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Zhao Shen

dblp:120/6161 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · unresolved

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%
Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper
Information retrieval · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory › advertising auctions
ad auction design
0.912025
GenAuction: A Generative Auction for Online Advertising · AAAI 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
mechanism design
0.912025
GenAuction: A Generative Auction for Online Advertising · AAAI 2025
Information retrieval › online advertising
ads allocation
0.312025
GenAuction: A Generative Auction for Online Advertising · AAAI 2025
Information retrieval
online advertising
0.312025
GenAuction: A Generative Auction for Online Advertising · AAAI 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

transformer · 1.7generative model · 1.7constrained optimization · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 GenAuction: A Generative Auction for Online Advertising
abstract
Previous ad auctions predominantly relied on rule-based mechanisms, which selected winning advertisements (ads) at the ad-level and subsequently combined them into page views (PVs), leading to suboptimal allocations in multi-round auctions. This limitation stems from the significant computational burden required to design ranking score rules and select winning ad sets, as well as the inability to fully capture contextual information within PVs during ad-level selection. In this paper, we propose a key-performance-indicator (KPI) based auction mechanism that selects winning PVs at the PV-level, modeling the ad allocation as a constrained optimization problem. This approach enables us to address both short-term and long-term KPIs while leveraging the comprehensive contextual information available within PVs. Based on this framework, we design GenAuction, a generative auction mechanism utilizing a Generator-Evaluator architecture powered by Transformer algorithms. The Generator swiftly generates multiple candidate PVs, while the Evaluator selects the optimal PVs based on contextual information, adhering to the objectives and KPIs of multi-round auctions. We conduct extensive experiments using real-world data and online A/B tests to validate that GenAuction efficiently handles multi-objective allocation tasks, demonstrating its efficacy and potential for real-world application.
Yuchao Ma 0002, Ruohan Qian, Bingzhe Wang, Qi Qi 0003, Zhao Shen, Zhi Guo, Shuanglong Li
AAAI7
2022 Prime automata do not exist
Zhao Shen
Theor. Comput. Sci.1