Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Yinhong Zhao
dblp:124/1177
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
0000-0002-4439-8271ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 100% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › consensus protocol
consensus protocol security |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Times, and Consensus Security · CCS 2022 |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › incentive mechanism
transaction fee mechanism |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Times, and Consensus Security · CCS 2022 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
empirical measurement · 0.6causal inference · 0.6
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Times, and Consensus SecurityabstractA transaction fee mechanism (TFM) is an essential component of a blockchain protocol. However, a systematic evaluation of the real-world impact of TFMs is still absent. Using rich data from the Ethereum blockchain, the mempool, and exchanges, we study the effect of EIP-1559, one of the earliest-deployed TFMs that depart from the traditional first-price auction paradigm. We conduct a rigorous and comprehensive empirical study to examine its causal effect on blockchain transaction fee dynamics, transaction waiting times, and consensus security. Our results show that EIP-1559 improves the user experience by mitigating intrablock differences in the gas price paid and reducing users' waiting times. However, EIP-1559 has only a small effect on gas fee levels and consensus security. In addition, we find that when Ether's price is more volatile, the waiting time is significantly higher. We also verify that a larger block size increases the presence of siblings. These findings suggest new directions for improving TFMs. Yulin Liu 0002, Yuxuan Lu 0001, Kartik Nayak, Fan Zhang 0022, Luyao Zhang 0001, Yinhong Zhao |
CCS | 6 |