Hardware assurance is a key process in ensuring the integrity, security and functionality of a hardware device. Its heavy reliance on images, especially on Scanning Electron Microscopy images, makes it an excellent candidate for the vision community. The goal of this paper is to provide a pathway for inter-community collaboration by introducing the existing challenges for hardware assurance on integrated circuits in the context of computer vision and support further development using a large-scale dataset with 800,000 images. A detailed benchmark of existing vision approaches in hardware assurance on the dataset is also included for quantitative insights into the problem.

Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications in integrated circuits (ICs) with an intent to breach security and compromise the reliability of an electronic system. This article proposes a framework using self-testing, advanced imaging, and image processing with machine learning to detect hardware Trojans inserted by untrusted foundries. It includes on-chip test structures with negligible power, delay, and silicon area overheads. The core step of the framework is on-chip golden circuit design, which can provide authentic samples for image-based Trojan detection through self-testing. This core step enables a golden-chip-free Trojan detection that does not rely on an existing image data set from Trojan-free chip or image synthesizing. We have conducted an in-depth analysis of detection steps and discussed possible attacks with countermeasures to strengthen this framework. The performance evaluation on a 28-nm FPGA and a 90-nm IC validates its high accuracy and reliability for practical applications.

In the context of hardware trust and assurance, reverse engineering has been often considered as an illegal action. Generally speaking, reverse engineering aims to retrieve information from a product, i.e., integrated circuits (ICs) and printed circuit boards (PCBs) in hardware security-related scenarios, in the hope of understanding the functionality of the device and determining its constituent components. Hence, it can raise serious issues concerning Intellectual Property (IP) infringement, the (in)effectiveness of security-related measures, and even new opportunities for injecting hardware Trojans. Ironically, reverse engineering can enable IP owners to verify and validate the design. Nevertheless, this cannot be achieved without overcoming numerous obstacles that limit successful outcomes of the reverse engineering process. This article surveys these challenges from two complementary perspectives: image processing and machine learning. These two fields of study form a firm basis for the enhancement of efficiency and accuracy of reverse engineering processes for both PCBs and ICs. In summary, therefore, this article presents a roadmap indicating clearly the actions to be taken to fulfill hardware trust and assurance objectives.

The future of smart environments is likely to involve both passive and active interactions on the part of users. Depending on what sensors are available in the space, users may make use of multimodal interaction modalities such as hand gestures or voice commands. There is a shortage of robust yet controlled multimodal interaction datasets for smart environment applications. One application domain of interest based on current state-of-the-art is authentication for sensitive or private tasks, such as banking and email. We present a novel, large multimodal dataset for authentication interactions in both gesture and voice, collected from 106 volunteers who each performed 10 examples of each of a set of hand gesture and spoken voice commands chosen from prior literature (10,600 gesture samples and 13,780 voice samples). We present the data collection method, raw data and common features extracted, and a case study illustrating how this dataset could be useful to researchers. Our goal is to provide a benchmark dataset for testing future multimodal authentication solutions, enabling comparison across approaches.

Over the past two decades, globalized outsourcing in the semiconductor supply chain has lowered manufacturing costs and shortened the time-to-market for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). However, such outsourcing has rendered the printed circuit boards (PCBs) vulnerable to malicious activities and alterations on a global scale. In this article, we take an in-depth look into one such attack, called the “Big Hack,” that was recently reported by Bloomberg Buisnessweek. The article provides background on the Big Hack from three perspectives: an attacker, a security investigator, and the societal impacts. This study provides details on vulnerabilities in the modern PCB supply chain, the possible attacks, and the existing and emerging countermeasures. The necessity for novel visual inspection techniques for PCB assurance is emphasized throughout the article. Further, a review of various imaging modalities, image analysis algorithms, and open research challenges are provided for automated visual inspection.