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Patrick R. Jordan

dblp:12/6104 · DBLP profile ↗
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6ranked-venue papers
4as first author
0since 2021 · last 2012
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Theory of computation · 4 · 2 first-authorArtificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 2 first-authorApplied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 3 · 2 first-authorDatabases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 first-authorGraphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
4 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 85% Approximation and online algorithms · 15%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Multi-agent systems · 100%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › equilibrium computation
nash equilibrium computation
0.112012
Lattice games and the economics of aggregators · WWW 2012
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
ad auction
0.112010
Strategy and mechanism lessons from the first ad auctions trading agent competition · EC 2010
Approximation and online algorithms
approximation algorithms
0.112010
Algorithms for Finding Approximate Formations in Games · AAAI 2010
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design
0.112010
Strategy and mechanism lessons from the first ad auctions trading agent competition · EC 2010
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Multi-agent systems › automated negotiation
trading agent competition
0.112006
Controlling a supply chain agent using value-based decomposition · EC 2006
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › computational game theory
empirical game-theoretic analysis
0.012010
Strategy and mechanism lessons from the first ad auctions trading agent competition · EC 2010
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
equilibrium computation
0.012010
Strategy and mechanism lessons from the first ad auctions trading agent competition · EC 2010

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

subgame perfect nash equilibrium · 0.1satisficing strategy · 0.1value-based decomposition · 0.1approximate optimization · 0.1simulation · 0.1equilibrium computation · 0.1approximation algorithm · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2012 Ad Auctions with Data
Hu Fu 0001, Patrick R. Jordan, Mohammad Mahdian, Uri Nadav, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Sergei Vassilvitskii
SAGT2
2012 Lattice games and the economics of aggregators
abstract
We model the strategic decisions of web sites in content markets, where sites may reduce user search cost by aggregating content. Example aggregations include political news, technology, and other niche-topic websites. We model this market scenario as an extensive form game of complete information, where sites choose a set of content to aggregate and users associate with sites that are nearest to their interests. Thus, our scenario is a location game in which sites choose to aggregate content at a certain point in user-preference space, and our choice of distance metric, Jacquard distance, induces a lattice structure on the game. We provide two variants of this scenario: one where users associate with the first site to enter amongst sites of equal distances, and a second where users choose uniformly between sites at equal distances. We show that subgame perfect Nash equilibria exist for both games. While it appears to be computationally hard to compute equilibria in both games, we show a polynomial-time satisficing strategy called Frontier Descent for the first game. A satisficing strategy is not a best response, but ensures that earlier sites will have positive profits, assuming all subsequent sites also have positive profits. By contrast, we show that the second game has no satisficing solution.
Patrick R. Jordan, Uri Nadav, Kunal Punera, Andrzej Skrzypacz, George Varghese
WWW1
2011 The Multiple Attribution Problem in Pay-Per-Conversion Advertising
Patrick R. Jordan, Mohammad Mahdian, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Erik Vee
SAGT1
2010 Algorithms for Finding Approximate Formations in Games
Patrick R. Jordan, Michael P. Wellman
AAAI1
2010 Strategy and mechanism lessons from the first ad auctions trading agent competition
abstract
The inaugural tournament for the Trading Agent Competition Ad Auctions game was held in July 2009. We describe the results, identifying key strategic behavior of the top agents in the competition. Through post-tournament simulation, we construct an empirical game using the agents and mechanism from the competition, and derive equilibria of this game. We then vary the auction mechanism used in simulation, and construct and solve an empirical game for each respective mechanism. Using the derived equilibria as predictions of play, we analyze revenue implications of these mechanism variations.
Patrick R. Jordan, Michael P. Wellman, Guha Balakrishnan
EC1
2006 Controlling a supply chain agent using value-based decomposition
abstract
We present and evaluate the design of Deep Maize, our entry in the 2005 Trading Agent Competition Supply Chain Management scenario. The central idea is to decompose the problem by estimating the value of key resources in the game. We first create a high-level production schedule that considers cross-cutting constraints and future decisions, but abstracts aways from the details of sales and purchasing. We then make specific sales and purchasing decisions separately, coordinating these decisions with the high-level schedule using resource values derived from the schedule. All of these decisions are made using approximate optimization techniques and make use of explicit predictions about market conditions. Deep Maize was one of the most successful agents in the 2005 tournament, both in overall performance and on specific measures that emphasize coordination.
Christopher Kiekintveld, Patrick R. Jordan, Michael P. Wellman
EC3