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Dongjing He

dblp:136/8426 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2014
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Web and mobile security · 50% Privacy and data protection · 50%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Operating systems · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Web and mobile security
mobile application security
0.212013
Identity, location, disease and more: inferring your secrets from android public resources · CCS 2013
Privacy and data protection › information leakage
side-channel privacy leakage
0.212013
Identity, location, disease and more: inferring your secrets from android public resources · CCS 2013
Operating systems › mobile systems › mobile operating systems
android
0.212013
Identity, location, disease and more: inferring your secrets from android public resources · CCS 2013

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

zero-permission inference · 0.3side-channel monitoring · 0.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2014 Security Concerns in Android mHealth Apps
Dongjing He, Muhammad Naveed 0001, Carl A. Gunter, Klara Nahrstedt
AMIA1
2013 Identity, location, disease and more: inferring your secrets from android public resources
abstract
The design of Android is based on a set of unprotected shared resources, including those inherited from Linux (e.g., Linux public directories). However, the dramatic development in Android applications (app for short) makes available a large amount of public background information (e.g., social networks, public online services), which can potentially turn such originally harmless resource sharing into serious privacy breaches. In this paper, we report our work on this important yet understudied problem. We discovered three unexpected channels of information leaks on Android: per-app data-usage statistics, ARP information, and speaker status (on or off). By monitoring these channels, an app without any permission may acquire sensitive information such as smartphone user's identity, the disease condition she is interested in, her geo-locations and her driving route, from top-of-the-line Android apps. Furthermore, we show that using existing and new techniques, this zero-permission app can both determine when its target (a particular application) is running and send out collected data stealthily to a remote adversary. These findings call into question the soundness of the design assumptions on shared resources, and demand effective solutions. To this end, we present a mitigation mechanism for achieving a delicate balance between utility and privacy of such resources.
Xiao-yong Zhou, Soteris Demetriou, Dongjing He, Muhammad Naveed 0001, Xiaorui Pan, XiaoFeng Wang 0001, Carl A. Gunter, Klara Nahrstedt
CCS3