Tasks that involve complex interactions between objects with unknown dynamics make planning before execution difficult. These tasks require agents to iteratively improve their actions after actively exploring causes and effects in the environment. For these type of tasks, we propose Causal-PIK, a method that leverages Bayesian optimization to reason about causal interactions via a Physics-Informed Kernel to help guide efficient search for the best next action. Experimental results on Virtual Tools and PHYRE physical reasoning benchmarks show that Causal-PIK outperforms state-of-the-art results, requiring fewer actions to reach the goal. We also compare Causal-PIK to human studies, including results from a new user study we conducted on the PHYRE benchmark. We find that Causal-PIK remains competitive on tasks that are very challenging, even for human problem-solvers.

This paper examines the transformative potential of Counterfactual World Simulation Models (CWSMs). CWSMs use pieces of multi-modal evidence, such as the CCTV footage or sound recordings of a road accident, to build a high-fidelity 3D reconstruction of the scene. They can also answer causal questions, such as whether the accident happened because the driver was speeding, by simulating what would have happened in relevant counterfactual situations. CWSMs will enhance our capacity to envision alternate realities and investigate the outcomes of counterfactual alterations to how events unfold. This also, however, raises questions about what alternative scenarios we should be considering and what to do with that knowledge. We present a normative and ethical framework that guides and constrains the simulation of counterfactuals. We address the challenge of ensuring fidelity in reconstructions while simultaneously preventing stereotype perpetuation during counterfactual simulations. We anticipate different modes of how users will interact with CWSMs and discuss how their outputs may be presented. Finally, we address the prospective applications of CWSMs in the legal domain, recognizing both their potential to revolutionize legal proceedings as well as the ethical concerns they engender. Anticipating a new type of AI, this paper seeks to illuminate a path forward for responsible and effective use of CWSMs.

When prompting a language model (LM), users often expect the model to adhere to a set of behavioral principles across diverse tasks, such as producing insightful content while avoiding harmful or biased language. Instilling such principles (i.e., a constitution) into a model is resource-intensive, technically challenging, and generally requires human preference labels or examples. We introduce SAMI, an iterative algorithm that finetunes a pretrained language model (without requiring preference labels or demonstrations) to increase the conditional mutual information between constitutions and self-generated responses given queries from a dataset. On single-turn dialogue and summarization, a SAMI-trained mistral-7b outperforms the initial pretrained model, with win rates between 66% and 77%. Strikingly, it also surpasses an instruction-finetuned baseline (mistral-7b-instruct) with win rates between 55% and 57% on single-turn dialogue. SAMI requires a model that writes the principles. To avoid dependence on strong models for writing principles, we align a strong pretrained model (mixtral-8x7b) using constitutions written by a weak instruction-finetuned model (mistral-7b-instruct), achieving a 65% win rate on summarization. Finally, we investigate whether SAMI generalizes to diverse summarization principles (e.g., "summaries should be scientific") and scales to stronger models (llama3-70b), finding that it achieves win rates of up to 68% for learned and 67% for held-out principles compared to the base model. Our results show that a pretrained LM can learn to follow constitutions without using preference labels, demonstrations, or human oversight.

Reconstructing past events requires reasoning across long time horizons. To figure out what happened, humans draw on prior knowledge about the world and human behavior and integrate insights from various sources of evidence including visual, language, and auditory cues. We introduce MARPLE, a benchmark for evaluating long-horizon inference capabilities using multi-modal evidence. Our benchmark features agents interacting with simulated households, supporting vision, language, and auditory stimuli, as well as procedurally generated environments and agent behaviors. Inspired by classic ``whodunit'' stories, we ask AI models and human participants to infer which agent caused a change in the environment based on a step-by-step replay of what actually happened. The goal is to correctly identify the culprit as early as possible. Our findings show that human participants outperform both traditional Monte Carlo simulation methods and an LLM baseline (GPT-4) on this task. Compared to humans, traditional inference models are less robust and performant, while GPT-4 has difficulty comprehending environmental changes. We analyze factors influencing inference performance and ablate different modes of evidence, finding that all modes are valuable for performance. Overall, our experiments demonstrate that the long-horizon, multimodal inference tasks in our benchmark present a challenge to current models. Project website: https://marple-benchmark.github.io/.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into our everyday lives, understanding their ability to comprehend human mental states becomes critical for ensuring effective interactions. However, despite the recent attempts to assess the Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning capabilities of LLMs, the degree to which these models can align with human ToM remains a nuanced topic of exploration. This is primarily due to two distinct challenges: (1) the presence of inconsistent results from previous evaluations, and (2) concerns surrounding the validity of existing evaluation methodologies. To address these challenges, we present a novel framework for procedurally generating evaluations with LLMs by populating causal templates. Using our framework, we create a new social reasoning benchmark (BigToM) for LLMs which consists of 25 controls and 5,000 model-written evaluations. We find that human participants rate the quality of our benchmark higher than previous crowd-sourced evaluations and comparable to expert-written evaluations. Using BigToM, we evaluate the social reasoning capabilities of a variety of LLMs and compare model performances with human performance. Our results suggest that GPT4 has ToM capabilities that mirror human inference patterns, though less reliable, while other LLMs struggle.

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people's causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people's judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

Prior work has identified a resilient phenomenon that threatens the performance of human-AI decision-making teams: overreliance, when people agree with an AI, even when it is incorrect. Surprisingly, overreliance does not reduce when the AI produces explanations for its predictions, compared to only providing predictions. Some have argued that overreliance results from cognitive biases or uncalibrated trust, attributing overreliance to an inevitability of human cognition. By contrast, our paper argues that people strategically choose whether or not to engage with an AI explanation, demonstrating empirically that there are scenarios where AI explanations reduce overreliance. To achieve this, we formalize this strategic choice in a cost-benefit framework, where the costs and benefits of engaging with the task are weighed against the costs and benefits of relying on the AI. We manipulate the costs and benefits in a maze task, where participants collaborate with a simulated AI to find the exit of a maze. Through 5 studies (N = 731), we find that costs such as task difficulty (Study 1), explanation difficulty (Study 2, 3), and benefits such as monetary compensation (Study 4) affect overreliance. Finally, Study 5 adapts the Cognitive Effort Discounting paradigm to quantify the utility of different explanations, providing further support for our framework. Our results suggest that some of the null effects found in literature could be due in part to the explanation not sufficiently reducing the costs of verifying the AI's prediction.

In decision support applications of AI, the AI algorithm's output is framed as a suggestion to a human user. The user may ignore this advice or take it into consideration to modify their decision. With the increasing prevalence of such human-AI interactions, it is important to understand how users react to AI advice. In this paper, we recruited over 1100 crowdworkers to characterize how humans use AI suggestions relative to equivalent suggestions from a group of peer humans across several experimental settings. We find that participants' beliefs about how human versus AI performance on a given task affects whether they heed the advice. When participants do heed the advice, they use it similarly for human and AI suggestions. Based on these results, we propose a two-stage, "activation-integration" model for human behavior and use it to characterize the factors that affect human-AI interactions.

In many practical applications of AI, an AI model is used as a decision aid for human users. The AI provides advice that a human (sometimes) incorporates into their decision-making process. The AI advice is often presented with some measure of "confidence" that the human can use to calibrate how much they depend on or trust the advice. In this paper, we present an initial exploration that suggests showing AI models as more confident than they actually are, even when the original AI is well-calibrated, can improve human-AI performance (measured as the accuracy and confidence of the human's final prediction after seeing the AI advice). We first train a model to predict human incorporation of AI advice using data from thousands of human-AI interactions. This enables us to explicitly estimate how to transform the AI's prediction confidence, making the AI uncalibrated, in order to improve the final human prediction. We empirically validate our results across four different tasks---dealing with images, text and tabular data---involving hundreds of human participants. We further support our findings with simulation analysis. Our findings suggest the importance of jointly optimizing the human-AI system as opposed to the standard paradigm of optimizing the AI model alone.