We explore the concept of meaning in applied ontologies using possible world semantics. We begin by analyzing the nature of possible worlds in the influential framework proposed by Guarino, Oberle and Staab: interpreting an ontology involves selecting, from the set of logically possible worlds, a subset of worlds that are metaphysically possible according to the ontology – ideally corresponding to the set of worlds that are metaphysically possible according to the ontology’s creator. We argue that this framework is limited to analytic statements and should be extended to encompass synthetic statements. The analytic/synthetic distinction, we suggest, can itself be understood in terms of the necessary/contingent distinction using metaphysically possible worlds. We propose a dual framework for introducing terms in ontology development, integrating both descriptivism and Kripke’s theory of rigid designators. This framework accommodates a posteriori analytic statements, implying that the meaning of a term may be unknown even to its creator. Finally, we distinguish two distinct roles that labels can play in ontology development: either as rigid designators that carry semantic weight, or as mere human-readable tags serving as proxies for underlying descriptions.

Despite its central importance for an ontology of food and food production, the notion of food product remains ambiguous. In this work, we develop two ontological approaches to food products within the framework of the upper ontology Basic Formal Ontology (BFO), aiming to enrich the axiomatization of the class Food product in the existing BFO-compliant ontology FoodOn. The first, a derivation-based approach, characterizes food products as being intentionally “derived from” food materials. The second, a role-based approach, analyzes them as food materials that bear a “product role”. We propose to elaborate these approaches to food products by introducing the relation “derives from part of” for the derivation-based approach and the entity “consumption product role” for the role-based approach. We evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each approach and propose possible strategies for addressing their respective weaknesses.

According to meaning holism, the meanings of all the words in a language are interdependent. If this was true, then the very practice of building largely interconnected set of ontologies would be threatened. We examine here the extent of the severity of meaning holism for ontology engineering, based on a definition of the meaning of a class term in an ontology, with regard to the classical analytic/synthetic distinction. We show that meaning holism is not as pervasive in ontologies as traditionally assumed in philosophy of language when interpreting the meaning of a class term as a collection of statements expressing necessary conditions on this term. Still, meaning holism presents substantial challenges for ontology engineering and requires mitigation strategies. We also investigate the related phenomenon of indeterminacy of reference and show how anchoring formal ontologies in natural language can mitigate this problem, even if not fully control it.

According to meaning holism, the meanings of all of the words in a language are interdependent. If this was true, then the very practice of building largely interconnected set of ontologies would be threatened. We examine here the extent of the severity of meaning holism for ontology engineering, based on several definitions of the meaning of a class term in an ontology, with regard to the classical analytic/synthetic distinction. We show that meaning holism is not as pervasive in ontologies as traditionally assumed in philosophy of language, and that a conception of meaning of a class term as a collection of statements expressing necessary conditions on this term limits meaning holism further. Still, meaning holism presents substantial challenges for ontology engineering and requires mitigation strategies. We also investigate the related phenomenon of indeterminacy of reference and show how anchoring formal ontologies in natural language can mitigate this problem, even if not fully control it.

Realizable entities are properties that can be realized in processes of specific correlated types in which the bearer participates. It will be valuable to create a systematic classification of realizable entities because they are useful for various modeling purposes in ontologies. In this paper we outline a unifying framework for realizable entities (including dispositions and roles) in the upper ontology Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) that is theoretically underpinned by J. McKitrick’s pragmatic approach to dispositions. In particular, we develop a formal ontological account of “extrinsic dispositions” and illustrate its potential applications with clarification of functions and roles in BFO.

This article provides the basis of a formal axiomatic system for a mereology of informational entities based on the idea of information fillers that can occupy information slots, such as the same word that can be used in different sentences. It is inspired by Karen Bennett’s mereological system that enables a whole to have a part “twice over”, but differs from it in several key points, such as the acceptance of empty slots, and the possibility for slots to have slots. Information slots are analyzed as informational entities that can carry aboutness.

Belief, desire, and intention are central notions in mentality and agency. We provide conceptual and formal foundations for an ontology of those mental entities. In this framework, beliefs and desires have a dual face: dispositional and occurrent. As distinct from beliefs and desires, intentions are dispositions to actions that emerge from a decision process in which occurrent beliefs and occurrent desires interact. We also discuss how our theory can be extended to some major philosophical accounts of desires, and cognitive biases such as wishful thinking.

Clear criteria for the identity of dispositions are still lacking, and this has been presented as one of the main challenge raised by such entities. It is of prime importance to identify or distinguish dispositions such as diseases or risks. This article first introduces conventional ways to refer to a disposition (such as “fragility”) and canonical ways (such as “disposition to break in case of a strong shock”). This raises the issue of how should exactly be defined a “disposition d to R when TR”, where R is a realization specification and TR a trigger specification. Two ontological frameworks are distinguished. The first framework, which has been largely used so far in the literature on dispositions, interprets d as a disposition which can only be triggered by instances of TR, and can only be realized by instances of R. The second, new framework introduces the notion of “minimal trigger” and “maximal realization”, and interprets TR as a parent class of a class of processes that have as part a minimal trigger, and R as a parent class of a class of processes that are parts of a maximal realization. We then discuss several criteria of identity, including the criterion according to which two dispositions are identical iff they have the same categorical basis, the same class of minimal triggers and the same class of maximal realizations. We show on several examples that the second framework avoids the disposition multiplicativism that is introduced by the first framework.

This article presents a formalization of velocity in the context of a realist and perspectivalist upper ontology like BFO. It argues that the term “velocity” can refer to two different entities: a motion-velocity, which is a process profile characterizing a motion process; and an object-velocity, which is a disposition inhering in the moving object. Three different kinds of motion-velocity are presented: left-velocity, right-velocity and bilateral velocity. Motion-velocity could exist without object-velocity, as revealed by a thought experiment presented by Tooley; but in our world, Newton's first law of inertia implies that every object has both an inertial disposition and a closely related but different disposition that we call “object-velocity.” Those two dispositions are realized by the right-velocity. The left-velocity is a trigger of the inertial disposition, and brings into existence the object-velocity.

This article presents CVDO, an ontology of cardiovascular diseases structured on OBO foundry's principle and based on BFO and FMA. CVDO reorganizes and completes DOID cardiovascular diseases around OGMS tripartite model of disease, and builds its taxonomy of diseases largely by automatic reasoning. It points to the need of OGMS to be supplemented by methodological rules to determine the end point of a disease course, and to locate the material basis of a disease in a causal chain of disorders.

We present a model of Newtonian forces and the causal relations they are involved in, applying Röhl & Jansen's model of disposition (extended with a relation between dispositions and their existential conditions), and show that this model fits with the intuition that force is the result of an interaction. We formalize forces as dispositions, dissociating field forces (which have local fields as existential conditions) from composite forces (which encompass contact forces). Finally, we hint at how this model could answer some classical philosophical difficulties concerning forces and dispositions.

We investigate how probabilities can be assigned to dispositions in ontologies, building on Popper's propensity approach. We show that if D is a disposition universal associated with a trigger T and a realization R, and d is an instance of D, then one can assign a probability to the triplets (d,T,R) and (D,T,R). These probabilities measure the causal power of dispositions, which can be defined as limits of relative frequencies of possible instances of T triggering an instance of R over a hypothetical infinite random sequence of possible instances of T satisfying certain conditions. Adopting a fallibilist methodology, these probability values can be estimated by relative frequencies in actual finite sequences.