Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Qing Ju

dblp:121/4933 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2012
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Network security · 100%
Computer networks
1 paper
Routing and switching · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security › routing security › interdomain routing security
BGP hijack detection
0.112012
Concurrent prefix hijacks: occurrence and impacts · Internet Measurement Conference 2012
Routing and switching › routing protocol
BGP routing
0.012012
Concurrent prefix hijacks: occurrence and impacts · Internet Measurement Conference 2012

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

BGP routing update correlation · 0.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2012 Concurrent prefix hijacks: occurrence and impacts
abstract
A concurrent prefix hijack happens when an unauthorized network originates IP prefixes of multiple other networks. Its extreme case is leaking the entire routing table, i.e., hijacking all the prefixes in the table. This is a well-known problem and there exists a preventive measure in practice to safeguard against it. However, we investigated and uncovered many concurrent prefix hijacks that didn't involve a full-table leak. We report these events and their impact on Internet routing. y correlating suspicious routing announcements and comparing it with a network's past routing announcements, we develop a method to detect a network's abnormal behavior of offending multiple other networks simultaneously. Applying the detection algorithm to BGP routing updates from 2003 through 2010, we identify five to twenty concurrent prefix hijacks every year, most of which are previously unknown to the research and operation communities at large. They typically hijack prefixes owned by a few tens of networks, last from a few minutes to a few hours, and pollute routes at most vantage points.
Varun Khare, Qing Ju, Beichuan Zhang 0001
Internet Measurement Conference2