Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Changhua Chen
dblp:12/10216
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
0009-0007-0038-7806ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Digital forensics and information hiding · 44% Systems and software security · 44% Usable security · 13% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Program analysis · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Digital forensics and information hiding
attack investigation |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | The Last Mile of Attack Investigation: Audit Log Analysis Toward Software Vulnerability Location · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024 |
Systems and software security › vulnerability discovery
vulnerability localization |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | The Last Mile of Attack Investigation: Audit Log Analysis Toward Software Vulnerability Location · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024 |
Program analysis
binary analysis |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | The Last Mile of Attack Investigation: Audit Log Analysis Toward Software Vulnerability Location · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024 |
Usable security › security operations
audit log analysis |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | The Last Mile of Attack Investigation: Audit Log Analysis Toward Software Vulnerability Location · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
static-dynamic analysis · 1.5log-program matching · 1.5
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | The Last Mile of Attack Investigation: Audit Log Analysis Toward Software Vulnerability LocationabstractCyberattacks have caused significant damage and losses in various domains. While existing attack investigations against cyberattacks focus on identifying compromised system entities and reconstructing attack stories, there is a lack of information that security analysts can use to locate software vulnerabilities and thus fix them. In this paper, we present AiVl, a novel software vulnerability location method to push the attack investigation further. AiVl relies on logs collected by the default built-in system auditing tool and program binaries within the system. Given a sequence of malicious log entries obtained through traditional attack investigations, AiVl can identify the functions responsible for generating these logs and trace the corresponding function call paths, namely the location of vulnerabilities in the source code. To achieve this, AiVl proposes an accurate, concise, and complete specific-domain program modeling that constructs all system call flows by static-dynamic techniques from the binary, and develops effective matching-based algorithms between the log sequences and program models. To evaluate the effectiveness of AiVl, we conduct experiments on 18 real-world attack scenarios and an APT, covering comprehensive categories of vulnerabilities and program execution classes. The results show that compared to actual vulnerability remediation reports, AiVl achieves a 100% precision and an average recall of 90%. Besides, the runtime overhead is reasonable, averaging at 7%. Changhua Chen, Tingzhen Yan, Chenxuan Shi, Hao Xi, Zhirui Fan, Hai Wan, Xibin Zhao |
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. | 1 |