EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Leslie J. Dotterer
dblp:13/6810
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 1987
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers |
Operating systems · 100% | |
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Systems and software security · 82% Authentication and access control · 18% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Operating systems › system security › operating system security
secure operating system |
0.0 | 1 | 1987 | Design and Implementation of Secure Xenix · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987 |
Systems and software security › operating system security
security kernel |
0.0 | 1 | 1986 | On the Design and the Implementation of Secure Xenix Workstations · S&P 1986 |
Operating systems › system security
operating system security |
0.0 | 1 | 1986 | On the Design and the Implementation of Secure Xenix Workstations · S&P 1986 |
Systems and software security › operating system security
UNIX security |
0.0 | 1 | 1987 | Design and Implementation of Secure Xenix · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987 |
Authentication and access control
security policy |
0.0 | 1 | 1986 | On the Design and the Implementation of Secure Xenix Workstations · S&P 1986 |
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1987 | Design and Implementation of Secure XenixabstractSecure Xenix™ is an experimental system designed to run on IBM PC/AT workstations. Like Xenix, it is a Unix™ System V implementation on the PC/AT workstation; unlike Xenix, it eliminates the Unix security deficiencies and it enhances security policies. In this paper, we present the design features of Secure Xenix, their integration within Xenix, and some of the lessons learned from this experiment to date. Virgil D. Gligor, C. Sekar Chandersekaran, Robert S. Chapman, Leslie J. Dotterer, Matthew S. Hecht, Wen-Der Jiang, Abhai Johri, Gary L. Luckenbaugh, N. Vasudevan |
IEEE Trans. Software Eng. | 4 |
| 1986 | On the Design and the Implementation of Secure Xenix WorkstationsabstractSecure Xenix * is an experimental system designed to run on IBM PC/AT workstations. Like Xenix, it is a Unix implementation on the PC/AT workstation; unlike Xenix, it eliminates the Unix security deficiencies and it enhances security policies. In this paper, we present the design features of Secure Xenix, their integration within Xenix, and some of the lessons learned from this experiment to date. In addition, we address some of the problems specific to workstations in the security management area. The major design differences between Secure Xenix and other experiments with Unix security enhancements, such as LINUS IV, are also presented. In a companion paper, we present the important problems that arise in the testing of Secure Xenix and their solutions. Virgil D. Gligor, E. L. Burch, C. Sekar Chandersekaran, Robert S. Chapman, Leslie J. Dotterer, Matthew S. Hecht, Wen-Der Jiang, Gary L. Luckenbaugh, N. Vasudevan |
S&P | 5 |