Learning how the world works is central to building AI agents that can adapt to complex environments. Traditional world models based on deep-learning demand vast amounts of training data, and do not flexibly update their knowledge from sparse observations. Recent advances in program synthesis using Large Language Models (LLMs) give an alternate approach which learns world models represented as source code, supporting strong generalization from little data. To date, application of program-structured world models remains limited to natural language and grid-world domains. We introduce a novel program synthesis method for effectively modeling complex, non-gridworld domains by representing a world model as an exponentially-weighted product of programmatic experts (PoE-World) synthesized by LLMs. We show that this approach can learn complex, stochastic world models from just a few observations. We evaluate the learned world models by embedding them in a model-based planning agent, demonstrating efficient performance and generalization to unseen levels on Atari's Pong and Montezuma's Revenge.

How people plan is an active area of research in cognitive science, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence. However, tasks traditionally used to study planning in the laboratory tend to be constrained to artificial environments, such as Chess and bandit problems. To date there is still no agreed-on model of how people plan in realistic contexts, such as navigation and search, where values intuitively derive from interactions between perception and cognition. To address this gap and move towards a more naturalistic study of planning, we present a novel spatial Maze Search Task (MST) where the costs and rewards are physically situated as distances and locations. We used this task in two behavioral experiments to evaluate and contrast multiple distinct computational models of planning, including optimal expected utility planning, several one-step heuristics inspired by studies of information search, and a family of planners that deviate from optimal planning, in which action values are estimated by the interactions between perception and cognition. We found that people's deviations from optimal expected utility are best explained by planners with a limited horizon, however our results do not exclude the possibility that in human planning action values may be also affected by cognitive mechanisms of numerosity and probability perception. This result makes a novel theoretical contribution in showing that limited planning horizon generalizes to spatial planning, and demonstrates the value of our multi-model approach for understanding cognition.

The Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC) is a set of procedural tasks that tests an agent's ability to flexibly solve novel problems. While most ARC tasks are easy for humans, they are challenging for state-of-the-art AI. What makes building intelligent systems that can generalize to novel situations such as ARC difficult? We posit that the answer might be found by studying the difference of $\textit{language}$: While humans readily generate and interpret instructions in a general language, computer systems are shackled to a narrow domain-specific language that they can precisely execute. We present LARC, the $\textit{Language-complete ARC}$: a collection of natural language descriptions by a group of human participants who instruct each other on how to solve ARC tasks using language alone, which contains successful instructions for 88\% of the ARC tasks. We analyze the collected instructions as `natural programs', finding that while they resemble computer programs, they are distinct in two ways: First, they contain a wide range of primitives; Second, they frequently leverage communicative strategies beyond directly executable codes. We demonstrate that these two distinctions prevent current program synthesis techniques from leveraging LARC to its full potential, and give concrete suggestions on how to build the next-generation program synthesizers.

Program synthesis techniques construct or infer programs from user-provided specifications, such as input-output examples. Yet most specifications, especially those given by end-users, leave the synthesis problem radically ill-posed, because many programs may simultaneously satisfy the specification. Prior work resolves this ambiguity by using various inductive biases, such as a preference for simpler programs. This work introduces a new inductive bias derived by modeling the program synthesis task as rational communication, drawing insights from recursive reasoning models of pragmatics. Given a specification, we score a candidate program both on its consistency with the specification, and also whether a rational speaker would chose this particular specification to communicate that program. We develop efficient algorithms for such an approach when learning from input-output examples, and build a pragmatic program synthesizer over a simple grid-like layout domain. A user study finds that end-user participants communicate more effectively with the pragmatic program synthesizer over a non-pragmatic one.

Humans flexibly solve new problems that differ from those previously practiced. This ability to flexibly generalize is supported by learned concepts that represent useful structure common across different problems. Here we develop a naturalistic drawing task to study how humans rapidly acquire structured prior knowledge. The task requires drawing visual figures that share underlying structure, based on a set of composable geometric rules and simple objects. We show that people spontaneously learn abstract drawing procedures that support generalization, and propose a model of how learners can discover these reusable drawing procedures. Trained in the same setting as humans, and constrained to produce efficient motor actions, this model discovers new drawing program subroutines that generalize to test figures and resemble learned features of human behavior. These results suggest that two principles guiding motor program induction in the model - abstraction (programs can reflect high-level structure that ignores figure-specific details) and compositionality (new programs are discovered by recombining previously learned programs) - are key for explaining how humans learn structured internal representations that guide flexible reasoning and learning.

Almost every university has an upper year course in which students read, discuss and write about the implications for society of advances in computer science. This paper describes our experience updating Waterloo University's version over three offerings of a course that is two decades old. We discovered that students prefer to read material that is current, that overt marking achieves universal participation in discussion and that assignments stressing precise control of short prose improve writing. Most interestingly, we observed students working together to create new ways of learning. These innovations are the result of paying close attention to the strengths, tastes and interests of the students.

Water is fluid and changeable, its colour and shape are determined by its environment. For example, deep and shallow water require very different physical simulations [Darles et al. 2011]. Yet humans effortlessly discriminate between water and non-water: there must be simple and unique perceptual features making discrimination possible. We are conducting an empirical study of water recognition and here report the preliminary results.