Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Qing Ju
dblp:121/4933
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2012
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Network security · 100% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Routing and switching · 100% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Network security › routing security › interdomain routing security
BGP hijack detection |
0.1 | 1 | 2012 | Concurrent prefix hijacks: occurrence and impacts · Internet Measurement Conference 2012 |
Routing and switching › routing protocol
BGP routing |
0.0 | 1 | 2012 | Concurrent prefix hijacks: occurrence and impacts · Internet Measurement Conference 2012 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
BGP routing update correlation · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | Concurrent prefix hijacks: occurrence and impactsabstractA concurrent prefix hijack happens when an unauthorized network originates IP prefixes of multiple other networks. Its extreme case is leaking the entire routing table, i.e., hijacking all the prefixes in the table. This is a well-known problem and there exists a preventive measure in practice to safeguard against it. However, we investigated and uncovered many concurrent prefix hijacks that didn't involve a full-table leak. We report these events and their impact on Internet routing. y correlating suspicious routing announcements and comparing it with a network's past routing announcements, we develop a method to detect a network's abnormal behavior of offending multiple other networks simultaneously. Applying the detection algorithm to BGP routing updates from 2003 through 2010, we identify five to twenty concurrent prefix hijacks every year, most of which are previously unknown to the research and operation communities at large. They typically hijack prefixes owned by a few tens of networks, last from a few minutes to a few hours, and pollute routes at most vantage points. Varun Khare, Qing Ju, Beichuan Zhang 0001 |
Internet Measurement Conference | 2 |