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Michael Rushanan

dblp:129/9487 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0004-2822-8071ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-authorHuman-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Cyber-physical and IoT security · 40% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 26% Privacy and data protection · 20%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › provable security › security notions
chosen ciphertext attack
0.212016
Dancing on the Lip of the Volcano: Chosen Ciphertext Attacks on Apple iMessage · USENIX Security Symposium 2016
Cyber-physical and IoT security › wireless sensor network security
body area network security
0.212014
SoK: Security and Privacy in Implantable Medical Devices and Body Area Networks · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2014
Cyber-physical and IoT security › medical device security
implantable medical device security
0.212014
SoK: Security and Privacy in Implantable Medical Devices and Body Area Networks · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2014

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

cryptanalysis · 0.2systematic literature review · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 A Hands-On Platform for Medical Device Security Education
abstract
Modern medical devices integrate hardware and software, thereby expanding the attack surface and creating patient safety risks. Regulators set cybersecurity expectations, and international standards guide implementation. However, outcome-based, method-agnostic policies give manufacturers wide latitude, producing variability, ambiguity, and fragmented, non-reproducible practices in training and education. We address this gap with a reproducible, open-source reference platform that operationalizes security-by-design in alignment with current regulatory expectations and standards. We also report an initial pilot course using the platform as a foundation for consistent medical-device cybersecurity curricula.
Kaixin Du, Dibyajyoti Nath, Ramit Saraswat, Zhicheng Sun 0006, Michael Rushanan, Tushar M. Jois
SIGCSE (2)5
2016 Dancing on the Lip of the Volcano: Chosen Ciphertext Attacks on Apple iMessage
Christina Garman, Matthew Green 0001, Gabriel Kaptchuk, Ian Miers, Michael Rushanan
USENIX Security Symposium5
2014 SoK: Security and Privacy in Implantable Medical Devices and Body Area Networks
abstract
Balancing security, privacy, safety, and utility is a necessity in the health care domain, in which implantable medical devices (IMDs) and body area networks (BANs) have made it possible to continuously and automatically manage and treat a number of health conditions. In this work, we survey publications aimed at improving security and privacy in IMDs and health-related BANs, providing clear definitions and a comprehensive overview of the problem space. We analyze common themes, categorize relevant results, and identify trends and directions for future research. We present a visual illustration of this analysis that shows the progression of IMD/BAN research and highlights emerging threats. We identify three broad research categories aimed at ensuring the security and privacy of the telemetry interface, software, and sensor interface layers and discuss challenges researchers face with respect to ensuring reproducibility of results. We find that while the security of the telemetry interface has received much attention in academia, the threat of software exploitation and the sensor interface layer deserve further attention. In addition, we observe that while the use of physiological values as a source of entropy for cryptographic keys holds some promise, a more rigorous assessment of the security and practicality of these schemes is required.
Michael Rushanan, Aviel D. Rubin, Denis Foo Kune, Colleen Swanson
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy1