Modeling decision-making under uncertainty typically relies on quantitative outcomes. Many decisions, however, are qualitative in nature, posing problems for traditional models. Here, we aimed to model uncertainty attitudes in decisions with qualitative outcomes. Participants made choices between certain outcomes and the chance for more favorable outcomes in quantitative (monetary) and qualitative (medical) modalities. Using computational modeling, we estimated the values participants assigned to qualitative outcomes and compared uncertainty attitudes across domains. Our model provided a good fit for the data, including quantitative estimates for qualitative outcomes. The model outperformed a utility function in quantitative decisions. Additionally, we found an association between ambiguity attitudes across domains. Results were replicated in an independent sample. We demonstrate the ability to extract quantitative measures from qualitative outcomes, leading to better estimation of subjective values. This allows for the characterization of individual behavior traits under a wide range of conditions.

This paper studies the role of information asymmetries in second price, common value auctions. Motivated by information structures that arise commonly in applications such as online advertising, we seek to understand what types of information asymmetries lead to substantial reductions in revenue for the auctioneer. One application of our results concerns online advertising auctions in the presence of "cookies," which allow individual advertisers to recognize advertising opportunities for users who, for example, are customers of their websites. Cookies create substantial information asymmetries both ex ante and at the interim stage, when advertisers form their beliefs. The paper proceeds by first introducing a new refinement of Nash equilibrium, which we call "tremble robust equilibrium" (TRE), which overcomes the problem of multiplicity of equilibria in many domains of interest. Second, we consider a special information structure, where only one bidder has access to superior information, and show that the seller's revenue in the unique TRE is equal to the expected value of the object conditional on the lowest possible signal, no matter how unlikely it is that this signal is realized. Thus, if cookies identify especially good users, revenue may not be affected much, but if cookies can (even occasionally) be used to identify very poor users, the revenue consequences are severe. In the third part of the paper, we study the case where multiple bidders may be informed, providing additional characterizations of the impact of information structure on revenue. Finally, we consider richer market designs that ensure greater revenue for the auctioneer, for example by auctioning the right to participate in the mechanism.