Elise Klein 0002

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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2023
0009-0002-0099-8627ORCID · verified

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Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 A comprehensive, formal and automated analysis of the EDHOC protocol
Charlie Jacomme, Elise Klein 0002, Steve Kremer, Maïwenn Racouchot
USENIX Security Symposium2
2022 Automatic generation of sources lemmas in Tamarin: Towards automatic proofs of security protocols
abstract
Tamarin is a popular tool dedicated to the formal analysis of security protocols. One major strength of the tool is that it offers an interactive mode, allowing to go beyond what push-button tools can typically handle. Tamarin is for example able to verify complex protocols such as TLS, 5G, or RFID protocols. However, one of its drawback is its lack of automation. For many simple protocols, the user often needs to help Tamarin by writing specific lemmas, called “sources lemmas”, which requires some knowledge of the internal behaviour of the tool. In this paper, we propose a technique to automatically generate sources lemmas in Tamarin. Following the intuition of manually written sources lemmas, our lemmas try to keep track of the origin of a term by looking into emitted messages or facts. We prove formally that our lemmas indeed hold, for arbitrary protocols that make use of cryptographic primitives that can be modelled with a subterm convergent equational theory (modulo associativity and commutativity). We have implemented our approach within Tamarin. Our experiments show that, in most examples of the literature, we are now able to generate suitable sources lemmas automatically, in replacement of the hand-written lemmas. As a direct application, many simple protocols can now be analysed fully automatically, while they previously required user interaction.
Véronique Cortier, Stéphanie Delaune, Jannik Dreier, Elise Klein 0002
J. Comput. Secur.4