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S. J. Padilla

dblp:13/1832 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 1989
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 54% Authentication and access control · 46%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Authentication and access control
access control		 0.011989
A Formal Model for UNIX Setuid · S&P 1989
Authentication and access control › access control models
discretionary access control		 0.011989
A Formal Model for UNIX Setuid · S&P 1989
Systems and software security
operating system security		 0.011989
A Formal Model for UNIX Setuid · S&P 1989
Systems and software security › operating system security
setuid		 0.011989
A Formal Model for UNIX Setuid · S&P 1989
Systems and software security
formal security model		 0.011989
A Formal Model for UNIX Setuid · S&P 1989

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

formal modeling · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1989 A Formal Model for UNIX Setuid
abstract
The Unix setuid (set user identification) mechanism is described in the context of the GEMSOS architecture. Motivation for modeling setuid is given, and modeling and policy requirements for the control of the setuid mechanism are presented. The GEMSOS formal security policy model is compared with the Bell and LaPadula model. The Bell and LaPadula model is shown not to admit the actions of a setuid mechanism. Features of the GEMSOS DAC (discretionary access control) model are described that represent the actions of the Unix setuid mechanism while limiting their negative effect on the DAC policy.>
Timothy E. Levin, S. J. Padilla, Cynthia E. Irvine
 S&P2