Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Zeinab Taghavi 0001
dblp:130/3941-1 · also Zeinab Sadat Taghavi
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
1as first author
4since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 1 first-author · 3 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
3 papers |
Trustworthy machine learning · 47% Generative modeling · 40% Language models and text generation · 12% | |
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% | |
| Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper |
Information retrieval · 100% |
Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack › backdoor defense
backdoor detection |
1.6 | 2 | 2025 | DISTIL: Data-Free Inversion of Suspicious Trojan Inputs via Latent Diffusion · ICCV 2025 Scanning Trojaned Models Using Out-of-Distribution Samples · NeurIPS 2024 |
Machine learning › Generative modeling
diffusion model |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | DISTIL: Data-Free Inversion of Suspicious Trojan Inputs via Latent Diffusion · ICCV 2025 |
Information retrieval
retrieval evaluation |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | ImpliRet: Benchmarking the Implicit Fact Retrieval Challenge · EMNLP 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
out-of-distribution detection |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Scanning Trojaned Models Using Out-of-Distribution Samples · NeurIPS 2024 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
retrieval-augmented generation |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | ImpliRet: Benchmarking the Implicit Fact Retrieval Challenge · EMNLP 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › adversarial machine learning
trojan detection |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | DISTIL: Data-Free Inversion of Suspicious Trojan Inputs via Latent Diffusion · ICCV 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
sparse retrieval · 1.7latent diffusion · 1.7dense retrieval · 1.7data-free inversion · 1.7out-of-distribution sampling · 1.5adversarial perturbation · 1.5long-context language models · 0.9long-context language model · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | ImpliRet: Benchmarking the Implicit Fact Retrieval ChallengeabstractRetrieval systems are central to many NLP pipelines, but often rely on surface-level cues such as keyword overlap and lexical semantic similarity.To evaluate retrieval beyond these shallow signals, recent benchmarks introduce reasoning-heavy queries; however, they primarily shift the burden to query-side processing techniques -like prompting or multi-hop retrieval -that can help resolve complexity.In contrast, we present IMPLIRET, a benchmark that shifts the reasoning challenge to documentside processing: The queries are simple, but relevance depends on facts stated implicitly in documents through temporal (e.g., resolving "two days ago"), arithmetic, and world knowledge relationships.We evaluate a range of sparse and dense retrievers, all of which struggle in this setting: the best nDCG@10 is only 14.91%.We also test whether long-context models can overcome this limitation.But even with a short context of only thirty documents, including the positive document, GPT-o4-mini scores only 55.54%, showing that document-side reasoning remains a challenge.Our codes are available at github.com/ZeinabTaghavi/IMPLIRET. Zeinab Taghavi 0001, Ali Modarressi, Yunpu Ma, Hinrich Schütze |
EMNLP | 1 |
| 2025 | DISTIL: Data-Free Inversion of Suspicious Trojan Inputs via Latent Diffusion
Hossein Mirzaei, Zeinab Taghavi 0001, Sepehr Rezaee, Masoud Hadi, Moein Madadi, Mackenzie W. Mathis |
ICCV | 2 |
| 2024 | Killing It With Zero-Shot: Adversarially Robust Novelty DetectionabstractNovelty Detection (ND) plays a crucial role in machine learning by identifying new or unseen data during model inference. This capability is especially important for the safe and reliable operation of automated systems. Despite advances in this field, existing techniques often fail to maintain their performance when subject to adversarial attacks. Our research addresses this gap by marrying the merits of nearest-neighbor algorithms with robust features obtained from models pretrained on ImageNet. We focus on enhancing the robustness and performance of ND algorithms. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms current state-of-the-art methods across various benchmarks, particularly under adversarial conditions. By incorporating robust pretrained features into the k-NN algorithm, we establish a new standard for performance and robustness in the field of robust ND. This work opens up new avenues for research aimed at fortifying machine learning systems against adversarial vulnerabilities. Hossein Mirzaei, Hamid Reza Dehbashi, Zeinab Taghavi 0001, Mohammad Sabokrou, Mohammad H. Rohban |
ICASSP | 4 |
| 2024 | Scanning Trojaned Models Using Out-of-Distribution SamplesabstractScanning for trojan (backdoor) in deep neural networks is crucial due to their significant real-world applications. There has been an increasing focus on developing effective general trojan scanning methods across various trojan attacks. Despite advancements, there remains a shortage of methods that perform effectively without preconceived assumptions about the backdoor attack method. Additionally, we have observed that current methods struggle to identify classifiers trojaned using adversarial training. Motivated by these challenges, our study introduces a novel scanning method named TRODO (TROjan scanning by Detection of adversarial shifts in Out-of-distribution samples). TRODO leverages the concept of "blind spots"—regions where trojaned classifiers erroneously identify out-of-distribution (OOD) samples as in-distribution (ID). We scan for these blind spots by adversarially shifting OOD samples towards in-distribution. The increased likelihood of perturbed OOD samples being classified as ID serves as a signature for trojan detection. TRODO is both trojan and label mapping agnostic, effective even against adversarially trained trojaned classifiers. It is applicable even in scenarios where training data is absent, demonstrating high accuracy and adaptability across various scenarios and datasets, highlighting its potential as a robust trojan scanning strategy. Hossein Mirzaei, Ali Ansari 0001, Bahar Dibaei Nia, Mojtaba Nafez, Moein Madadi, Sepehr Rezaee, Zeinab Taghavi 0001, Arad Maleki, Kian Shamsaie, Mahdi Hajialilue, Jafar Habibi, Mohammad Sabokrou, Mohammad H. Rohban |
NeurIPS | 7 |