Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Matthew Reardon
dblp:134/4053
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2013
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper |
Data mining · 87% Data models and query languages · 13% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Data mining
anomaly detection |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Detecting insider threats in a real corporate database of computer usage activity · KDD 2013 |
Data mining › anomaly detection
graph anomaly detection |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Detecting insider threats in a real corporate database of computer usage activity · KDD 2013 |
Data models and query languages › query language
visual query language |
0.0 | 1 | 2013 | Detecting insider threats in a real corporate database of computer usage activity · KDD 2013 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
temporal sequence analysis · 0.2statistical anomaly detection · 0.2dynamic graph processing · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | Detecting insider threats in a real corporate database of computer usage activityabstractThis paper reports on methods and results of an applied research project by a team consisting of SAIC and four universities to develop, integrate, and evaluate new approaches to detect the weak signals characteristic of insider threats on organizations' information systems. Our system combines structural and semantic information from a real corporate database of monitored activity on their users' computers to detect independently developed red team inserts of malicious insider activities. We have developed and applied multiple algorithms for anomaly detection based on suspected scenarios of malicious insider behavior, indicators of unusual activities, high-dimensional statistical patterns, temporal sequences, and normal graph evolution. Algorithms and representations for dynamic graph processing provide the ability to scale as needed for enterprise-level deployments on real-time data streams. We have also developed a visual language for specifying combinations of features, baselines, peer groups, time periods, and algorithms to detect anomalies suggestive of instances of insider threat behavior. We defined over 100 data features in seven categories based on approximately 5.5 million actions per day from approximately 5,500 users. We have achieved area under the ROC curve values of up to 0.979 and lift values of 65 on the top 50 user-days identified on two months of real data. Ted E. Senator, Henry G. Goldberg, Alex Memory, William T. Young, Bradley Rees, Robert Pierce, Daniel Huang 0003, Matthew Reardon, David A. Bader, Edmond Chow, Irfan A. Essa, Joshua Jones, Vinay Bettadapura, Polo Chau, Oded Green, Oguz Kaya, Anita Zakrzewska, Erica Briscoe, Rudolph Louis Mappus IV, Robert McColl, Lora Weiss, Thomas G. Dietterich, Alan Fern, Weng-Keen Wong, Shubhomoy Das, Andrew Emmott, Jed Irvine, Jay-Yoon Lee, Danai Koutra, Christos Faloutsos, Daniel D. Corkill, Lisa Friedland, Amanda Gentzel, David D. Jensen |
KDD | 8 |