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Thomas DuBuisson

dblp:118/3434 · also Thomas M. DuBuisson · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2016
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 3Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 39% Hardware security and side channels · 30% Privacy and data protection · 30%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Privacy and data protection › information leakage
encrypted database leakage
0.212016
What Else is Revealed by Order-Revealing Encryption? · CCS 2016
Hardware security and side channels
leakage analysis
0.212016
What Else is Revealed by Order-Revealing Encryption? · CCS 2016
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › encryption › property-preserving encryption
order-revealing encryption
0.212016
What Else is Revealed by Order-Revealing Encryption? · CCS 2016
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › one-way functions
one-wayness
0.112016
What Else is Revealed by Order-Revealing Encryption? · CCS 2016

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

leakage analysis · 0.2cryptanalysis · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2016 What Else is Revealed by Order-Revealing Encryption?
abstract
The security of order-revealing encryption (ORE) has been unclear since its invention. Dataset characteristics for which ORE is especially insecure have been identified, such as small message spaces and low-entropy distributions. On the other hand, properties like one-wayness on uniformly-distributed datasets have been proved for ORE constructions.
F. Betül Durak, Thomas DuBuisson, David Cash
CCS2
2014 Application-Scale Secure Multiparty Computation
John Launchbury, David W. Archer, Thomas DuBuisson, Eric Mertens
ESOP3
2012 Template your boilerplate: using template haskell for efficient generic programming
abstract
Generic programming allows the concise expression of algorithms that would otherwise require large amounts of handwritten code. A number of such systems have been developed over the years, but a common drawback of these systems is poor runtime performance relative to handwritten, non-generic code. Generic-programming systems vary significantly in this regard, but few consistently match the performance of handwritten code. This poses a dilemma for developers. Generic-programming systems offer concision but cost performance. Handwritten code offers performance but costs concision.
Michael D. Adams 0001, Thomas DuBuisson
Haskell2
2012 Efficient lookup-table protocol in secure multiparty computation
abstract
Secure multiparty computation (SMC) permits a collection of parties to compute a collaborative result, without any of the parties gaining any knowledge about the inputs provided by other parties. Specifications for SMC are commonly presented as boolean circuits, where optimizations come mostly from reducing the number of multiply-operations (including and-gates) - these are the operations which incur significant cost, either in computation overhead or in communication between the parties. Instead, we take a language-oriented approach, and consequently are able to explore many other kinds of optimizations. We present an efficient and general purpose SMC table-lookup algorithm that can serve as a direct alternative to circuits. Looking up a private (i.e. shared, or encrypted) n-bit argument in a public table requires log(n) parallel-and operations. We use the advanced encryption standard algorithm (AES) as a driving motivation, and by introducing different kinds of parallelization techniques, produce the fastest current SMC implementation of AES, improving the best previously reported results by well over an order of magnitude.
John Launchbury, Iavor S. Diatchki, Thomas DuBuisson, Andy Adams-Moran
ICFP3