in machine learning more broadly. As compared to traditional loss functions that take only a single data point, these multi-observation loss functions can in some cases drastically reduce the dimensionality of the hypothesis required. In elicitation, this corresponds to requiring many fewer reports; in empirical risk minimization, it corresponds to algorithms on a hypothesis space of much smaller dimension. We explore some examples of the tradeoff between dimensionality and number of observations, give some geometric characterizations and intuition for relating loss functions and the properties that they elicit, and discuss some implications for both elicitation and machine-learning contexts.

Traditional approaches to differential privacy assume a fixed privacy requirement ε for a computation, and attempt to maximize the accuracy of the computation subject to the privacy constraint. As differential privacy is increasingly deployed in practical settings, it may often be that there is instead a fixed accuracy requirement for a given computation and the data analyst would like to maximize the privacy of the computation subject to the accuracy constraint. This raises the question of how to find and run a maximally private empirical risk minimizer subject to a given accuracy requirement. We propose a general “noise reduction” framework that can apply to a variety of private empirical risk minimization (ERM) algorithms, using them to “search” the space of privacy levels to find the empirically strongest one that meets the accuracy constraint, and incurring only logarithmic overhead in the number of privacy levels searched. The privacy analysis of our algorithm leads naturally to a version of differential privacy where the privacy parameters are dependent on the data, which we term ex-post privacy, and which is related to the recently introduced notion of privacy odometers. We also give an ex-post privacy analysis of the classical AboveThreshold privacy tool, modifying it to allow for queries chosen depending on the database. Finally, we apply our approach to two common objective functions, regularized linear and logistic regression, and empirically compare our noise reduction methods to (i) inverting the theoretical utility guarantees of standard private ERM algorithms and (ii) a stronger empirical baseline based on binary search.

We propose definitions of substitutes and complements for pieces of information ("signals") in the context of a decision or optimization problem, with game-theoretic and algorithmic applications. In a game-theoretic context, substitutes capture diminishing marginal value of information to a rational decision maker. There, we address the main open problem in a fundamental strategic-information-revelation setting, prediction markets. We show that substitutes characterize "best-possible" equilibria with immediate information aggregation, while complements characterize "worst-possible", delayed aggregation. Game-theoretic applications also include settings such as crowdsourcing contests and question-and-answer forums. In an algorithmic context, where substitutes capture diminishing marginal improvement of information to an optimization problem, substitutes imply efficient approximation algorithms for a very general class of (adaptive) information acquisition problems. In tandem with these broad applications, we examine the structure and design of informational substitutes and complements. They have equivalent, intuitive definitions from disparate perspectives: submodularity, geometry, and information theory. We also consider the design of scoring rules or optimization problems so as to encourage substitutability or complementarity, with positive and negative results. Taken as a whole, the results give some evidence that, in parallel with substitutable items, informational substitutes play a natural conceptual and formal role in game theory and algorithms.

Investigating potential purchases, such as a start-up company to acquire, is often a substantial investment under uncertainty. Standard market designs, such as simultaneous or ascending price auctions, compound this with additional uncertainty about the eventual price a bidder will have to pay in order to win. As a result they tend to confuse the process of search by leading to both wasteful information acquisition on goods that have already found a good purchaser and discouraging needed investigations of objects, potentially eliminating all gains from trade. Fully efficient procedures that avoid these problems, such as dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves processes, are extremely complex and fragile. By contrast, we show that the Dutch auction preserves all of its properties from a standard setting without information costs because it guarantees, at the time of information acquisition, a price at which the good can be purchased.

In a search task, a group of agents compete to be the first to find the solution. Each agent has different private information to incorporate into its search. This problem is inspired by settings such as scientific research, Bitcoin hash inversion, or hunting for some buried treasure. A social planner such as a funding agency, mining pool, or pirate captain might like to convince the agents to collaborate, share their information, and greatly reduce the cost of searching. However, this cooperation is in tension with the individuals' competitive desire to each be the first to win the search. The planner's proposal should incentivize truthful information sharing, reduce the total cost of searching, and satisfy fairness properties that preserve the spirit of the competition. We design contract-based mechanisms for information sharing without money. The planner solicits the agents' information and assigns search locations to the agents, who may then search only within their assignments. Truthful reporting of information to the mechanism maximizes an agent's chance to win the search. Epsilon-voluntary participation is satisfied for large search spaces. In order to formalize the planner's goals of fairness and reduced search cost, we propose a simplified, simulated game as a benchmark and quantify fairness and search cost relative to this benchmark scenario. The game is also used to implement our mechanisms. Finally, we extend to the case where coalitions of agents may participate in the mechanism, forming larger coalitions recursively.

The classic problems of testing uniformity of and learning a discrete distribution, given access to independent samples from it, are examined under general lp metrics. The intuitions and results often contrast with the classic l1 case. For p > 1, we can learn and test with a number of samples that is independent of the support size of the distribution: For 1 < p < 2, with a lp distance parameter ε, O(ü√1/εq) samples suffice for testing uniformity and O(1/εq) samples suffice for learning, where q=p/(p-1) is the conjugate of p. These bounds are tight precisely when the support size n of the distribution exceeds 1/εq, which seems to act as an upper bound on the "apparent" support size.

We propose a mechanism for purchasing information from a sequence of participants.The participants may simply hold data points they wish to sell, or may have more sophisticated information; either way, they are incentivized to participate as long as they believe their data points are representative or their information will improve the mechanism's future prediction on a test set.The mechanism, which draws on the principles of prediction markets, has a bounded budget and minimizes generalization error for Bregman divergence loss functions.We then show how to modify this mechanism to preserve the privacy of participants' information: At any given time, the current prices and predictions of the mechanism reveal almost no information about any one participant, yet in total over all participants, information is accurately aggregated.

We design mechanisms for online procurement of data held by strategic agents for machine learning tasks. We study a model in which agents cannot fabricate data, but may lie about their cost of furnishing their data. The challenge is to use past data to actively price future data in order to obtain learning guarantees, even when agents' costs can depend arbitrarily on the data itself. We show how to convert a large class of no-regret algorithms into online posted-price and learning mechanisms. Our results parallel classic sample complexity guarantees, but with the key resource constraint being money rather than quantity of data available. With a budget constraint B, we give robust risk (predictive error) bounds on the order of 1/√B. In many cases our guarantees are significantly better due to an active-learning approach that leverages correlations between costs and data. Our algorithms and analysis go through a model of no-regret learning with T arriving pairs (cost, data) and a budget constraint of B, coupled with the "online to batch conversion". Our regret bounds for this model are on the order of T/√B and we give lower bounds on the same order.

The online stochastic matching problem is a variant of online bipartite matching in which edges are labeled with probabilities. A match will “succeed” with the probability along that edge; this models, for instance, the click of a user in search advertisement. The goal is to maximize the expected number of successful matches. This problem was introduced by Mehta and Panigrahi (FOCS 2012), who focused on the case where all probabilities in the graph are equal. They gave a 0.567-competitive algorithm for vanishing probabilities, relative to a natural benchmark, leaving the general case as an open question. This paper examines the general case where the probabilities may be unequal. We take a new algorithmic approach rather than generalizing that of Mehta and Panigrahi: Our algorithm maintains, at each time, the probability that each offline vertex has succeeded thus far, and chooses assignments so as to maximize marginal contributions to these probabilities. When the algorithm does not observe the realizations of the edges, this approach gives a 0.5-competitive algorithm, which achieves the known upper bound for such “non-adaptive” algorithms. We then modify this approach to be “semi-adaptive:” if the chosen target has already succeeded, choose the arrival's “second choice” instead (while still updating the probabilities non-adaptively). With one additional tweak to control the analysis, we show that this algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 0.534 for the unequal, vanishing probabilities setting. A “fully-adaptive” version of this algorithm turns out to be identical to an algorithm proposed, but not analyzed, in Mehta and Panigrahi (2012); we do not manage to analyze it either since it introduces too many dependencies between the stochastic processes. Our semi-adaptive algorithm thus can be seen as allowing analysis of competitive ratio while still capturing the power of adaptivity.

The recent advent of human computation -- employing non-experts to solve problems -- has inspired theoretical work in mechanism design for eliciting information when responses cannot be verified. We study a popular practical method, output agreement, from a theoretical perspective. In output agreement, two agents are given the same inputs and asked to produce some output; they are scored based on how closely their responses agree. Although simple, output agreement raises new conceptual questions. Primary is the fundamental importance of common knowledge: We show that, rather than being truthful, output agreement mechanisms elicit common knowledge from participants. We show that common knowledge is essentially the best that can be hoped for in any mechanism without verification unless there are restrictions on the information structure. This involves generalizing truthfulness to include responding to a query rather than simply reporting a private signal, along with a notion of common-knowledge equilibria. A final important issue raised by output agreement is focal equilibria and player computation of equilibria. We show that, for eliciting the mean of a random variable, a natural player inference process converges to the common-knowledge equilibrium; but this convergence may not occur for other types of queries.

In many mechanisms (especially online mechanisms), a strategic agent can influence the outcome by creating multiple false identities. We consider voting settings where the mechanism designer cannot completely prevent false-name manipulation, but may use false-name-limiting methods such as CAPTCHAs to influence the amount and characteristics of such manipulation. Such a designer would prefer, first, a high probability of obtaining the “correct” outcome, and second, a statistical method for evaluating the correctness of the outcome. In this paper, we focus on settings with two alternatives. We model voters as independently drawing a number of identities from a distribution that may be influenced by the choice of the false-name-limiting method. We give a criterion for the evaluation and comparison of these distributions. Then, given the results of an election in which false-name manipulation may have occurred, we propose and justify a statistical test for evaluating the outcome.