Traditionally, the problem of apportioning the seats of a legislative body has been viewed as a oneshot process with no dynamic considerations. While this approach is reasonable for some instances of the problem, dynamic aspects play an important role in many others. In this paper, we initiate the study of apportionment problems in an online setting. Specifically, we introduce an online algorithmic framework to handle proportional apportionment with no information about future events. In this model, time is discrete and there are \(n\) parties that receive a certain share of the votes at each time step. An online algorithm needs to irrevocably assign a prescribed number of seats at each time, ensuring that each party receives its fractional share rounded up or down, and that the cumulative number of seats allocated to each party remains close to its cumulative share up to that time.

We study a variant of the prophet inequality with limited information, where the decision maker has access only to the first k moments of each random variable, rather than their full distributions. In this work, we show that even with full moment knowledge (i.e., k=∞), the best possible competitive ratio is Θ(1/ logn), and that this can already be achieved with only knowledge of the first moment. While the lower bound is simple and is attained by a standard exponential bucketing algorithm, the upper bound requires a subtle construction. This involves using Vandermonde matrices first to construct a parametrized family of distributions for which the first k moments coincide, and for which the expected maximum of n such copies varies widely across different parameter choices. Using Prokhorov’s theorem, we establish the existence of limit distributions, which we show have all their moments equal. Finally, we describe a construction where an adversary can select equally looking instances combining these distributions, making it impossible for the decision maker to obtain a factor better than O(1/ logn) of the expected maximum.

We study resource allocation in two-sided markets from a fundamental perspective and introduce a general modeling and algorithmic framework to effectively incorporate the complex and multidimensional aspects of fairness. Our main technical contribution is to show the existence of a range of near-feasible resource allocations parameterized in different model primitives to give flexibility when balancing the different policymaking requirements, allowing policy designers to fix these values according to the specific application. To construct our near-feasible allocations, we start from a fractional resource allocation and perform an iterative rounding procedure to get an integer allocation. We show a simple yet flexible and strong sufficient condition for the target feasibility deviations to guarantee that the rounding procedure succeeds, exhibiting the underlying trade-offs between market capacities, agents' demand, and fairness. To showcase our framework's modeling and algorithmic capabilities, we consider three prominent market design problems: school allocation, stable matching with couples, and political apportionment. In each of them, we obtain strengthened guarantees on the existence of near-feasible allocations capturing the corresponding fairness notions, such as proportionality, envy-freeness, and stability.

The apportionment problem constitutes a fundamental problem in democratic societies: How to distribute a fixed number of seats among a set of states in proportion to the states’ populations? This—seemingly simple—task has led to a rich literature and has become well known in the context of the US House of Representatives. In this paper, we connect the design of monotone apportionment methods to classic problems from discrete geometry and combinatorial optimization and explore the extent to which randomization can enhance proportionality.

Apportionment is the act of distributing the seats of a legislature among political parties (or states) in proportion to their vote shares (or populations). A famous impossibility by Balinski and Young (2001) shows that no apportionment method can be proportional up to one seat (quota) while also responding monotonically to changes in the votes (population monotonicity). Grimmett (2004) proposed to overcome this impossibility by randomizing the apportionment, which can achieve quota as well as perfect proportionality and monotonicity --- at least in terms of the expected number of seats awarded to each party. Still, the correlations between the seats awarded to different parties may exhibit bizarre non-monotonicities. When parties or voters care about joint events, such as whether a coalition of parties reaches a majority, these non-monotonicities can cause paradoxes, including incentives for strategic voting.

We study the classic single-choice prophet inequality problem through a resource augmentation lens. Our goal is to bound the (1 - ε)-competition complexity of different types of online algorithms. This metric asks for the smallest k such that the expected value of the online algorithm on k copies of the original instance, is at least a (1 - ε)-approximation to the expected offline optimum on a single copy.

We study the competition complexity of dynamic pricing relative to the optimal auction in the fundamental single-item setting. In prophet inequality terminology, we compare the expected reward Am(F) achievable by the optimal online policy on m i.i.d. random variables drawn from F to the expected maximum Mn(F) of n i.i.d. draws from the same distribution. We ask how big does m have to be to ensure that (1+ε) Am(F) ≥ Mn(F) for all F.

Deciding how to allocate the seats of a house of representatives is one of the most fundamental problems in the political organization of societies, and has been widely studied over already two centuries. The idea of proportionality is at the core of most approaches to tackle this problem, and this notion is captured by the divisor methods, such as the Jefferson/D'Hondt method. In a seminal work, Balinski and Demange extended the single-dimensional idea of divisor methods to the setting in which the seat allocation is simultaneously determined by two dimensions, and proposed the so-called biproportional apportionment method. The method, currently used in several electoral systems, is however limited to two dimensions and the question of extending it is considered to be an important problem both theoretically and in practice. In this work we initiate the study of multidimensional proportional apportionment. We first formalize a notion of multidimensional proportionality that naturally extends that of Balinski and Demange. By means of analyzing an appropriate integer linear program we are able to prove that, in contrast to the two-dimensional case, the existence of multidimensional proportional apportionments is not guaranteed and deciding its existence is NP-complete. Interestingly, our main result asserts that it is possible to find approximate multidimensional proportional apportionments that deviate from the marginals by a small amount. The proof arises through the lens of discrepancy theory, mainly inspired by the celebrated Beck-Fiala Theorem. We finally evaluate our approach by using the data from the recent 2021 Chilean Constitutional Convention election.

In the ordinal matroid secretary problem (MSP), candidates do not reveal numerical weights, but the decision maker can still discern if a candidate is better than another. An algorithm [Formula: see text] is probability-competitive if every element from the optimum appears with probability [Formula: see text] in the output. This measure is stronger than the standard utility competitiveness. Our main result is the introduction of a technique based on forbidden sets to design algorithms with strong probability-competitive ratios on many matroid classes. We improve upon the guarantees for almost every matroid class considered in the MSP literature. In particular, we achieve probability-competitive ratios of 4 for graphic matroids and of [Formula: see text] for laminar matroids. Additionally, we modify Kleinberg’s [Formula: see text] utility-competitive algorithm for uniform matroids of rank [Formula: see text] in order to obtain a [Formula: see text] probability-competitive algorithm. We also contribute algorithms for the ordinal MSP on arbitrary matroids.

We consider the problem of estimating the graph size, where one is given only local access to the graph. We formally define a query model in which one starts with a seed node and is allowed to make queries about neighbours of nodes that have already been seen. In the case of undirected graphs, an estimator of Katzir et al. (2014) based on a sample from the stationary distribution π uses O(1/(||π||2) + davg) queries; we prove that this is tight. In addition, we establish this as a lower bound even when the algorithm is allowed to crawl the graph arbitrarily; the results of Katzir et al. give an upper bound that is worse by a multiplicative factor tmix · log (n).

We consider the problem of estimating the graph size, where one is given only local access to the graph. We formally define a query model in which one starts with a seed node and is allowed to make queries about neighbours of nodes that have already been seen. In the case of undirected graphs, an estimator of Katzir et al. (2014) based on a sample from the stationary distribution pi uses O(1/||pi||_2 + d_avg) queries; we prove that this is tight. In addition, we establish this as a lower bound even when the algorithm is allowed to crawl the graph arbitrarily; the results of Katzir et al. give an upper bound that is worse by a multiplicative factor t_mix(1/n^4). The picture becomes significantly different in the case of directed graphs. We show that without strong assumptions on the graph structure, the number of nodes cannot be predicted to within a constant multiplicative factor without using a number of queries that are at least linear in the number of nodes; in particular, rapid mixing and small diameter, properties that most real-world networks exhibit, do not suffice. The question of interest is whether any algorithm can beat breadth-first search. We introduce a new parameter, generalising the well-studied conductance, such that if a suitable bound on it exists and is known to the algorithm, the number of queries required is sublinear in the number of edges; we show that this is tight.