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Changwei Cao

dblp:121/3125 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Network security · 75% Digital forensics and information hiding · 25%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security
anonymity networks
1.012026
A Tor-Based Anonymous Network Covert Channel · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Network security
covert channel
1.012026
A Tor-Based Anonymous Network Covert Channel · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Digital forensics and information hiding
steganography
1.012026
A Tor-Based Anonymous Network Covert Channel · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Network security › anonymity networks
tor
1.012026
A Tor-Based Anonymous Network Covert Channel · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

hidden service directories · 1.0error correction encoding · 1.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 A Tor-Based Anonymous Network Covert Channel
abstract
Network Covert Channels (NCC) enhance covertness by concealing the existence of information transmission. However, traditional NCCs remain vulnerable to traffic analysis. Once NCC is detected, adversaries can breach anonymity by uncovering users' network identities and even communication relationships. While certain indirect NCCs offer limited anonymity to protect the identity of at most one party and the relationship, this level proves insufficient. This paper proposes ANCC, an innovative Anonymous Network Covert Channel that is the first to achieve comprehensive anonymity for the sender, the receiver and the communication relationship. By leveraging the Tor network's Hidden Service Directories (HSDirs) as intermediate nodes, Tor-based ANCC modulates covert information through the publication and retrieval statuses of hidden services distributed on multiple HSDirs. This mechanism allows ANCC traffic to blend seamlessly into legitimate Tor traffic, ensuring both robust covertness and high-level anonymity. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that even against a powerful adversary compromising fifty intermediate nodes, the detection probability remains below 0.25%, with the risk of identity or relationship exposure staying negligible (under 0.0021% and 0.00002% respectively). Additionally, the multiple HSDirs supporting parallel transmission enhance the channel capacity and error correction encoding strengthens the robustness. Extensive evaluation within the real-world Tor network demonstrates a transmission accuracy exceeding 99.6% and a channel capacity of around 3 Kbps, proving its effectiveness for practical applications.
Ming Yang 0001, Zhen Ling 0001, Zixia Liu, Changwei Cao, Shan Wang 0008, Xinwen Fu
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.6