Defects in the source code that affect security are one of the main elements used to carry out cyber attacks. Examining source code for vulnerabilities is a difficult and expensive process. As a result, specialized software is needed for this. Due to the development of various artificial intelligence methods, improving existing vulnerability detection methods is possible. In particular, it is possible to reduce the number of false positives and enable the detection of complex vulnerabilities that require understanding the broader context of the code. The article presents the concept of a system for automatic analysis of vulnerabilities in source code, along with the challenges and problems related to its design and use.

The main goal of introducing an identity-based cryptosystem and certificateless cryptosystem was avoiding certificates’ management costs. In turn, the goal of introducing a certificate-based cryptosystem was to solve the certificate revocation problem. In this paper, we propose a new digital Implicit and Explicit Certificates-Based Hess's Signature (IE-CBHS) scheme that combines the features of a standard public key infrastructure (PKI) and certificate-based cryptosystem. Our IE-CBHS scheme is an efficient certificates-based signature. The security analysis proves that the scheme is secure against two game attacks in the random oracle model. The security is closely related to the difficulty of solving the computational Diffie–Hellman and discrete logarithm problems. The IE-CBHS scheme, when compared with other signature schemes, has similar efficiency and is both more flexible and more useful in practice. It is possible to revoke the explicit certificate and use that fact during digital signature verification. Thus, our scheme is useful in applications where typical mechanisms of standard PKI are used. One of many important security features is resistance to denial of signature verification attack. Also, it is impossible for a trusted authority to recreate a partial private key, even with cooperation with the signer.

Increasing numbers of documents are currently being stored in electronic archives. These documents are often digitally signed to ensure non-repudiation. However, the term of validity of digital signatures is usually only 2 years, so the archive must extend their validity to the required storage period. The simplest solution to this problem is to use XAdES-A specification and process each signed document separately. Such an approach requires the creation of a timestamp for each signed document. This time stamping operation is very time consuming; therefore several improved techniques have been proposed, for example, evidence record syntax (ERS). The documents in an archive are often related to one entity. The ERS allows us to prove the existence of a document group in one round. This study presents a solution extending ERS and providing a functionality that enables proof of the existence of a document group over a long period (multiple rounds).