Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Ronald W. Sackman
dblp:122/1684
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2011
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Cyber-physical and IoT security · 77% Network security · 23% | |
| Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper |
Energy systems and smart grids · 100% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Energy systems and smart grids › power system control
smart grid control |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | High-Assurance Smart Grid: A Three-Part Model for Smart Grid Control Systems · Proc. IEEE 2011 |
Cyber-physical and IoT security
smart grid security |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | High-Assurance Smart Grid: A Three-Part Model for Smart Grid Control Systems · Proc. IEEE 2011 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
trust modeling · 0.2risk categorization · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | High-Assurance Smart Grid: A Three-Part Model for Smart Grid Control SystemsabstractAs electrical grids evolve through the introduction of additional “smart” sensors, actuators, and control systems, cybersecurity becomes an ever more significant factor, necessitating the incorporation of Information Assurance principles throughout the electrical system-from central station power generating facilities, through transmission and distribution systems, to building management systems, distributed generation, home area networks, and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. A precursor to determining the appropriate controls for any particular device within this complex system is to determine the trust model (or untrusted condition) within which the device exists. This paper, then, sets out to define a multilevel framework for an architecture to be used throughout the electrical system-a High-Assurance Smart Grid architecture that incorporates three core attributes: 1) categorizes cybersecurity requirements based on a multi-tier determination of a subsystem's potential impact on the overall system; 2) implements a robust defense-in-depth cybersecurity architecture; 3) implements a distributed rather than hierarchical control system architecture based on an assumed compromise (untrusted condition) of system control components and subsystems using autoresponsive (AR) load control wherever possible. Thomas M. Overman, Ronald W. Sackman, Terry Davis, Brad Cohen |
Proc. IEEE | 2 |