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Sean Heelan

dblp:13/9731 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
3as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 3 · 3 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Systems and software security · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
exploitation
0.722019
Gollum: Modular and Greybox Exploit Generation for Heap Overflows in Interpreters · CCS 2019
Automatic Heap Layout Manipulation for Exploitation · USENIX Security Symposium 2018
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery
0.522019
Gollum: Modular and Greybox Exploit Generation for Heap Overflows in Interpreters · CCS 2019
Automatic Heap Layout Manipulation for Exploitation · USENIX Security Symposium 2018
Systems and software security › exploitation
heap layout manipulation
0.422019
Automatic Heap Layout Manipulation for Exploitation · USENIX Security Symposium 2018
Gollum: Modular and Greybox Exploit Generation for Heap Overflows in Interpreters · CCS 2019
Systems and software security › exploitation
exploit generation
0.412019
Gollum: Modular and Greybox Exploit Generation for Heap Overflows in Interpreters · CCS 2019
Systems and software security
memory safety
0.112019
Gollum: Modular and Greybox Exploit Generation for Heap Overflows in Interpreters · CCS 2019

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

greybox fuzzing · 0.4search · 0.3reinforcement learning · 0.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2019 Gollum: Modular and Greybox Exploit Generation for Heap Overflows in Interpreters
abstract
We present the first approach to automatic exploit generation for heap overflows in interpreters. It is also the first approach to exploit generation in any class of program that integrates a solution for automatic heap layout manipulation. At the core of the approach is a novel method for discovering exploit primitives---inputs to the target program that result in a sensitive operation, such as a function call or a memory write, utilizing attacker-injected data. To produce an exploit primitive from a heap overflow vulnerability, one has to discover a target data structure to corrupt, ensure an instance of that data structure is adjacent to the source of the overflow on the heap, and ensure that the post-overflow corrupted data is used in a manner desired by the attacker. Our system addresses all three tasks in an automatic, greybox, and modular manner. Our implementation is called GOLLUM, and we demonstrate its capabilities by producing exploits from 10 unique vulnerabilities in the PHP and Python interpreters, 5 of which do not have existing public exploits.
Sean Heelan, Tom Melham, Daniel Kroening
CCS1
2018 Automatic Heap Layout Manipulation for Exploitation
Sean Heelan, Tom Melham, Daniel Kroening
USENIX Security Symposium1
2012 Augmenting vulnerability analysis of binary code
abstract
Discovering and understanding security vulnerabilities in complex, binary code can be a difficult and time consuming problem. While there has been notable progress in the development of automatic solutions for vulnerability detection, manual analysis remains a necessary component of any binary auditing task. In this paper we present an approach based on run time data tracking that works to narrow down the attack surface of an application and prioritize code regions for manual analysis. By supporting arbitrary data sources and sinks we can track the spread of direct and indirect attacker influence throughout a program. Alerts are generated once this influence reaches potentially sensitive code and the results are post-processed, prioritized, and integrated into common reverse engineering tools. The data recorded is used to inform the decisions of users, rather than replace them. By avoiding the processing required for semantic analysis and automated reasoning our approach is sufficiently fast to integrate into the normal work flow of manual vulnerability detection.
Sean Heelan, Agustin Gianni
ACSAC1