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David Vigilant

dblp:13/25 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 4 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 77% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 23%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels
fault attacks
0.112008
RSA with CRT: A New Cost-Effective Solution to Thwart Fault Attacks · CHES 2008
Hardware security and side channels › fault attacks
RSA-CRT fault attacks
0.112008
RSA with CRT: A New Cost-Effective Solution to Thwart Fault Attacks · CHES 2008
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
public-key cryptography
0.012008
RSA with CRT: A New Cost-Effective Solution to Thwart Fault Attacks · CHES 2008
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
RSA
0.012008
RSA with CRT: A New Cost-Effective Solution to Thwart Fault Attacks · CHES 2008

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

fault attack countermeasure · 0.1CRT · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Masked Vector Sampling for HQC
abstract
International audience
Maxime Spyropoulos, David Vigilant, Fabrice Perion, Renaud Pacalet, Laurent Sauvage
SECRYPT2
2010 Fault Attacks and Countermeasures on Vigilant's RSA-CRT Algorithm
abstract
At CHES 2008, Vigilant proposed an efficient way of implementing a CRT-RSA resistant against Fault Analysis. In this paper, we investigate the fault-resistance of this scheme and we show that it is not immune to fault injection. Indeed, we highlight two weaknesses which can lead an attacker to recover the whole private key by using only one faulty signature. We also suggest some modifications with a negligible cost to improve the fault-resistance of Vigilant's scheme. Therefore the scheme including modifications remains suited to embedded device constraints.
Jean-Sébastien Coron, Christophe Giraud 0001, Nicolas Morin, Gilles Piret, David Vigilant
FDTC5
2008 RSA with CRT: A New Cost-Effective Solution to Thwart Fault Attacks
David Vigilant
CHES1
2006 Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation
Guillaume Fumaroli, David Vigilant
FDTC2